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ABSTRACT
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The U.S. position in the debate on space security has been that (1) space-based
systems could be developed and used to obtain decisive warfighting superiority over
an adversary, and (2) these space-based systems, because they might give such an
inordinate advantage over any adversary, will be attacked. The Russians and Chi-
nese, in contrast, claim to be threatened by U.S. aspirations in space but deny that
they pose a serious threat to U.S. space-based systems. They view the development
of advanced military space systems by the United States as evidence of a growing
gap of military capabilities limited only by technological–not political–constraints.
They argue that U.S. missile defense systems operating in coordination with ad-
vanced satellite sensors would weaken their nuclear retaliatory potential.
This dissertation argues that the positions held by both of these parties are
more extreme than warranted. An analytical evaluation quickly narrows the touted
capabilities and assumed vulnerabilities of space systems to a much smaller set of
concerns that can be addressed by collaboration. Chapter 2: Operationally Respon-
sive Space (ORS): Is 24/7 Warfighter Support Feasible? demonstrates the infea-
sibility of dramatically increasing U.S. warfighting superiority by using satellites.
Chapter 3: What Can be Achieved by Attacking Satellites? makes the case that
although U.S. armed forces rely extensively on its satellite infrastructure, that does
not immediately make them desirable targets. The functions performed by military
satellites are diffused among large constellations with redundancies. Also, some of
the functions performed by these satellites can be substituted for by other terres-
trial and aerial systems. Chapter 4: The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Missiles
demonstrates that anti-satellite (ASAT) intercepts are very complex under realis-
tic conditions and that a potential adversary with space capabilities comparable to
China’s has very limited capability to use ASATs in a real-world battle scenario.
Finally, in order to evaluate the chief concern raised by the Russians and Chinese,
chapter 5: Satellites, Missile Defense and Space Security simulates a boost-phase
missile defense system cued by the advanced Space Tracking and Surveillance (STSS)
sensors. It demonstrates that even under best case assumptions, the STSS sensors
are not good enough for the boost-phase missile defense system to successfully in-
tercept and destroy an ICBM.
Together, these chapters aim to narrow the contentions in the debate on space
security thereby fostering the international colloboration and data sharing needed
to ensure safe operations in space.
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Chapter 1
Debating Space Security: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
The recent debate on space security was primarily sparked by two assertions
that emanated from the U.S. policy apparatus: (1) satellites and other space-based
systems could be developed and used to obtain decisive warfighting superiority over
an adversary, and (2) these space-based systems, because they might give such an
inordinate advantage over any adversary, will be attacked.
The Joint Vision 2010 issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996 was
the first policy document to outline a number of ambitious mission areas1 where
space-based systems could be utilized to significantly alter the status quo and give
the U.S. armed forces a decisive advantage over an adversary. In 2001, the Rumsfeld
Commission2 extended the debate by claiming that U.S. military satellites, because
they might provide an array of capabilities, would be considered an attractive target
by adversaries. The Rumsfeld Commission in its report stated, “If the U.S. is to
avoid a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on
U.S. space systems. The U.S. is more dependent on space than any other nation.
Yet the threat to the U.S. and its allies in and from space does not command the
1. These mission areas were reiterated by the Joint Vision 2020 document issued by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in 2010. The ambitious mission areas identified by these documents include[39, 40]: (i)
Long-Range Precision Strike; (ii) Dominant Battlespace Awareness; (iii) Information Superiority;
(iv) Dominant Maneuver; and (v) Full Dimensional Protection.
2. Formally, it was called Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization and was headed by Donald Rumsfeld.
1
attention it merits.”
The other key players influencing the debate, Russia and China, argue oth-
erwise. They claim to be threatened by U.S. aspirations in space and deny that
they pose any threat to U.S. space-based systems. They view the development of
advanced military space systems by the U.S as evidence of a growing gap of military
capabilities. Many Russian experts believe that U.S. activities in the military use
of space are currently limited only by technological—not political—constraints3. It
is assumed that the number of U.S. military space-based systems will grow with
improvements in their technical characteristics and with their increased ability to
operate as part of an extensive and well coordinated network[229]. A capability of
this kind would introduce new uses of military force, and it is not yet understood
how these would affect Russia’s reliance on the strategic nuclear force that exist
today. The resulting uncertainty is one of the reasons the Russian military is wary
of the continued militarization of space, as it is unclear if Russia would be able to
deal with the new situation.
Russian military officials are worried that Washington could eventually ob-
tain the capability to launch a surprise missile attack in which space-based systems
3. From their perspective, the U.S. decision to expand capabilities into outer space represents the
collapse of the Cold War political bargains[146]. In the years of the Cold War, satellites were given
protected status due to their role as “national technical means” to verify arms control treaties
and as early-warning systems of nuclear strikes. The 1971 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty represented the first of several agreements to designate
satellites as “national technical means” for treaty verification. Other agreements including, the
1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War committed the
superpowers to consult immediately in the event of interference with communications or early-
warning satellites and the 1971 Hot Line Modernization Agreement which specified the use of
Soviet Molniya and American Intelsat satellites for crisis communication and committed both
sides to ensure their continuous and reliable operation[144].
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would be used both for striking Russian targets and blinding its command, control,
communications, and reconnaissance networks. It is assumed that missile defense
systems would operate in coordination with advanced satellite sensors to further
weaken Russia’s retaliatory potential. Russians do not discount the possibility of a
disarming “bolt-from-the-blue” U.S. strike from space as Washington seeks undis-
puted, unilateral military advantages[154].
The Chinese have similar concerns about U.S. missile defense and space plans.
Though not a party to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, China has viewed
it as a cornerstone of strategic stability and an important legal instrument for pre-
venting the deployment of weapons in space. Even a limited missile defense system
using advanced satellite sensors could in principle neutralize China’s limited number
of single-warhead ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. A space enabled boost-phase
missile defense system would be particularly threatening. Many Chinese fear that
whether or not U.S. missile defenses are as effective as planned, decision makers
could become incautious in their actions, willing to risk a disarming first strike
because they believe they have the capability to intercept any surviving Chinese
missiles[154].
This thesis is an attempt to analytically evaluate these various claims of ca-
pabilities and vulnerabilities made by the U.S., Russia, and China. This thesis
will demonstrate that most of these concerns are overblown. Chapter 2: Opera-
tionally Responsive Space (ORS): Is 24/7 Warfighter Support Feasible? posits that
obtaining decisive warfighting superiority using space-based systems is so difficult
and costly that they might not be feasible. Chapter 2 will show that many of the
3
developments needed to achieve such warfigthing superiority have not been accom-
plished. The chapter arrives at this conclusion by systematically examining the four
areas of innovation4 that supporters of ORS propose will provide 24/7 dominant
battlespace awareness5. The chapter demonstrates the infeasibility of succeeding in
the four areas of innovation.
saying that obtaining operational warfighting capability from TacSat sensors
is so difficult and so costly as to be questionably feasible
Chapter 3: What Can be Achieved by Attacking Satellites? evaluates the mili-
tary benefits that could accrue to an adversary by attacking U.S. military satellites.
Three types of target satellites were considered: GPS satellites, reconnaissance satel-
lites and U.S. military communication satellites. This chapter makes the case that
although U.S. armed forces rely extensively on their satellite infrastructure that does
not immediately make them desirable targets. The functions performed by satellites
like navigation, reconnaissance, and communications are diffused among large con-
stellations. These constellation of satellites possess design redundancies that enable
them to serve the U.S. armed forces even after some of them are lost. The GPS con-
stellation is used to demonstrate this particular point by a simulation exercise. Also,
some of the functions performed by these satellites can be substituted for by other
4. The four areas of innovation are: (1) Developing Plug and Play Satellite (PnPSat) manufacturing
architectures to accelerate satellite design, development and manufacturing; (2) Innovating launch
site operations to be able to rapidly and continuously launch satellite to create satellite constel-
lations; (3) Developing cheap and operationally responsive launch vehicles ; and (4) Designing
innovative satellite orbits to produce tactically mission relevant information that will give the U.S.
warfighter an asymmetric advantage against his adversary.
5. For this chapter, 24/7 dominant battlespace awareness includes beyond line of sight (BLOS) signal
intelligence (SIGINT); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); blue force tracking and
situational awareness (BFT/SA); and continuous uninterrupted communications missions.
4
terrestrial and aerial systems as observed in the case of reconnaissance missions.
Even though these other systems will not completely compensate for lost satellites,
there is no analytical evidence that suggests the U.S. would be completely disabled if
some of its military satellites are lost. For example, the communication architecture
created during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 illustrates that the capability was
spread across various satellites, terrestrial systems and self-sufficient radio relays.
Disrupting satellite communications might momentarily affect U.S. capabilities but
would also provide it with the legitimacy to escalate the battle as it desires. These
factors should dissuade an adversary from attacking U.S. military satellite systems.
While the threat to space assets ranks high among the threats that concern U.S.
strategists, it need not follow that enemies of the U.S. will do so, or will invest
in the weapons required to do so. The U.S. armed forces possess many important
vulnerabilities that adversaries have opted not to attack in past conflicts, typically
due to resources limitations, a desire to avoid escalation, or fear of the reaction of
third party audiences. Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did
want to develop the ability to disrupt U.S. space functions, it could choose to do so
in ways that would not involve targeting satellites[115].
The analysis in chapter 3 was conducted under the assumption that a po-
tential adversary like China possessed the capability to attack a number of U.S.
satellites simultaneously. Chapter 4: The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Missiles
demonstrates that anti-satellite (ASAT) intercepts are very complex under realistic
conditions and that even a potential adversary with space capabilities comparable
to China’s has very limited potential, if any, to use ASATs in a real-world battle sce-
5
nario. This chapter arrives at this conclusion by analytically evaluating the technical
capabilities required of a missile to perform a direct ascent hit-to-kill anti-satellite
intercept. The evidence presented in the chapter will show that even under the
ideal conditions of a non-varying orbit satellite as a target, the reach of a Chinese
SC-19 ASAT missile is very limited. In the case of an ASAT engaging a satellite
target emerging over the horizon in a “head-on collision”–which is a more appropri-
ate real-world scenario–the capabilities of the SC-19 are insufficient6. To maintain
a manageable miss distance, an ASAT attack has to be launched simultaneously
as the emerging target is being tracked. However, doing so requires a continuous
thrusting capability that would enable the ASAT to fly out and intercept the target
satellite. The ASAT missile can, however, generate thrust only during its boosting
phase. This limitation makes any real-world operational ASAT mission infeasible.
Given the arguments made in chapter 3 and 4, a more logical reaction for China
would be to create its own system of military satellites to offset the advantages U.S.
armed forces obtain from space-based systems. That would narrow the capability
gap without having to resort to the extremely difficult task of a synchronized multi-
satellite ASAT attack. There are indications that this is happening. In the period
1992–2002, China deployed both LEO and GEO weather satellites (the Fengyun
series) as well as improved GEO communications satellites (the Dongfanghong-3
6. A target satellite at 800 km is traveling at approximately 7.5 km/s. In the three minutes of
boost available to the SC-19 missile the satellite travels a distance of 1350 km. In the same three
minutes the ASAT missile will have to travel to the altitude of 800 km and at the same time
compensate for the 1350 km the satellite traverses using its lateral acceleration forces. The ASAT
mission must accomplish this while starting from 0 km/s velocity and flying at a average velocity
of approximately 5.42 km/s during its 3 minutes of boosted flight.
6
series) and recoverable satellites with varying payloads (the Fanhui Shi Weixing-2
series). Chinese earth observation capabilities also improved during this period. In
cooperation with Brazil, China in 1999 deployed the China Brazil Earth Resource
Satellite (CBERS), its first electro-optical imaging satellite capable of beaming pic-
tures directly down to Earth. China has subsequently launched several similar
satellites without Brazilian involvement; these are known as the Ziyuan series to
distinguish them from the CBERS satellites. In 2000, China became only the third
country to deploy a navigational satellite system, launching two Beidou regional nav-
igation satellites into GEO. China has also deployed a variety of additional satellites,
including new remote sensing satellites (the Yaogan series), microsatellites such as
the Shijian series, and improved versions of the Fengyun and Ziyuan series[53].
Finally chapter 5: Satellites, Missile Defense and Space Security evaluates the
improvements that a futuristic satellite sensor, the Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS), would provide to missile defense systems. By modeling and sim-
ulating a boost-phase missile defense system cued by the advanced STSS sensors,
this chapter demonstrates that although the STSS sensors reduce the intercept miss
distances substantially it is still not good enough to enable a successful intercept of
a solid-propellant target ICBM. However, it is possible that against a slow burning
liquid-propellant target ICBM, the STSS satellite sensors could produce more ac-
curate information needed to enable a successful intercept. The estimation of that
possibility is left to future iterations of this work.
Together, chapters 2 through 5 aim to narrow the points of contentions in
the debate on space security thereby fostering the international collaboration and
7
data sharing needed to ensure safe operations in space. There is already a growing
interest in such measures. The U.S. is seeking a direct line with Beijing–similar to
one recently established with Moscow–to prevent collisions and potentially destabi-
lizing events in space. Washington has proposed a bilateral space security dialogue
with China patterned after a U.S.-Russian forum that kicked off in mid-2010 and ex-
panded last summer into a direct hotline connecting U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) in California with the Russian Space Surveillance
and System Command Center in Moscow.
Arguing for similar collaboration with China, Frank Rose, U.S. Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of State of Space and Defense Policy said, “JSpOC in California has
direct contact with space operations centers throughout the world, as well as with
commercial operators...so that when there’s a close approach, they call companies
or countries directly. We’d very much like a number to call in China,”[25]. Ab-
sent a direct line with Chinese space authorities, notifications of impending debris
threats will be passed from JSpOC to the State Department, then to the Chinese
Foreign Ministry. Such a case occurred about 18 months ago, when JSpOC detected
a piece of space debris from China’s 2007 ASAT test that was heading close to a
Chinese satellite, Rose said. “At first, my initial reaction was, ‘Why do we want
to notify them? But then I caught myself and realized that if a piece of debris hit
their satellite, then we’d have more debris threatening our own satellites, and that
would not be in anyone’s interest.” He added, “As China continues their economic
expansion, they will become ever more dependent on space systems, and that’s one
8
of the reasons why we want to talk with them7. We believe it’s in the interest of all
nations not to have collisions in space[25].”
Ultimately, this mutual interest and the reduction in the perceived difference
of interests as argued above should impel the U.S., Russia, China and other space-
faring nations to negotiate an agreement on space activities in the future in line with
contemporary challenges. In the interim to that agreement, the pressure to ensure
safe and reliable satellite operations will force the major space players to create
measures of selective cooperation and data sharing similar to those as articulated
above between the U.S. Russia and China.
7. Gen. William Shelton, the Air Force Space Command chief made a similar point recently say-
ing, “Trying to watch traffic in every search volume in the 73 million cubic miles of space be-
tween Earth’s surface and GEO altitude, it’s nigh on impossible.” “So tell me before you’re going




Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): Is 24/7 Warfighter Support
Feasible?
Operational Responsive Space (ORS) is a recently proposed project1 for pro-
viding warfighters with uninterrupted 24/7 access to satellite-enabled services. As
U.S. warfighters’ areas of operation become larger in modern conflicts, and dis-
tributed operations become more the norm, deficits in the tactical2 warfighters’
ability to conduct beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) signal intelligence (SIGINT); intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); blue force tracking and situational
awareness (BFT/SA); and continuous uninterrupted communications missions could
become detrimental and dangerous[14]. ORS proponents claim that their project
aims to eliminate these deficits and provide the war fighter with 24/7 SIGINT,
BFT/SA and communications capability through the extensive use of tactical satel-
lites (TacSats).
According to ORS supporters, TacSats will be designed and launched with
1. The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office was established in May of 2007 in response to
section 913 of the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act[236].
2. Tactical is used in this chapter with the understanding and intent as defined here: Tactical in
reference to units are those of the size to operate independently for a short period of time and/or
toward limited mission goals, in our case, units at or below Army Brigades. Tactical in reference
to missions are those executed in a period that the unit tasked can operate autonomously without
continuous resupply or control from higher headquarters. At the tactical level, battles and engage-
ments are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives. Activities at this level focus on
the ordered management and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the
enemy to achieve combat objectives[113, 135].
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the explicit aim of serving the field commanders’ tactical needs as opposed to usual
strategic missions that satellites serve[91, 139]. In the future, should a comman-
der spontaneously require a possible satellite capability over a region or should an
adversary take away a space capability from a JFC, he will be able to turn to the
ORS office, and request replacement of that capability, and see that capability re-
turned through TacSats within days or weeks rather than years3[95]. TacSats are
envisioned to provide direct real-time support to the commanders in the field in a
“hyper-tactical” mode i.e., they can task, process data on-board, and downlink a
required product to users all in one overhead pass[169]. A rough outline of how ORS
proponents envision their TacSat capabilities could be used is listed below.
Unit X in-theater is not receiving the ISR data they need in a timely manner.
Their U-2’s and Global Hawks do not have access to the airspace, but they need
3. Apart from aiming to satisfy the JFCs immediate needs, ORS also aims to address other
users’ needs for improving the responsiveness of space capabilities to meet national security
requirements[166]. These aims of the ORS are to be accomplished in three varied time scales
ranging from days to a year at maximum referred to as Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3 operations.
Tier-1 uses existing or on-orbit capabilities to provide highly responsive space effects through the
employment/modification/revised application of existing, fielded space capabilities. The targeted
time period for application of Tier-1 solutions is immediate-to-days from the time at which
the need is established. Tier-2 solutions would utilize field-ready capabilities or deploy new or
additional capabilities that are field-ready. The targeted time frame for delivering usable Tier-2
solutions is days-to-weeks from the time at which the JFC need is established. The focus of
activities in Tier-2 solutions is on achieving responsive exploitation, augmentation, or reconstitu-
tion of space force enhancement or space control capabilities through rapid assembly, integration,
testing, and deployment of a small, low cost satellite. Tier-3 involves development of capabilities.
In some cases, an expressed need may not be addressable through existing capabilities (Tier-1) or
through the rapid deployment of field-ready capabilities (Tier-2). In such cases, ORS efforts must
focus on the rapid development and deployment of a new capability. The goal for execution of
Tier-3 approaches is months-to-one year from established need to presentation of operational
capability. Achieving such a time line will be very challenging, and cannot be accomplished unless
the amount of new development involved is very limited. Consequently, much of the ORS work
will be anticipatory in nature-identifying the most probable emergent space needs and preparing
the elements required (via SNT and development/acquisition) to ensure highly responsive delivery
of needed capabilities.
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to know what is over the hill. The wait for up-to-date ISR products could be
days long and they don’t have that kind of time. Luckily, their Modular In-
teroperable Surface Terminal (MIST), used to communicate with the U-2 and
Global Hawk is also configured for communications with a Tactical Satellite
(TACSAT) Common Data Link (CDL) radio that will be overhead in a matter
of minutes. With the flip of a switch, Unit X now has a satellite command
and control station at their fingertips. As the satellite comes over the horizon,
the MIST will lock on to the satellite and provide direct commanding access
to the war fighter. Now he can task the satellite for ISR collection overhead
but only has a few minutes to do it. But with an interface as easy to use
as Orbitz.com, tasking the satellite can be done very quickly. Now that the
satellite has been tasked, all he has to do is sit back and wait—but not for
long! In a matter of minutes, a high speed downlink begins and the image can
be displayed on the computer right in front of him[125].
The question immediately arises: can this be done? At what expense? The
stated goals of a generalized TacSat program as proposed in various open source
documents by their supporters is to:
1. quickly launch the energy equivalent of a 1000 lbs payload into a 100 NM
(185 km) circular orbit (or a combination of payload weight and operational
altitude that is within the same energy capability)
2. keep it there for between six months and a year4 to provide real-time persis-
4. This time period is derived from the average duration of conflicts the U.S. has been involved in
recently including Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan[139, 100].
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tent battlefield coverage for SIGINT, ISR, BFT and communication missions
during the entire course of a tactical engagement
3. for an acquisition cost of about USD 20 million per satellite and booster com-
bined
ORS supporters intend to achieve their envisioned capabilities within the con-
straints of the goals outlined above by innovating in four focus areas:
• Developing methods to accelerate satellite design, development and manu-
facturing. ORS aims to reduce satellite production time lines from years to
months and in some cases to weeks. The aim is to create Plug and Play satel-
lites (PnPSats) manufacturing architectures. PnP architectures will produce
satellites that have a “standard” satellite bus that can be used to quickly
tailor satellite capabilities in response to immediate war fighting needs[170].
Section 2.1 of this chapter will discuss the infeasibility of creating such man-
ufacturing architectures cost efficiently within the desired time.
• Innovating launch site operations to be able to rapidly and continuously launch
satellites to create TacSat constellations. The aim is to be able to launch and
populate a complete constellation in a matter of days. Section 2.2 will discuss
the difficulty for such rapid continuous launches.
• Developing cheap and operationally responsive launch vehicles to reduce and
bring the cost of TacSat to within the reach of a tactical commander. Open
source documents show that ORS supporters claim to meet an acquisition cost
13
of about USD 20 million per satellite and launch vehicle combined5. Section 2.3
will evaluate the feasibility of attaining these cost goals. That section will show
that there is very little reason to believe that such cheap launchers would be
available for ORS payloads.
• Designing innovative satellite orbits that can employ TacSats (in constella-
tions) within the above cost restriction to produce tactically mission rele-
vant information that will give the U.S. war fighter an asymmetric advantage
against his adversary. Section 2.4 will evaluate the operational feasibility and
limitations of TacSats.
In order to achieve the goal of ORS, all the above focus areas need to be
satisfied at minimum. This chapter will demonstrate that is not the case.
2.1 PnPSat: Assembly, Integration and Test (AIT) Constraints
This section will discuss one of the principal conceptual innovations needed
to realize ORS missions: the ability to rapidly manufacture a satellite. The ORS
Tier-2 solution, for example, focuses on using space-qualified field-ready components
and subsystems to rapidly assemble and manufacture a satellite. The targeted time
frame for delivering usable Tier-2 solutions is days to weeks from the time at which
the need is established (in contrast to years for regular satellite manufacturing).
5. This comparative cost metric for TacSats is pegged to not exceed the the operational cost to field a
UAV mission. Suggested TacSat operational goal is to meet the costs of a deployed Predator team,
consisting of UAVs and a control van. This was found to be approximately USD 25 million[139,
100, 99].
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ORS proponents envision achieving this time frame by using a rapid satellite manu-
facturing facility, currently referred to as “Chileworks,” that will function more like
an aircraft depot with quick turn-around sortie rates, than a one of a kind satellite
AIT facility[124, 151, 200].
In this Chileworks concept of operations, all spacecraft components/subsystems
will be preordered, pretested and sitting on shelf to avoid long wait times. These
components/subsystems along with the main spacecraft bus on which the compo-
nents are assembled must have passed all qualification tests to be accepted into
the Chileworks inventory. From this stock of fully qualified components/subsystems
a Tier-2 spacecraft will be assembled. This assembled spacecraft will be rapidly
tested, qualified and launched.
The Chileworks spacecraft assembling process would use a Plug and Play
(PnP) design architecture where they would be connected to a spacecraft bus us-
ing a standardized mechanical interface such as a grid pattern of screw holes. All
components will also be connected electrically to the spacecraft using a standard-
ized electrical interface[15]. It should be noted that proponents of the concept have
neither provided any prior examples of such rapid satellite manufacturing processes
nor have they conducted and published any detailed analysis that examines the eco-
nomics and feasibility of such an innovation. Irrespective of that, discussion in the
ORS community has extended so far as to predict a industrial-like capability for
the Chileworks concept. These predictions project that by 2015, Chileworks should
have both a steady-state and surge capability, that is throttleable depending on the
assessed level of threat. In the steady-state mode, it would be constantly active with
15
system testing and exercises to build competence and confidence. As the assessed
need for satellite augmentation or reconstitution arises, increasing amounts of com-
ponent stock would be brought into the Chileworks to support a space capability
augmentation or reconstitution response so rapid that the war fighter truly retains
assured access to space. At any given time, the Chileworks satellite manufacturing
facility will be able to respond to a single time-critical need at a rate of one per
week for first spacecraft, promising a full constellation response within a month[15].
A prime goal of the ORS mission is, however, immediately violated by this
“Chileworks” concept: cost. To operationalize the Chileworks concept, new or-
ganizations would have to be created to train, exercise, and eventually conduct
operations at such accelerated pace. Creating, staffing and funding such organiza-
tions and facilities would place a significant cost burden on ORS missions. AIT and
launch personnel in a stand-by mode are necessary to rapidly respond to a need to
build and launch a Tier-2 satellite. It will also be highly cost-intensive to maintain
on hold the inventory and the workforce needed to achieve such PnP satellite time
lines. Storage facilities must be adequate to maintain the desired storage life of the
components, as certain components may require environmentally controlled facilities
(clean rooms etc.) and special storage facilities (e.g., for batteries or propellants)[63].
Inventory management requires periodic assessment and update of inventory content
and level, such as checking and testing of components and re-stocking components
as necessary.
None of these factors are well defined, which creates a large uncertainty about
the cost-effectiveness of Chileworks manufacturing[236]. Frequency of launch, num-
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ber of satellites to be launched, satellite testing standards and requirement, and the
level of modularity of satellite components influence the required Chileworks depot
capacity and use of the depot (i.e., how often is the depot producing and launching
Tier-2 satellites). Cost escalation beyond stated ORS goals (of USD 20 million per
satellite and launch vehicle combined) immediately arise from the uncertainty in
these variables.
Also underappreciated is the issue of AIT constraints that are involved in this
concept (see figure A.1 in Appendix A on page 226 for a list of factors influencing
AIT process). The entire AIT phase for a unique spacecraft can last many years
and includes extensive qualification and acceptance tests. AIT is a documented,
formal, and sequential process6 of integrating and testing components/subsystems
and the satellite system to verify if specifications and requirements are met. The
spacecraft integration and test plan7 includes tests/activities to identify unantici-
pated interactions among the subsystems, failure modes and recovery procedures,
faulty workmanship, and component/subsystem infant mortality or failure. A list of
possible failures is shown in figures A.2 and A.3 on pages 227 and 228 respectively
in Appendix A.
The tests are designed to replicate the actual operational environment and
scenarios. Vibration and thermal vacuum tests are designed to replicate the launch
6. The primary military standards that define spacecraft AIT programs are: MIL-STD-1540D Prod-
uct Verification Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage, and Space Vehicles; MIL-STD-340 Test
Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage, and Space Vehicles; and DOD-HDBK-343 Design, Con-
struction, and Testing Requirements for One of a Kind Space Equipment.
7. Typical test plans are shown in figures A.4 and A.5 on pages 229 and 230 respectively in Ap-
pendix A.
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and on-orbit environments, respectively. Other tests, like payload functionality
tests, electromagnetic compatibility tests, and attitude determination and control
subsystems tests, duplicate operational scenarios. When deviations or anomalies oc-
cur, discrepancy reports are written to identify the problem and facilitate a solution.
As mentioned previously, the entire AIT phase for a unique spacecraft can last many
years and includes extensive qualification and acceptance tests. The importance of
a comprehensive AIT process at all levels of spacecraft assembly and manufacturing
is illustrated in figure 2.18.
Almost one-third of spacecraft discrepancies occur at the system level where
Chileworks intends to accelerate. Even if components and subsystems are pretested
and readily available, it is still necessary to test the assembled spacecraft rigor-
ously, unless there is a tolerance for high risk margin or multiple redundancies are
present in the satellite. A similar restriction on rapid satellite AIT emerges from
figure 2.2. The non-flight ground support equipment cause one-third of the total
spacecraft discrepancies. The final spacecraft assembly and launch process involves
significant interaction with support equipment, thereby necessitating a careful and
lengthy process in the end stages of satellite assembly and launch. The Chileworks
concept is in opposition to both these observations and there is no explanation by
the supporters of ORS on how they intend to address these concerns.
Tosney, Arnheim, and Clark collected data on 454 satellites encompassing all
8. Weigel[13] studied 23,000 spacecraft discrepancies (from 224 spacecraft representing 20 different
programs) as part of a MIT Lean Aerospace Initiative to arrive at the data displayed in figure 2.1
and figure 2.2.
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Percent Discrepancy (Per Spacecraft)
Figure 2.1: Spacecraft Discrepancy Distribution Spectrum[13]
U.S. manufactured satellites launched from 1980 to 1999 to correlate test thorough-
ness (ETTI9), design complexity, launch mass, and production sequence with on-
orbit mission failures[209]. Strong correlation was found between on-orbit failures
and ETTI (see figure 2.3): an exponential decrease in failures occurred as testing
increased. This data again underscores the need for comprehensive testing. The
data also suggests that as mass and complexity increased so does the number of
9. The Environmental Test Thoroughness Index is a qualitative technique to subjectively assign a
measure of adequacy to spacecraft testing and qualification programs based on compliance with
MIL-STD-1540.
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Figure 2.2: Spacecraft Subsystem Discrepancy Distribution Spectrum[13]
failures10.
The Chileworks idea of accelerating spacecraft assembly, integration and test-
ing by using pretested components/subsystems is poised against the standard indus-
try practice. For a true Chileworks-like capability to materialize requires the satellite
manufacturing industry to be on-board with the proposed standards and architec-
tures. However, it is highly uncertain whether wide market acceptance of these
standards and architectures could be achieved. There is initial industry reluctance
10. With the exception of lowest mass and complexity category; this outlying category is probably due
to the experimental nature of most small satellites.
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Figure 2.3: On-Orbit Spacecraft Failures[209]
because the business case is not clear. Adopting new standards and architectures
requires industry (satellite manufacturers and suppliers) to make some initial cap-
ital investment, such as in new tooling and equipment, even though the return on
the investment is unclear because of what still appears to be a low-volume satellite
market.
Industry is concerned that the ORS market may never attain a sufficient vol-
ume to support standardization and PnP technology. Further satellite manufac-
turers are concerned about sustaining a competitive edge. They have their own
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“standards” and other streamlining approaches that are often proprietary, which al-
lows them to be competitive. Many bus standards and interface standards have been
developed, but they have not achieved wide acceptance across the space industry.
In 2008 the Integrated Systems Engineering Team (ISET) completed devel-
opment of bus standards that could be used to support a range of ORS missions.
Industry members were key participants in the development. However, the progress
in maturing these standards and gaining industry has been stagnant. The ISET
business case team reported that a block buy would be necessary to realize any
standardization and production benefits[236].
There has been only one attempt to achieve Chileworks-like spacecraft pro-
duction timelines. The Air Force Institute of Technology conducted a trial of PnP
satellite AIT in 2009 using the PnPSat-1[124]. Although the trial was able to attain
AIT of the satellite within 24 hours, the process was undertaken in highly scripted
and controlled conditions with a large proportion of standard tests eliminated. The
PnPSat-1 was a smaller and less complex satellite than planned ORS Tier-2 satel-
lites and most of its components were not flight qualified. Flight qualification would
have been a hard requirement for any other spacecraft mission. There is no further
evidence to suggest that the Chileworks concept can be attained.
2.2 Launch Site Constraints
Another hoped-for innovation of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
community is the ability to rapidly launch satellites in response to an immediate
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tactical requirement. The aim is to launch satellites rapidly and continuously within
a time line that must fit the joint force commander’s mission requirements. Such
rapid satellite launch operations have not been demonstrated to date. The launch
facilities in the United States cannot readily accommodate quick-response vehicles.
The Vandenberg Air Force base, one of the two major launch sites in the US, for
example, has lengthy and detailed scheduling processes and strict safety measures for
preparing and executing a launch, making it impossible to launch satellites within
the tight time frames required for mounting constellation of satellites within weeks.
Processing at the launch site can alone take weeks to months depending on
the size of the launch vehicle and spacecraft. Numerous stakeholders are involved
in the entire process: the spacecraft manufacturer and customer, launch vehicle
manufacturer, USAF, NASA, DOT (FAA), Coast Guard, and others. Extensive
documentation, permits, launch clearances, frequency allocation, etc. are all re-
quired before a launch can occur. After a launch, maintenance and refurbishment
of the launch pad is typically required and can take several days to weeks before
another launch can occur[139]. Advocates of responsive launch capabilities do not
address how these limitations will be overcome to attain the advertised timelines of
ORS missions.
There are also constraints that emerge from the location and operational limi-
tations of launch sites. Figure 2.4 shows the geographical location of various launch
sites within CONUS; namely (1)Spaceport Florida at Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station (CCAFS) (2)California Spaceport at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB)
(3)Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) at Wallops Island, Virginia and (4)Ko-
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diak Launch Complex on Kodiak Island, Alaska[74, 75, 163]. All of these launch
sites have limitations of launch corridor to avoid direct overflight over populous re-
gions. These limitation have a significant effect on ORS operations. For example,
none of the eastern or western launch sites in CONUS have the capability to launch
directly into a 63.4 degree inclination11 that is a strict requirement for operating the
elliptical MAJIC orbits that are proposed by TacSat supporters12.
Figure 2.4: CONUS Satellite Launch Facilities
11. Doing so require the launch vehicle and boosters to make a low-altitude pass over populated land
mass posing an unacceptable risk to these areas should the launch vehicle fail.
12. To achieve maximum coverage over a region of interest from a MAJIC orbit the angle of inclination
needs to be fixed at 63.4 degrees to prevent the location of perigee/apogee from moving. The
earth is not perfectly spherical. This imperfection causes several orbital perturbations including
the rotation of the perigee and apogee of an orbit. By placing the MAJIC orbit at an inclination
of 63.4 degrees this rotation is prevented.
24
Current launch infrastructure at the various spaceports around the country
are often unique and designed around a given vehicle architecture. Facility and in-
frastructure accommodations for a new architecture tend to take considerable time,
on the order of several years. ORS aims to use high-risk low-cost launch vehi-
cles assembled, tested and launched at an accelerated pace. That idea goes against
established paradigms and thereby precludes the sharing of existing facilities and in-
frastructure without significant ground infrastructure investment or costly insurance
arrangements[33]. SpaceX Falcon launchers, a candidate low cost ORS launcher,
have experienced such difficulties. SpaceX’s launch of TacSat 1 at Vandenberg was
put on hold when because of the potential risks it posed to a billion-dollar satellite
that was waiting to be launched from a nearby pad. The Air Force had licensed the
use of another nearby pad at Vandenberg to a contractor for large-scale launches.
Given the proximity of launch pads, SpaceX’s insurance premium increased ten-fold,
from about USD50,000 to as much as USD500,000. Because of these issues, SpaceX
decided to use the Reagan Test Site facility on Kwajalein Atoll, in the Pacific Ocean
for its first launch[75]. The potential effect of such launch site constraints or the
need to transport satellite to distant locations on ORS mission cost has not been
documented and addressed by ORS supporters. It seems fair to conclude that these
constraints would push ORS mission costs above the stated goals of USD 20 million
per satellite and launch vehicle combined.
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2.3 Launch Cost Constraints
In order to be cost competitive with UAVs for performing the same mission,
ORS supporters want to to achieve an acquisition cost of about USD 20 million per
satellite and launch vehicle combined13. However, all potential responsive launch
vehicles alone currently cost close to or more than the USD 20 million for launches to
LEO, essentially limiting all possible responsive spacelift systems to LEO. Satellites
launches to higher orbits require larger, more complex and expensive boosters for
launch. This section will discuss the status of various responsive launch vehicle
candidates, their anticipated cost and their ORS mission feasibility.
2.3.1 Falcon Launcher
Name: Falcon14 1, 1e, 5, N 9.
Developer: Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX)
Class: Partially Reusable
Description[179, 75, 72]: The partially reusable Falcon 1 is a two stage, liquid
13. The comparative cost metric for TacSats is to not exceed the the operational cost to field a UAV
mission. Suggested TacSat goal is to meet the costs of a deployed Predator team, consisting of
UAVs and a control van. This was found to be approximately USD 25 million[139, 100, 99].
14. At the end of 2002 DOD directed the Air Force and DARPA to combine their individual projects
on hypersonic research into a common program. The resulting joint program was called Force
Application and Launch from Continental US (FALCON), which consisted of two components:
(1) Small Launch Vehicle (SLV): develop a low-cost, quick-response booster, which could launch
small payloads into orbit, suborbit, or potentially launch hypersonic technology vehicles, and (2)
Hypersonic Technology Vehicles (HTV): develop conceptual design, demonstrate technology, and
flight test a low-risk first generation hypersonic technology vehicle. In 2004, the global strike or
force application component of DARPA’s FALCON project was canceled and “FALCON” was
subsequently renamed “Falcon”. Adding to the confusion, two of Project FALCON Phase IIa
developers used the name “Falcon” for their launch vehicles: (1) SpaceX and its Falcon boosters
(2) Lockheed Martin and its Falcon SLV hybrid rocket.
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oxygen and rocket grade kerosene powered launch vehicle designed to place up to 670
kilograms (1,477 pounds) into LEO. The first stage of this vehicle is to be recovered
from the ocean after a parachute landing, refurbished, and reused. The Falcon 1
achieved orbit on its fourth attempt, on 28 September 2008, with a mass simulator as
a payload. On 14 July 2009, Falcon 1 successfully delivered the Malaysian RazakSAT
satellite to orbit on SpaceX’s first commercial launch (fifth launch overall). Following
its fifth launch, the Falcon 1 was retired in favor of an enhanced variant, the Falcon
1e. The Falcon 1e consists of a new first stage, the same second stage used on the
Falcon 1, and a new, larger payload fairing. Falcon 1e’s payload capacity is 1,010
kilograms (2,200 pounds) into LEO.
Falcon 5 was based on much of the same technology developed for Falcon 1;
the larger Falcon 5 was supposed to use five SpaceX-developed Merlin engines in
the first stage with an engine-out capability to enhance reliability. Falcon 5 has
been replaced by Falcon 9. Falcon 9 is a spaceflight launch system that uses rocket
engines designed and manufactured by SpaceX. Both stages of the two-stage-to-orbit
vehicles use liquid oxygen (LOX) and rocket-grade kerosene (RP-1) propellants.
Multiple variants are planned with payloads of 10,450 to 26,610 kilograms (23,000
to 58,700 pounds) to LEO, and 4,450 to 15,010 kilograms (9,800 to 33,100 pounds) to
geostationary transfer orbit, which will place the Falcon 9 design in the medium-lift
to heavy-lift range of launch systems.
The first Falcon 9 flight was successfully launched from Cape Canaveral Air
Force Station on June 4, 2010 with a successful orbital insertion, after several delays.
The Falcon 9 is the launch vehicle for the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft. The Falcon 9
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and Dragon combination won a Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contract from
NASA to resupply the International Space Station under the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program. The second Falcon 9 launch, and the
first launch of the Dragon spacecraft, occurred at on December 8, 2010 from Cape
Canaveral. The launch was successful, with the Dragon spacecraft completing two
orbits before splashing down in the Pacific Ocean.
Recently, on May 22, 2012 Falcon 9 successfully flew the Dragon spacecraft
for its first ISS resupply mission. SpaceX has a launch manifest of over 40 launches,
including the space station resupply and the Iridium constellation. At the end of
this launch volume there should be sufficient data to establish the reliability and
price of SpaceX launch vehicles. However, all of these launches are for the heavy-lift
Falcon 9 launcher. From the perspective of TacSat missions this is of little direct
consequence, since for the TacSat missions Falcon 1e is the appropriate launcher. It
is, however, possible that SpaceX might be able to subsidize some of the costs of its
Falcon 1e launcher from the profits of its Falcon 9 launcher and Dragon spacecraft
missions.
Assessment: Viable. Falcon 1e has a quoted cost of USD 10.9 million for a payload
of 1010 kg and Falcon 9 has a quoted cost of USD 54 million to USD 59.5 million.
The company owner, Elon Musk, is investing his own money into building a tech-
nically viable launch family. He plans to sell these vehicles for a price far below
his competition. There is still queries among the aerospace community whether the




Developer: Orbital Sciences Corporation
Class: Expendable
Description: Pegasus was specifically developed to orbit small satellites weighing
up to 1,000 pounds into low-Earth orbit. It is a winged, 3 stage expendable booster.
The launch vehicle is carried aloft by an L-1011 carrier aircraft to approximately
40,000 feet over open ocean, where it is released and then free-falls in a horizontal
position for five seconds before igniting its first stage rocket motor.
Assessment: Viable. Pegasus is expensive (USD 20 to 24M) but is the launcher
of choice for small payloads. Unless SpaceX can deliver a cheap small launcher,
Pegasus will continue to be the primary U.S. small launcher[179, 75].
2.3.3 Minotaur Launcher
Name: Minotaur[173]
Developer: Orbital Sciences Corporation
Class: Expendable
Description: Minotaur was developed for the USAF Orbital/Suborbital Program
as a low-cost, four-stage vehicle using a combination of government-supplied surplus
Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missile motors and existing technologies.
Proposed growth versions would use surplus Peacekeeper rocket stages. Minuteman
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motors serve as the first and second stages while the third and fourth stages, struc-
tures, and payload fairing are from Orbitals Pegasus XL rocket[179, 75]. Several
derivatives of Minotaur were developed or proposed:
• Minotaur I can deliver a payload of 580 kg to a 185 km, 28.5 degree orbit
from Cape Canaveral; or 310 kg to a 740 km sun-synchronous orbit from
Vandenberg.
• Minotaur IV can deliver a payload of 1720 kg to a 185 km, 28.5 degree orbit
from Cape Canaveral; or 1000 kg to a 740 km sun-synchronous orbit from
Vandenberg.
• Minotaur V can put small spacecraft on high-energy trajectories, such as GTO,
HEO, and lunar with a Star 48V fourth stage and Orion 38 fifth stage. For
example, it can place 560 kg to a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO).
Assessment: Viable. Minotaur has been successful, but is limited to Government
payloads. The Minotaur is not very cheap, costing between USD 15-20 million.
2.3.4 Taurus Launcher
Name: Taurus
Developer: Orbital Sciences Corporation
Class: Expendable
Description: The Taurus was developed under DARPA sponsorship for easy trans-
portability and rapid set-up and launch. Since 1994, it has conducted six of seven
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successful missions launching 12 satellites for commercial, civil, military, and inter-
national customers. The vehicle is a ground-based variant of the Pegasus rocket.
The four-stage, all solid propellant vehicle can deploy 1,350 kg (3,000 lbs) to LEO.
Two fairing sizes offer the option of single or multiple payloads[179, 75]. Taurus uses
horizontal integration of the upper stages and offline encapsulation of the payload
within the fairing to expedite integration.
Assessment: Viable. Taurus is successful, but is not cheap, costing between USD
25 and USD 30 million a launch.




Description: One of the four DARPA Force Application and Launch from CONUS
(FALCON) Phase 2a contracts to develop concepts for a low-cost (USD 5M) small
launch vehicle. Falcon SLV approach uses an all-hybrid propulsion approach and a
mobile launch system. Lockheed was not selected to continue in the Phase 2b of the
FALCON project[179, 75].
Assessment: Not likely to be viable. Lockheed conducted several test firing of
its new hybrid rocket. Hybrid rocket technology is estimated to be more expensive
than conventionally fueled rockets. Lockheed was not selected to continue in Phase
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2b of the FLACON project. While a competitor in FLACON 2a, Lockheed test
fired its engine several times but never developed integrated rocket plans. A hybrid
rocket has issues with environmental impact and does not have the performance of
cryogen propellants.
2.3.6 Eagle Launcher
Name: Eagle SLV (Scorpius)
Developer: Microcosm, Inc.
Class: Expendable
Description: Part of the Scorpius family of expendable launch vehicles, marketed
for suborbital and orbital missions. Microcosm, Inc. the developer plans to even-
tually market up to eight Scorpius variants: two suborbital vehicles, the SR-S and
SR-M launchers; three light-lift orbital vehicles, the Sprite Mini-Lift, the Eagle
SLV, and the Liberty Light-Lift launchers; one intermediate-lift orbital vehicle, the
Antares Intermediate-Lift launcher; one medium-lift vehicle, the Exodus Medium-
Lift launcher; and one heavy lift vehicle, the Space Freighter. Each Scorpius vari-
ant is based on a scalable modular design featuring simple liquid oxygen, kerosene
pressure-fed motors without turbo pumps and with low-cost avionics equipped with
Global Positioning System internal navigation. Microcosm was one of the FALCON
Phase 2a contractors but was not selected for further work[179, 75].
Assessment: This system is not currently viable. Microcosm is a small company
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surviving largely on small business study contracts. They launched two suborbital
rockets in the past (SR-S and SR-XM-1). However, the Scorpius family is designed
around an inappropriate technology: pressure-fed liquid propulsion. The structure
mass has to be strengthened to accommodate high pressure. Because the perfor-
mance is so poor, there are not any currently operational launch vehicles that use
this technology for their main stage. The vehicles cannot compete in the market-
place.
All of the potential responsive launch vehicles discussed above are beyond the
cost margin of ORS with the possible exception of Falcon 1e. However, even that
launch vehicle costs approximately 50 percent of the cost budget of one ORS TacSat
raising questions on its utility for ORS missions. Given the current launcher market,
it would be extremely difficult to execute ORS missions without exceeding the cost
constraints significantly. Proponents assert that launch costs would come down once
the demand for launch services had increased substantially, but this claim has been
made for decades and is yet to be demonstrated in practice.
2.4 Evaluating TacSats
This section will evaluate TacSats, their orbits, and their utility to the tactical
war fighter. The evaluation will test if suggested SIGINT, ISR, BFT and commu-
nication missions can be achieved by designing innovative satellite orbits that can
employ TacSats (in constellations) within the above cost restriction to produce tac-
tically mission relevant information that will give the U.S. war fighter an asymmetric
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advantage against his adversary.
Subsection 2.4.1 below will begin the evaluation by outlining the analytical
method used to optimize a TacSat for coverage over a particular region of interest.
This optimization is initially performed for the ideal case of a satellite with no sensor
constraints. The next subsection 2.4.2 on page 44 will then impose the real-world
sensor constraints like minimum elevation angle or maximum off-nadir imaging angle
to the analysis. This process will normalize the optimized TacSat orbits to realistic
conditions. The maximum average daily coverage over the region of interest will
be numerically determined using the analytical method in this subsection. Then
in subsection 2.4.3 on page 51 more mission relevant parameters like satellite pass
duration, gap time between passes, etc., will be estimated for the optimized orbits.
Subsection 2.4.4 on page 58 will progress from the previous subsection and
estimate the number of satellite needed to obtain 24/7 coverage over the region of
interest for the various missions. It will shown that an unrealistically large number
of satellites will be needed to obtain 24/7 communication or ISR coverage over a
region of interest when employing TacSats. Finally, subsection 2.4.5 on page 59
will evaluate TacSats operating in Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO) called MAJIC
(Microsatellite Area-Wide Joint Information Communication Orbit), which are the
suggested orbits to accomplish communication and BFT missions for the tactical
war fighter using fewer satellites[170, 63, 97, 30]. This subsection will discuss the
difficulties of realizing the MAJIC orbits.
All the subsections outlined above will in sequence demonstrate that even if
the cost and timeline requirements of the TacSat concept are met, there are oper-
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ational limitations emerging from orbital mechanics that make the idea of TacSats
unrealistic. A combination of physical constraints placed on satellites by orbital me-
chanics and operational requirements placed on their payloads by the mission that
can be performed from space prevent all but the most rudimentary missions from
being attainable.
2.4.1 TacSat Orbit Optimization
TacSats by their definition require optimizing for a specific location, perhaps a
city or a small region of a country, but most definitely not for continental or global
coverage. Therefore, the first step in evaluating TacSats is to determine how to
optimize a TacSat’s orbit for maximum coverage over the region of interest. This
subsection will outline that process of optimizing a single satellite15 for tactical
operations i.e., maximize the contact time over a specific city/region at a particular
latitude. The optimization is initially performed assuming a TacSat sensor with
a horizon Field of Regard (FOR)16 with no constraints. The next subsection will
impose satellite sensor FOR constraints17.
TacSat orbit optimization is done by numerically estimating the average long-
15. Satellite constellations will be examined later.
16. The Field of Regard (FOR) of a satellite is the total extent of “the area of Earth that can be
covered by its sensor by altering the satellite orientation (in space).” Satellites are never able to
operate in their entire FOR. Satellites operate in a much narrower Field of View (FOV) which
is “the area of Earth that a sensor has coverage over at any moment without moving its sensor.”
More explanation on FOR and the distinction between FOR and FOV is detailed in Appendix B.
17. The missions of a satellite dictates the FOR constraints that is imposed on it. For example,
in order to operate without interference communication satellites have a 5/10 degree above-the-
horizon FOR requirement. Similarly, ISR satellites have a 45/30 degree off-nadir FOR constraint
in order to capture images with sufficient resolution.
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term contact time over the latitude of interest18 and then interpolating for the
averaged maximum per-day satellite coverage over the target location in that lati-
tude. The optimization is accomplished by applying the concept of ergodic theory19
to satellite orbit coverage analysis [137, 138]. Using ergodic theory, a definite in-
tegral is obtained that gives the average view period of a ground location from a
spacecraft in orbit. This method avoids the propagation of the orbit, which requires
a lot of time and computation resources, and simplifies the computation of satellite










g(φ) = 2 (acos[(cos β0 − sinφ sinφ0)/ cosφ0 cosφ])
h(φ) = cosφ/(2π2
√
sin2 i− sin2 φ)
18. For a generalized optimization study, we are not interested in the exact day-to-day times that a
particular satellite will be overhead. Instead, our true interest lies in the long-term average contact
time of the satellite with the target location latitude. As TacSat proponents intend the satellites
to have a life of six months to a year, this study will perform satellite optimization for a period
of one year. The Long term average calculations mean that we really only need to specify the
latitude of the target; all longitudes crossing the specified latitude will have the same long term
average contact times due to the symmetry of the Earth. Symmetry also implies that northern
and southern latitudes will have the same long-term average contact times.
19. Ergodic theory studies the statistical behavior of the solutions of differential equations.
20. Ergodic theory optimizes the coverage over a single point on the ground at a latitude of interest.
This raises the question of accuracy. In reality, operations are conducted over a finite area of the
size of a city. How does this affect the results of this paper? Not much in reality. Appendix C
will show that the difference in coverage durations obtained from simulating a orbit coverage over
the city of Baghdad and obtained from applying ergodic theory are trivial and does not affect the
validity of the results as applied in this chapter.
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φ0 = stationlatitude latitude
β0 = station mask angular radius
i = satellite inclination
P(T) in equation 2.1 is the total time the satellite has coverage over the target
latitude from time 0 to time T. Implying, ρ is the fraction of time the satellite has
coverage over target latitude.
Of the four variable parameters in equation 2.1 (orbital altitude, orbital in-
clination, satellite FOR, and target location) for TacSat orbit optimization, there
is real flexibility in only two. The analysis in this subsection is done assuming the
TacSat is able to perform its mission from a horizon FOR. Once the satellite FOR
and target location (i.e., latitude) are chosen, only the satellite’s inclination and
altitude can be varied to determine the maximum coverage. Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7
below plot the maximum average daily contact time a single TacSat with a horizon
FOR would have over three cities at different latitudes:
1. Jakarta, Indonesia (6 deg south latitude)
2. Baghdad, Iraq (33 deg north latitude)
3. St. Petersburg, Russia (60 deg north latitude)
These cities were chosen to give representative samples across southern and northern
hemisphere and between low, mid, and high latitudes. Altitudes are varied between
150 km to 600 km; the lower limit is where the atmosphere becomes thick enough to
bring a satellite down in a matter of several days and the upper limit is somewhat
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around the published value for the funded TacSat programs. Inclinations are varied





































Figure 2.5: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage (at HORIZON FOR)
Over Jakarta (minutes per day). The sidebar graph key denotes the
maximum minutes of coverage per day over Jakarta for a given satel-







































Figure 2.6: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage (at HORIZON FOR)







































Figure 2.7: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage (at HORIZON FOR)
Over St. Petersburg (minutes per day)
39
From the plots above the following inferences can be made:
Inference 2.1 There is a certain orbital inclination that, for any given altitude,
maximizes average daily contact time21. In most cases, this optimal orbital inclina-
tion will be slightly larger than the target’s latitude 22. For example, on examining
figure 2.6 on page 39 it becomes clear that for a given satellite altitude as the satellite
inclination increases from 0 to around 33 degrees (the target latitude of Baghdad)
the coverage goes from 0 minutes to a value close to the maximum; it reaches maxi-
mum at a slightly larger inclination than 33 degrees23. Furthermore, as the satellite
inclination continues to increase the coverage duration starts to taper off. The same
phenomenon can be observed in the case of Jakarta and St. Petersburg.
Inference 2.2 As a direct consequence of the first inference it becomes apparent
that to optimize contact time, the inclination of the TacSat orbit should be higher
than the latitude of the target. As a corollary, no satellite can be optimized for more
than one target latitude. For example, observe that in figure 2.6 at the given satellite
21. It should be noted that there might be a single day where the coverage exceeds this value; however,
on average this is the maximum daily coverage that can be obtained from the satellite for the given
altitude and inclination. This coverage is not obtained in a single orbital pass but is the averaged
value of the cumulative coverage from multiple passes over the target latitude over a period of one
year. It will be shown later that the duration of each pass and time gap between each pass is
different.
22. The only case for which it is exactly equal to the target’s latitude is for the theoretical case of a
zero altitude orbit. As the satellite altitude increases above zero, the optimal inclination moves
further away from the target’s latitude, the magnitude of the shift being directly related to the size
of the FOR. The reason the optimum inclination is generally larger than the target latitude is that
the actual path the target location appears to trace through the FOR is not a straight line but
instead a curve concave toward the equator. Also, there are more opportunities for access when
inclination is greater than target latitude due to curvature of the Earth and longitude compression
[180].
23. In fact there is analytical evidence that for mid-latitude regions, the optimal inclination is approx-
imately equal to the target latitude plus 2 degrees for each 100 km increase in the altitude of the
satellite[23].
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inclination of 33 degrees the coverage drastically drops off for all latitudes not close
to 33 degrees. It is, of course, true that all targets/locations at this latitude of 33
degrees would receive the maximum daily average contact time24. It should also be
noted that the corresponding latitude in the opposite hemisphere would receive exactly
the same coverage, so technically there are two latitudes that are optimized for each
orbit.
Inference 2.3 Increasing the orbital altitude increases contact time. Re-examining
figure 2.6 it can seen that at a latitude of 33 degrees as the satellite altitude increases
from 150 km to 500 km, the coverage duration increases approximately from 35
minutes to 75 minutes. This result is due to two causes. Further distance can be
seen when altitude increases since increasing the altitude also physically increases the
size of the FOR, which in turn increases the contact time. Additionally, moving to a
higher orbit slows the satellite down a bit, more closely matching its speed with that
of earth’s angular velocity. The FOR thus moves more slowly across a target tending
to increase the contact time. While boosting the satellite altitude to a more realistic
500 km does increase contact time, it simultaneously degrades image resolution by a
factor of almost three and signal strength for all missions (communication, BFT, and
SIGINT) by a factor of over seven. Overcoming these mission degradations involves
adding large sensors and associated equipment, increasing weight and making it that
much more difficult and expensive to get the payload to the higher orbit.
24. It would be a rare event to have two battle engagement at two different regions of the world with
the same latitude within the short lifetime (6 months/1 year) of a tactical satellite. Hence, tactical
satellites are mostly useful only for a single battle situation.
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Inference 2.4 Targets near the equator and the poles receive better optimized cover-
age than mid-latitude targets. Notice from the plots above that the maximum average
daily coverage time that Baghdad receives (approximately 85 minutes) is less than
the maximum average daily coverage time that Jakarta and St. Petersburg receive
(approximately 180 and 100 minutes, respectively). The layout of the plots (fig-
ures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7) above have to be changed to better demonstrate this inference.
Instead of plotting the satellite altitude versus the inclination, the plots below in fig-
ure 2.8 and figure E.6 on page 43 vary satellite inclination against the target latitude
(at two different altitudes). It is immediately apparent on examining the y-axis that
maximum coverage is attained at the equator and at the poles. This is because it is
possible to put a satellite in orbit directly over the equator, since the plane of the
equator contains the center of the earth. If the target is on or close to the equator
(like Jakarta), the satellite will pass over it every single time it goes around the
earth. Similarly, if the target is at or close to one of the poles (like St. Petersburg),
placing the satellite into a polar orbit with an inclination of 90 degrees makes the
satellite pass over the target every time25. However, if the target is located at the
mid-latitudes (like Baghdad), even an optimized orbit will not necessarily pass over
it every single orbit; depending upon the match between the satellite’s and the earth’s
rotational speeds, sometimes the satellite will reach its maximum inclination over
the target and at other times it will reach its maximum inclination some distance
away from the target.
25. No matter what longitude along which the satellite makes it approach, it will pass directly over






































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure 2.8: HORIZON FOR Maximum Average Satellite Coverage From



































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure 2.9: HORIZON FOR Maximum Average Satellite Coverage From
500 km (minutes per day)
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Inference 2.5 Hence, to optimize a TacSat (i.e., to obtain maximum average daily
contact time over a specified target): place the satellite in a orbit as high as possible
and match its inclination to (slightly higher than) the desired target’s latitude.
2.4.2 FOR Constraints on Optimized Orbits
In subsection 2.4.1 no real-world operational constraints were placed on the
satellite sensors. The figures displayed in the previous subsection and the corre-
sponding inferences drawn represent the best-case average contact times that can
be obtained, limited only by orbital constraints on a satellite. Unconstrained and
unobstructed FORs were assumed for the satellite.
However, actual tactical satellite missions will have limited FORs. Tactical
satellites engaged in SIGINT mission are the only ones that can operate effectively
at a horizon FOR. Since they are detecting radio transmissions, SIGINT TacSats
only need to have line of sight to the emitter they are trying to detect, hence its
FOR extends to the horizon as seen from the satellite26. For communication and
BFT missions, the ground-based node of a ground-to-space communication/BFT
link generally requires the satellite to be a specified angle above the horizon, usually
five to ten degrees, to ensure connectivity. The FOR for such a mission would be the
area on the ground from where the satellite is at least 5-10 degrees above the horizon.
26. This does not imply that SIGINT missions lend themselves well to TacSats. Military signals of
interest span a range of frequencies, and this would obviously need to be taken into account in the
design of any satellite collector, probably requiring a number of different antennas to be accommo-
dated on the satellite. TacSats are not conceptualized to host multiple antennae. Also, typically
SIGINT satellite collection concepts utilize three or perhaps four satellite working together in close
formation in order to provide appropriate baselines between the satellites for “time difference of
arrival” calculations[195].
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Given a constraint of 5 or 10 degrees above the horizon FOR, the daily maximum
coverage of a particular target latitude decreases significantly from a horizon FOR



































Figure 2.10: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Baghdad with
a 5 Degree Above the Horizon FOR (minutes per day)
Inference 2.6 At a given satellite altitude and inclination, as the FOR becomes
more constrained for operational reasons, the maximum average daily coverage over
the target latitude decreases. For example, it can be seen in figure 2.6 on page 39 that
at an altitude of 500 km and an inclination of 33 degrees (Baghdad being the target
location at that particular latitude) the maximum daily coverage is approximately
70 minutes for a horizon FOR. In comparison, it is seen in figure 2.10 above that







































Figure 2.11: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Baghdad with
a 10 Degree Above the Horizon FOR (minutes per day)
horizon FOR constraint the maximum average daily coverage is approximately 50
minutes: a 29 percent decrease in coverage. Similarly, it is seen in figure 2.11 above
that at the same altitude of 500 km and 33 degrees inclination for a 10 degree above
the horizon FOR constraint the maximum average daily coverage is approximately
35 minutes: a 50 percent decrease in coverage (in comparison to the horizon FOR
case). Similar trends in the decrease of coverage are seen in the cases of Jakarta
and St. Petersburg. The graphs illustrating the reduction in coverage for Jakarta
and St. Petersburg can be found in Appendix D on page 239.
ISR satellites have even more restrictive FORs. Not only must they have LOS
like the other missions, but they cannot look too far away from the nadir27 without
27. Nadir is the direction of an imaginary line extending from the satellite straight down toward the
center of the Earth.
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introducing a host of problems. In order to properly analyze overhead images, the
images cannot be taken from too shallow an angle. Atmospheric effects are much
more pronounced when the image is taken at a shallow angle due to the much
greater distance through the atmosphere the light has to travel from the object. At
shallower than certain angles, the images become useless as the information desired
(discriminating between tank and truck, for example) can no longer be discerned28.
The resolution of an image i.e.,, the ability to distinguish small, closely-spaced
objects from each other, is directly related to how far away the object is. The
smallest feature x that can be resolved by a circular aperture of diameter D at
a range R from the target using an electromagnetic wavelength λ is approximately
given by the formula x = 1.22Rλ
D
, showing that the resolution power is linearly related
to range29. Therefore, imagery satellites seldom look more than about 30 degrees
off-nadir. A quick survey of currently operational private for-profit satellite systems
proves this (see table B.1 on page 233 of Appendix B).
The figures 2.12 and 2.13 below illustrate the effects of 45 degree30 and 30
degree off-nadir satellite sensor FOR constraint on coverage durations.
Inference 2.7 Similar to the previous inference, when the FOR is constrained by
28. For discrimination resolution requirements for various military targets see table B.2 on page 236
of Appendix B.
29. For example, as shown in table B.2 on page 236 to detect a radar from a satellite a 3 meter resolution
is required. Operating in visible band at a wavelength λ of 20 nm with a 20 cm diameter aperture,
the maximum distance (that can tolerated without loss of detection) between the satellite and radar
location can be 984 km. If the satellite is operating at 500 km altitude, this distance translates
into a maximum off-nadir angle of 30 degrees at a slant range of 984 km.
30. The 45 degree off-nadir imaging scenario is given to illustrate the drastic loss in coverage even at








































Figure 2.12: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Baghdad with





































Figure 2.13: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Baghdad with
a 30 Degree Off-Nadir FOR (minutes per day)
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ISR requirements there are drastic losses in coverage time. For example, it can be
seen in figure 2.12 that at an altitude of 500 km and an inclination of 33 degrees with
a 45 degree off-nadir FOR constraint the maximum daily coverage is approximately
8 minutes: a 90 percent decrease in coverage from the horizon FOR case. Similarly,
it is seen in figure 2.13 that at the same altitude of 500 km and 33 degrees inclination
with a 30 degree off-nadir FOR constraint the maximum average daily coverage is
approximately 3 minutes: a 95 percent decrease in coverage (in comparison to the
horizon FOR case).
The dramatic fall in coverage between the ideal case of horizon FOR and the
5/10 degree above the horizon FOR requirement for communication satellites or the
30/45 degree off-nadir FOR for ISR satellites can be comprehended by examining
figure 2.1431 below. It is immediately clear that as FOR becomes more constrained,
the area on the ground accessible for the particular mission gets smaller hence leading
to reduced mission coverages32.
Inference 2.8 Once a tactical satellite is optimized for a particular target loca-
tion, the operational mission constraints on the satellite’s sensors drastically limit
the maximum daily average coverage possible. This is true across all latitudes (see
Appendix E on page 247 for evidence). However, the decrease in coverage is more
drastic at mid-latitude regions in comparison to equatorial and polar regions33.
31. This figure has been copied from [67]. An articulate and detailed review of the discussion above
can also be found here.
32. More details are in Appendix B on page 231.
33. See inference E.1 in Appendix E on page 247 for illustration and proof.
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Figure 2.14: Field of Regard (FOR) from 500 km. The solid line
(Horizon) represent the SIGINT FOR, the dashed lines (5/10 degree
above horizon) represent communication/BFT FOR and the dotted lines
(45/30 degree off-nadir) represent ISR related FOR[67].
Up to this point, it has been assumed that there is only FOR constraints and
no FOV constraints. It is important to realize that just because a target is in the
FOR of the satellite, it is not necessarily being imaged by the payload. Satellites
typically do not image their entire FOR during a single pass. Especially for the
high resolution imagery necessary for the tactical war fighter, only a tiny fraction
of the whole FOR can be seen by the camera’s FOV at any instant34. Similarly, the
34. For example, the FOR for earthbound photographers with a camera would be everything they can
possibly see from their location through their camera (i.e.,, zero to 360 degrees in azimuth and
zero to 90 degrees in elevation); their FOV, on the other hand, would be the substantially reduced
portion of the world that can be seen through their camera at any instant[67].
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power from the main lobe of a communication satellite would be concentrated in a
smaller region of its FOR. These FOV constraints will further diminish the average
daily coverage durations. Also, this analysis has ignored the non-trivial limitations
of weather and darkness and assumed an ability for imagery sensors to operate at
full capacity 24/7.
2.4.3 Tactical Performance of Optimized Orbits
In the previous two subsections, the maximum average coverage over a latitude
of interest for a optimized satellite was estimated under various FOR constraints.
To more fully appreciate the limitations of these estimations, this subsection will
discuss other tactically relevant parameters like satellite pass duration, number of
passes per day, average coverage gaps between passes and cost per-hour of satellite
coverage.
To calculate the pass duration, a generalized average metric is used again.
A pass occurs when the FOR of the satellite passes over the target. However,
as the FORs on the earth’s surface are circles centered on the subsatellite point,
different contacts have different pass durations. Their duration depends on the
distance of the subsatellite point to the target location[67]. Assuming the FOR
passes over the target in a straight line, the minimum pass duration would be an
almost instantaneous flicker should the target location pass at the very edge of the
FOR circle; on the other hand, if the satellite passes directly over the target location
dragging the entire diameter of the FOR circle across it, the pass duration would
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be maximum.
For the calculations in this subsection, the average pass duration is related to
the average chord length of a circle equal to the FOR diameter. The maximum chord
length is the FOR diameter and is dependent on the orbital altitude. Applying the
relationship that distance traversed is equal to the product of the velocity and time,
the average pass durations can be found by dividing the chord lengths by the ground
speed of the FOR which is again altitude dependent. Figure 2.15 below shows the
results of applying this discussion.
Figure 2.15: Average Pass Durations Per Satellite Pass
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Figure 2.15 illustrates the average pass durations (y-axis) against a range of
satellite altitudes (x-axis) accounting for the various FOR constraints. For example,
at an altitude of 500 km, a satellite with horizon FOR would have an average pass
duration of approximately 8 minutes whereas a satellite with 10 degree above the
horizon FOR constraint would have an average pass duration of 5 minutes. The
maximum pass duration (i.e., when the FOR diameter passes directly over the tar-
get latitude) is shown for illustrative purposes. It would almost never be attained.
Along with the individual pass durations shown in Figure 2.15 above, the opti-
mized coverage per day at various latitudes that was calculated in subsections 2.4.1
and 2.4.2 is reproduced below in figures 2.16 and 2.17. Using the information embed-
ded in figures 2.15, 2.16 and 2.17 on can calculate the other parameters of interest
like average number of passes per day, average gap time between passes, and cost
per-hour overhead for a TacSat.
By dividing the optimized average daily contact time by the average pass
durations, the average number of passes per day can be determined. By inverting
the number of passes per day, the average revisit time between passes is determined.
The average gap time is the difference between the revisit time and pass duration.
The cost per hour overhead can be calculated by dividing the aspirational TacSat
cost of USD 20 million by the total of number of hours the satellite would be
overhead during its life time (one year for the purpose of calculations). Evaluating
these metrics shows the insufficiency and inefficiency of TacSats in performing their
missions. On examining figure 2.18 below, for the case where the TacSat is orbiting
at an altitude of 100 NM (185 km) with a horizon FOR, a single satellite will have
53





































5 Deg Above Horizon FOR
10 Deg Above Horizon FOR
45 Deg Off-Nadir FOR
30 Deg Off-Nadir FOR
Figure 2.16: Daily Satellite Coverage at 100 NM (185 km) altitude








































5 Deg Above Horizon FOR
10 Deg Above Horizon FOR
45 Deg Off-Nadir FOR
30 Deg Off-Nadir FOR
Figure 2.17: Daily Satellite Coverage at 500 km altitude
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approximately 8 passes over Baghdad (33 degrees latitude) per day with an average
pass duration of 4.5 minutes (from figure 2.15) per pass. The gap time between each
successive passes on average would be approximately 3 hours.
























































































































Figure 2.18: Number of Passes, Average Gap Time, and Cost Per Hour
of Visibility for a TacSat at 100 NM (185 km)
Similarly, on examining figure 2.19 on page 57 for the case where the TacSat
is orbiting at an altitude of 500 km with a horizon FOR, a single satellite will have
approximately 10 passes over Baghdad (33 degrees latitude) per day with an average
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pass duration of 8 minutes (from figure 2.15) per pass. The gap time between each
successive passes on average would be approximately 2 hours. Finally, the cost per
hour of overhead visibility (over Baghdad) is approximately USD 40,000 per hour.
Placing the satellite at a higher altitude does give some improved performance.
There is a limit, however, on the achievable altitude since the TacSats intend to use
COTS technology that limit the operational altitude of ISR sensors35. Any attempt
to use state-of-the-art sensors that can provide high resolution at greater orbital
altitudes will place the cost of the TacSat in the range of strategic satellites.
Even at a higher operational altitude of 500 km, the performance obtained
from a optimized TacSat is completely unsuitable for tactical operations. It would
be impossible to undertake a tactical mission that lasts for a duration of 8 minutes
with an average gap of 2 hours between each pass. The emphasis on average in
the previous sentence is to illustrate another important limitation that all TacSats
suffer from: pseudorandom distribution of passes. Pseudorandom passes implies that
although the time of each satellite pass can be calculated, there will be no apparent
regular schedule between passes with some occurring quite close together in time,
while at other times there will be substantial gaps. The tactical war fighter will have
no control over exactly when a satellite will pass over the location of interest. This
will be detrimental to mission accomplishment as regular, predictable information is
needed by tactical commanders. On the other hand, a fairly sophisticated adversary
would be able to predict the passes and employ counter strategies to defeat the
35. The effect of the Van Allen belt radiation on TacSats can be severe as they are designed using
cheaper COTS electronics that might not be manufactured to withstand these radiations.
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Figure 2.19: Number of Passes, Average Gap Time, and Cost Per Hour
of Visibility for a TacSat at 500 km
purpose of the tactical satellite[67].
Inference 2.9 To operationalize a tactical engagement under a best-case scenario
using a single optimized LEO satellite, its mission would be have to be defined as:
“Mission lasting for an average of 8 minutes with repeat engagement possibly 2 hours
(more or less)”. It would be inept for a commander to use such a vague time line for
engaging in a military mission. A tactical war fighter needs persistent imagery and
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constant communication. Getting a snapshot or minutes of communications every
two hours or so is not very useful at the tactical level, where the time scale of the
action is measured in minutes or seconds[67].
2.4.4 Constellation of TacSats
One of the mechanisms advocated by the ORS community to eliminate the
limitations of a single optimized TacSat and to obtain 24/7 persistence is to use a
constellation of these satellites. This subsection will evaluate the improvement in
performances obtained by employing such TacSat constellations.
A simple approach to approximate the number of satellites required to gain
24/7 persistence of the target location is to divide the minutes in a day by the
average number of minutes per day spent overhead by a single satellite. This number
of satellites would be the chain of satellites required to pass sequentially over the
target to provide 24/7 persistence. For example, as shown in figure 2.20 below
the minimum number of satellites required on average to ensure persistent 24/7
coverage over Baghdad from an orbital altitude of 100 NM (185 km) with a best
case scenario horizon FOR is 40 satellites. At an aspirational cost of USD 20 million
per satellite this would be a total of USD 800 million for one tactical mission over
one city. The number of satellite required and the total cost goes up rapidly as the
FOR becomes more constrained. If the orbital altitude of is increased to 500 km, for
the same best case scenario horizon FOR the total number of satellite required to
create 24/7 persistence over Baghdad is approximately 20 satellites (see figure 2.21
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below). At a cost of USD 20 million per satellite this would be a total of USD 400
million for one tactical mission over one region. This still is much higher than the
possibly obtainable funding for any one tactical mission’s communication or ISR
requirements.
































































Figure 2.20: Approximate number of satellites required for 24/7 persis-
tence at 100 NM (185 km)
2.4.5 Elliptical Orbits for Communications
In an attempt to prevent the large costs involved with optimized LEO orbits
(as demonstrated in the previous subsections), ORS proponents have proposed a
Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) for TacSat communications missions called MAJIC
(Microsatellite Area-Wide Joint Information Communication) Orbit (500 x 8000
km, 63.4 degrees inclination)[170, 63, 97, 30]. The advantage of a MAJIC orbit is
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Figure 2.21: Approximate number of satellites required for 24/7 persis-
tence at 500 km
that it greatly reduces the number of satellite required for 24/7 persistence of a
tactical area and can be reached within the launch budget constraints of a TacSat.
However, when at the useful part of its orbit, a satellite in a MAJIC orbit is about
8000 km above the earth, over 16 times further than a likely 500 km circular tactical
satellite orbit. At this distance, conventional imagery missions are ineffective due
to resolution limitations. Therefore MAJIC orbit TacSats could only be used for
communication missions.
Studying figure 2.22 below on page 62 it can be seen that at an optimized
argument of perigee36 of 270 degrees, a single satellite in MAJIC orbit will provide
36. Argument of perigee is the angular distance between the point where the satellite crosses the
equatorial plane in a northerly direction and the point of closest approach to the earth.
60
close to 8 hours of coverage at horizon FOR37, implying that 24/7 persistence can
be obtained by employing just three satellites. The reason for this highly improved
coverage is because the orbital period of the MAJIC orbit is 1/8th of a day and
therefore TacSats at the MAJIC orbit move slower with respect to earth. The
satellite and its FOR move very slowly at apogee when the satellite is above the
location of interest spending the major portion of its orbit there. As the satellite
accelerates back towards perigee, it zips past the target providing very little coverage
then.
TacSats employing the MAJIC orbit and orbiting at an optimized argument of
perigee do provide significantly improved coverage per satellite, removing the need
for large number of satellites to provide 24/7 persistence. On the other hand, em-
ploying MAJIC orbits introduces other problems that negate their utility as tactical
assets. Satellites in MAJIC orbit are on average 17 times further from a location
in comparison to a 500 km orbit. At this range, signal strength can be very prob-
lematic. Using the simple 1/r2 metric for signal strength attenuation, it becomes
obvious that at MAJIC orbit altitudes the satellite antennae and signal power den-
sity have to be substantially higher than LEO requirements. To illustrate, for a
communications antenna in a MAJIC orbit satellite to be as sensitive to signals as
37. For highly elliptical orbits, to maximize contact time over regions in the northern hemisphere like
Baghdad and St. Petersburg the argument of perigee needs to be close to 270 degrees. Similarly,
for regions in the southern hemisphere like Jakarta the argument of perigee that maximizes contact
is 90 degrees. Additionally, HEO orbit missions require the angle of inclination of the orbit needs
to be fixed at 63.4 degrees to prevent the location of the perigee/apogee from moving, The earth
is not perfectly spherical. This imperfection causes several orbital perturbations including the
rotation of the perigee and apogee point of an orbit. By placing the MAJIC orbit at an inclination
of 63.4 degrees this rotation is prevented.
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Baghdad 5 deg. elevation access
Baghdad 10 deg. elevation access




























St.Petersburg 5 deg. elevation access
St.Petersburg 10 deg. elevation access
Figure 2.22: Average Contact Time vs. Argument of Perigee for MAJIC Orbit
the Iridium SATCOM system (which has a set of three 1.6 square-meter antennae
for reception) its antennae should be about 200 square-meter. The weight and en-
ergy requirements for such a large antennae are outside the design and cost margins
of a tactical satellite[67, 125]. Additionally, unlike traditional GEO communication
satellites which have a fixed position in the sky in reference to the tactical user,
MAJIC orbit TacSats will be operating in such a manner that the satellite will
have complex and unpredictable apparent motion and range to the tactical user
(see figure 2.23 below). This is a more involved form of pseudorandom motion.
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For the case of MAJIC orbit satellite passage over Jakarta, as illustrated in left
panel of figure 2.23 below, the direction of apparent motion and time gap between
each satellite pass is highly variable, exhibiting the characteristics of a pseudorandom
motion. Similarly, it can be inferred from studying the right panel of figure 2.23 that
the range between the satellite and the target location and the apparent velocity of
the satellite with respect to the location is varying randomly. A similar pattern of
behavior is observed for MAJIC orbit TacSats over Baghdad and St. Petersburg as


















Pass 1 (9 hours and 11 minutes after propagation)
Pass 2 (12 hours and 16.5 minutes after propagation)
Pass 3 (15 hours and 56 minutes after propagation)
Pass 4 (19 hours and 29 minutes after propagation)
Pass 5 (22 hours and 49 minutes after propagation)



















Pass 1 (54 minutes)
Pass 2 (1 hour and 7.5 minutes)
Pass 3 (1 hour and 12 minutes)
Pass 4 (1 hour and 6 minutes)
Pass 5 (49 minutes)
Figure 2.23: Apparent Motion and Range of a MAJIC Satellite Over
Jakarta (24 hours; 10 minutes interval)
Inference 2.10 In operational terms, the pseudorandom motion of a satellite in
MAJIC orbit would require the tactical unit employing a MAJIC orbit-based satellite





















Pass 1 - (24 minutes after propagation)
Pass 2 (3 hours and 22 minutes after propagation)
Pass 3 (6 hours and 32 minutes after propagation)
Pass 4 (9 hours and 56 minutes after propagation)
Pass 5 (13 hours and 17 minutes after propagation)
Pass 6 (16 hours and 42 minutes after propagation)



















Pass 1 (1 hour and 3 minutes)
Pass 2 (1 hour and 25 minutes)
Pass 3 (1 hour and 39 minutes)
Pass 4 (1 hour and 33 minutes)
Pass 5 (1 hour and 17 minutes)
Pass 6 (39 minutes)
Figure 2.24: Apparent Motion and Range of a MAJIC Satellite Over
Baghdad (24 hours; 10 minutes interval)
satellite and then continuously estimate its position and track it. At the current
time, one of the biggest limitations on tactical use of satellite for communications
is that the tactical squad unit must stop its vehicle and point a high gain antenna
towards the stationary satellite GEO to get reception. The reason for this limitation
is that communication satellites are very far away and the signals they emit are
relatively weak. The signal from a satellite in a MAJIC orbit would be about 20
times stronger, but instead of coming from a stationary communications satellite it
would come from a moving one. The soldier’s problem is now compounded; he has
to stop and acquire a satellite that is constantly changing location[67]. Doing so in
the middle of a tactical engagement is prohibitive.
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Pass 1 - (36 minutes after propagation)
Pass 2 (3 hours and 30 minutes after propagation)
Pass 3 (6 hours and 32 minutes after propagation)
Pass 4 (9 hours and 42 minutes after propagation)
Pass 5 (12 hours and 53 minutes after propagation)
Pass 6 (16 hours and 2 minutes after propagation)


















Pass 1 (1 hour and 14 minutes)
Pass 2 (1 hour and 29 minutes)
Pass 3 (1 hour and 38 minutes)
Pass 4 (1 hour and 39 minutes)
Pass 5 (1 hour and 32 minutes)
Pass 6 (1 hour and 18 minutes)
Figure 2.25: Apparent Motion and Range of a MAJIC Satellite Over St.
Petersburg (24 hours; 10 minutes interval)
2.4.6 The Futility of TacSats
The fundamental laws of orbital mechanics work against the idea of TacSats.
A combination of physical constraints placed on satellites by orbital mechanics and
operational requirements placed on their payloads by the mission that can be per-
formed from space prevent all but the most rudimentary missions from being attain-
able cost-efficiently. Choosing an orbit that slows down the satellite pass to improve
persistence ends up requiring huge increase in payload size in order to maintain the
standard of performance. Neither the operational constraints from orbital mechan-
ics and FOR/FOVs nor the cost constraints involved in mounting and populating a
TacSat constellation have been resolved by TacSat advocates.
Unless there is a significantly new paradigm of satellite development or there is
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a technological revolution in space launch, there is very little chance of satellites be-
ing used a tactical battle asset. Furthermore, the effect of orbiting tens to hundreds
of satellites on the space control network has not been studied and might well turn
out to be a significant deciding factor. TacSat supporters have also not adequately
addressed the issue of data management and the training required for tactical U.S.
war fighters to operate a possible TacSat network.
This entire chapter on evaluating TacSats has demonstrated that the use of
high-risk low-cost quick-response satellites for tactical battle missions is question-
able. It is conceivable that cheaper small satellites (in the weight range of 100-150
kg) that cost less than USD 20 million might have some battle management appli-
cations. These satellites may have possible augmentation missions of DSP, DMSP,
and GPS satellites. However, they might not be ideal candidates for the purposes
of tactical missions as outlined by TacSats proponents. These cheaper small satel-
lites have limited on-board processing capability which might inhibit rapid image
processing in order to provide real-time intelligence to the warfighter. Also, most of
these satellites are launched as piggyback payloads. Such a launch schedule does not
suit TacSat missions. Finally, for TacSat missions supporting warfighters a certain
level of reliability is needed. It is not clear if these cheap smaller satellites pos-
sess that level of reliability. The TacSat community is yet to have to demonstrate
both the physical viability and the economic feasibility of using these cheaper small
satellites for TacSat missions.
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2.5 ORS missions vis-a-vis DOD space programs
The previous sections of this chapter demonstrated the infeasibility of attain-
ing the goals outlined by proponents of ORS mission in each of the four areas of
innovation. Those arguments should convince an impartial evaluator about the futil-
ity of spending scarce resources on ORS missions. Indeed, the White House’s fiscal
year 2013 budget has called for terminating the Operationally Responsive Space
office[191]. Testifying before the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommit-
tee, Air Force Gen. William Sheldon, commander of Air Force Space Command,
said the move was necessary as part of the Air Force contribution to the USD 487
billion in planned reduction in defense spending over the next decade mandated by
the Budget Control Act of 2011[204].
There is, however, resistance against the move. For example, Rep. Martin
Heinrich (D-N.M.) in whose state the ORS is headquartered at the Kirkland Air
Force Base characterized the cancellation as “penny-wise and pound-foolish” given
the minimal investment involved[204]. However, when the goals and achievements
of the ORS mission are investigated in reference to the current situation in DOD’s
space acquisition activities they come out to be futile and very inefficient.
Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-scale acquisition
programs in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space portfolio have experienced
problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and
increased technical risks. The reasons cited for these cost escalations and schedule
delays are also present in ORS-TacSat missions as discussed below. Figure 2.26
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below illustrates that the yearly combined cost38 of various space programs have
been steadily climbing39. The combined estimated costs for the major space acqui-
sitions programs have increased by about USD 11.6 billion–321 percent–from initial
estimates for fiscal year 2011 though 2016.












































Figure 2.26: Comparison between Original Cost Estimates and Current
Cost Estimates for Selected Major Space Acquisitions Program[226]
38. Programs included in the combined cost estimate are the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF), Global Broadcast System, Global Positioning System II and III, Mobile User Objective
System (MUOS), Space Based Infrared System (SBIR), and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS).
39. It’s worth noting that the declining investment in later years is the result of mature programs
that have planned lower out-year funding, cancellation of a major space acquisition program and
several development efforts, and the exclusion of several major space acquisition efforts like the
Space Fence, Space Based Space Surveillance, and the Defense Weather Satellite effort for which
the total cost data were unavailable[226].
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Figure 2.27 illustrates the additional months of delay not anticipated at the
programs’ start dates. These delays in space acquisitions are leading to potential
gaps in the delivery of critical capabilities. For example, DOD faces a potential gap
in protected military communications caused by delays in the AEHF program and
the proposed cancellation of the TSAT program. DOD also faces a potential gap in
ultra high frequency (UHF) communications capability caused by the unexpected
failure of two satellite already in orbit and the delays resulting from the MUOS
program. Similarly DOD faces potential gaps or decrease in positioning, navigation
and timing (PNT) capabilities because of late delivery of GPS IIF satellites and the
late start of the GPS IIIA program. There are also concerns about potential gaps
in missile warning and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS
and NPOESS[223, 225, 226].
GAO has cited a number of reasons for the cost growth and time delays in
DOD’s space acquisitions[225, 223]:
• DOD has tended to start more weapons programs that it can afford, creat-
ing a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic
scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and for space programs,
forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable
alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound
management. Invariably, with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is
forced to continually shift funds to and from programs–particularly as pro-
grams experience problems that require additional time and money to address.
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Figure 2.27: Total Number of Estimated Months from Program Start to
Initial Launch[225, 224]
Such shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects.
• DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the
assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available
resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding
process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concen-
trating solely on proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to
extend technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical
problems that require large investments of time and money to fix. Moreover,
when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned to de-
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velop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns. Put more
simply, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it would take to de-
sign, develop, and build a satellite system when critical technologies planned
for that system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention.
• Programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single
step, regardless of the design challenges or the maturity of the technologies
necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer but
heavier, larger, and more complex satellites40 that perform a multitude of mis-
sions rather than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that
gradually increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology challenges
beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased the complexities
related to software.
• Many of the cost and schedule problems identified were tied in part to diffuse
leadership and organizational stovepipes throughout DOD, particularly with
respect to DOD’s ability to coordinate delivery of space, ground, and user
assets. Additionally DOD faces a situation where satellites with advances in
capability will be residing for years in space without users being able to take
full advantage of them because investments and planning for ground, user, and
space components were not well coordinated.
40. This preference stems from the satellite “real estate” constraint. With space launch prices ranging
from around USD 100 million to well over USD 200 million, space programs often seek to maximize
the “real estate” on board a satellite by including more capabilities that can sometimes be handled
by a single program or within the time period desired for the program.
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All of these criticisms of DOD’s legacy space acquisitions projects will also
apply to the missions of ORS. A variety of offices undertake ORS-related opera-
tions and a number of important personnel have provided their own version of what
ORS is meant to accomplish (see Appendix F). The ORS concept is not commonly
understood by all members of the war fighter and national security space commu-
nities. Key stakeholders do not share a common understanding of the ORS concept
for two primary reasons-the ORS concept is not clearly defined in its initial guid-
ance documents and DOD has not adequately communicated the concept to key
stakeholders41. Also, there has been very little scrutiny of the technical feasibility
of TacSats before project commitments were extended. Proponents have claimed
that TacSats would quickly and cheaply provide 24/7 capabilities to warfighters
across a number of mission areas and the DOD seems to have accepted that premise
with very little proof. However, all recent ventures to orbit tactical satellites have
surpassed estimates of cost and time (see Table 2.1 below for cost estimates).
Almost of all the experimental TacSat missions have crossed the target price
of USD 20 million. Even though these TacSats have much simpler and less complex
mission objectives than the strategic space systems discussed above they have suf-
41. The first extensive outreach to the combatant commands by the ORS Office was in preparation
of the the November 2007 ORS senior War fighters Forum, which took place 6 months after the
standup of the Joint ORS office. As stated in a recent GAO report a senior space planner, who is
the lead for ORS for one combatant command, has mentioned that during preparatory briefings for
the ORS Senior War fighters Forum, participants were told that the purpose of the forum would
be to learn what space capabilities the various combatant commands needed that ORS might be
able to address. However, after a couple of briefings, the purpose of the ORS Senior War fighters
Forum had shifted to that of educating the combatant commands on the ORS process. The senior
space planner explained that rather than asking the war fighter what they need, the focus was now
on placing their needs into a process that had already developed. This would derail the technology
from having user buy-in[222].
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fered from cost escalation and schedule delays. It is then valid to conclude that if
these satellites are used as visualized by ORS proponents they will end up costing
much more. Given this it is very unrealistic to expect the DOD to support TacSats
when there is a real and immediate need for resources in the strategic legacy space
systems.
Table 2.1: Costs of Selected National Security TacSat Like Demonstration
Missions[179, 188]
Satellite Organization Cost (Millions) Year
in 2006 USD) Launched
Mightysat I AFRL/Phillips Lab 7.4 1998
Space Technology NRO 88.0 1998
Experiment (STEX)
Mightysat II AFRL 42.6 2000
XSS-10 AFRL 43.6 2003
XSS-11 AFRL 67.1 2005
TacSat 2 AFRL 39 2006
TacSat 3 AFRL 40 2009
TacSat 4 NRL 41 2011
Scheduled
TacSat 1 NRL 9.3 Mission
canceled
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has systematically demonstrated the difficulty in achieving suc-
cess in each of the four focus areas that supporters of ORS hope to innovate in.
Section 2.1 of this chapter outlined the difficulties in achieving the “Chileworks”
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like rapid satellite manufacturing model. To operationalize the Chileworks con-
cept, new organizations would have to be created to train, exercise, and eventually
conduct operations at a accelerated pace. It will also be highly cost-intensive to
maintain on hold the inventory and the workforce needed to achieve such rapid time
lines. None of these factors are well defined and accounted for, which creates a large
uncertainty about the cost-effectiveness of Chileworks manufacturing concept. Also,
the ORS community has not addressed how the Assembly, Integration and Testing
(AIT) requirements that underlie current satellite manufacturing operations would
affect the Chileworks concept.
Section 2.2 of this chapter examines the ability to rapidly launch satellites
within days to weeks in response to an immediate tactical requirement. The aim
of ORS proponents is to launch satellites rapidly and continuously within a time
line that must fit the joint force commander’s unfolding mission requirements. Such
rapid satellite launch operations have not been demonstrated to date. The ORS
community has not identified any mechanism to compress the current satellite launch
times. Section 2.3 evaluates the cost of launchers and its effect on ORS missions.
In order to be cost competitive, ORS supporters want to to achieve an acquisition
cost of about USD 20 million per satellite and launch vehicle combined. However,
all potential responsive launch vehicles alone currently cost close to or more than
the USD 20 million for launches to LEO. This raises doubts on the viability of
accomplishing ORS missions within the stated cost.
Section 2.4 demonstrates the operational limitations emerging from orbital
mechanics that make the idea of TacSats unrealistic. A combination of physical
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constraints placed on satellites by orbital mechanics and operational requirements
placed on their payloads by the mission that can be performed from space prevent
all but the most rudimentary missions from being attainable within the cost goals
and launch time constraints. Finally, section 2.5 concludes this chapter by making
the case that scarce DOD resources would be more usefully spent in addressing the
immediate requirements in legacy space systems rather than diverting it to ORS
missions whose purpose and viability rest on weak foundations.
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Chapter 3
What Can be Achieved by Attacking Satellites?
A pivotal question in the debate on space security is: what could be achieved by
attacking satellites? A significant portion of that debate in the U.S. proceeds under
the assumption that there are substantial benefits for an adversary in attacking U.S.
satellites. A sampling of this notion is given below.
• America’s reliance on space is so extensive that a widespread loss of space
capabilities would prove disastrous for both its military security and its civil-
ian welfare. The Armed Forces would be obliged to hunker down in a de-
fensive crouch awaiting withdrawal from dozens of no-longer-tenable foreign
deployments[73].
• The sudden major loss of satellite function would quickly throw U.S. military
capabilities back twenty years or more and substantially damage U.S. and
world economies. While backup systems could partially compensate for this
loss, U.S. military forces would be significantly weakened[32].
• The U.S. now, more than at any point in its history, depends on space systems
for its national security-and much more so than any other country. This com-
bined, with the fact that those systems are becoming vulnerable to a growing
number of potential adversaries, suggests that first-strike stability in space is
eroding. If locked in a confrontation with the U.S., were the aggressor to con-
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clude that war was inevitable, it would also realize that it would eventually
have to pay a higher price if it did not attack U.S. space systems[80].
This chapter will make the case that these concerns are exaggerated. Although
U.S. armed forces rely extensively on its satellite infrastructure, that does not im-
mediately make them desirable targets. The functions performed by satellites like
navigation, reconnaissance, and communications are diffused among large constel-
lations. These constellations of satellites possess redundancies that enable them to
serve the U.S. armed forces even after some of them are lost. Also, some of the
functions performed by these satellites can be substituted for by other terrestrial
and aerial systems. Even though these other systems will not completely compen-
sate for lost satellites, there is no analytical evidence that suggests the U.S. would
be completely disabled if some of its military satellites are lost.
Section 3.1 below will examine the benefits of attacking the GPS satellite
system. Section 3.2 will then examine the benefits of attacking U.S. satellite recon-
naissance platforms. Finally, section 3.3 will examine the benefits of attacking U.S.
communication satellites. These sections of this chapter will demonstrate in detail
why feasible attacks on US satellite systems cannot be expected to confer decisive
advantage in a military engagement.
It is possible, however, to conceive of more limited motivations for an adversary
to attack U.S. satellites. An adversary could arguably attack U.S. satellites as a
warning of further escalation in response to a certain U.S. military action, based
on the assumption that attacking U.S. satellite assets would be less severe than
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attacking U.S. battle ships or U.S. ground troops. This chapter does not study the
logic behind such an action by an adversary nor does it try to formulate political
arrangements that would prevent that event. Those questions are left to future
developments of this chapter. This chapter only attempts to evaluate the military
advantages that might induce an adversary to attack U.S. satellites.
3.1 Is There a Benefit to Attacking GPS Satellites?
In order to evaluate the effort required and benefits accrued from attacking
GPS satellites, a simulation is performed in this section. The various steps of the
simulation and the conclusions drawn from the simulation are outlined below:
• An Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompassing Taiwan and the part of East
China Sea between China1 and Taiwan was modeled in STK2. The modeled
region is shown in figures 3.1 and in 3.2 on page 82. A 3D illustration of the
model is shown in figure 3.3 on page 83.
• Once the AOR has been defined, it is granulated into finer points along every
latitude and longitude direction. This is done to determine the cumulative
GPS Geometric Dilution of Precision3 (GDOP) in the entire AOR. Figure 3.4
1. For the purposes of illustration only, China is chosen as the candidate nation that is attempting
to attack GPS satellites. This dissertation does not attribute such an intention to China.
2. STK or Satellite Tool Kit is a commercial software for orbital analysis. An evaluation copy of the
software was used to undertake the analysis in this chapter.
3. Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP) is a common measure of GPS 3D positioning error.
Generally, if the GDOP rises above six, the satellite geometry is not very good and there will
increased positioning error. The operational GPS constellation is designed to provide a world-wide
GDOP of less than six, assuming at least four satellite are visible[141].
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on page 83 shows the cumulative GDOP over the entire AOR. Also, 25 facilities
are defined in the AOR as shown in figure 3.2 on page 82. This is done to
determine the individual GPS GDOP values at specific locations in the AOR.
Figure 3.5 on page 84 shows the GDOP at the individual facilities distributed
along the diagonal of the AOR. It can be seen that the GDOP is below 3
over the entire AOR and at each of the individual facilities. An adversary like
China would prefer to degrade this value to above 6.
• The simulation is performed over a period of 48 hours starting from 00:00:00.000
UTCG on 11 March, 2012 to 00:00:00.000 UTCG 13 March, 2012.
• Now, in the simulation it is assumed that China intends to attack GPS satel-
lites in the AOR at 00:00:00.000 UTCG on 12 March, 2012. In order to
determine which satellites China should attack to obtain the best possible ad-
vantage over U.S., the 5 satellites contributing the most to the GDOP values
at the instant of attack are chosen. Figure 3.6 on page 85 shows the 5 satel-
lites that could be attacked. To model the attack scenario, these satellites are
removed one after the other from the simulation in order to evaluate the effect
of on an attack on GPS satellites.
• Figure 3.7 on page 86 shows the effect of removing the 5 selected satellites
one-by-one on the defined AOR. It is observed that removing up to 3 satellites
does not significantly degrade the GDOP. When 4 or 5 satellites are removed
(i.e., attacked) the GDOP values are degraded above 6. The GDOP degrades
around the time chosen for the attack. However, the degradation lasts only
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for approximately 2 hours. After that the redundancy of the GPS satellite
constellation makes up for the degradation that occurred due to the attack on
the GPS satellites.
• The same phenomenon is also observed in the case of the individual facilities
distributed diagonally across the AOR. For example, figure 3.8 on page 87
shows that removing up to 3 satellites does not affect the GDOP value over
facility 1. Removing 4 or 5 satellites, degrades the GDOP over facility 1
for a period of 42 minutes. After that the redundancy of the GPS satellite
constellation makes up for the effects of the attack on GPS satellites.
• Figure 3.9 on page 88 shows that the effect of removing 4 or 5 GPS satellites
degrades the GDOP over facility 7 for a period of 48 minutes. Figure 3.10
on page 89 shows that the effect of removing 4 or 5 GPS satellites degrades
the GCOP over facility 13 for a period of approximately 2 hours. Figure 3.11
on page 90 shows that the effect of removing 4 or 5 GPS satellites degrades
the DCOP over facility 19 for a period of approximately 2 hours. Finally,
Figure 3.12 on page 91 shows that the effect of removing 4 or 5 GPS satellites
degrades the GDOP over facility 25 for a period of approximately 2 hours.
• In sum, to affect the GDOP over the AOR, the Chinese would have to simul-
taneously attack at least 4 GPS satellites. The next chapter on ASATs will
demonstrate that China does not possess such a capability.
• Even if it did possess such a capability, there does not seem to be any abiding
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tactical logic in attacking GPS satellites. As previously argued, any benefits of
the attack last only for a period of 2 hours at most. After that, the redundancy
of the GPS satellite constellation makes up for the effects of the attack on GPS
satellites.
• Also, the degradation of the GDOP values shows a periodic pattern after the
modeled attack. Figure 3.13 on page 92 shows that the degradation of GDOP
occurs at the same time everyday. This makes it easier for the U.S. to respond
and adapt its strategy after the attack. The U.S. would still be able to navigate
on land or sea without GPS, albeit with lesser accuracy for that period. As for
its ability to use precision munitions, table 3.1 below on page 93 shows that
the percentage of GPS-based Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) usage
has been around 25% in recent U.S. operations. The U.S. could easily shift to
its other precision-guided munitions or non-precision munitions4 during the 2
hour time period when GPS is not available at the required accuracy.
• All that China would obtain from executing the attacks on the GPS satellites
is a two hour window. That outcome does not seem to be worth the retribution
the action would entail.
4. Uncertainty as to what is being targeted and where weapons will fall can have a significant psy-
chological effect on an enemy. Interviews of captured Iraqi soldiers during the Gulf War revealed
that their greatest fear was being attacked by B-52s, each dropping 38,250 pounds of conventional,
non-precision ordinance. It is especially true for troop formations, but reasonably, applicable at
all echelons, that the shock, noise, and disruption of an air attack can have a paralyzing and
demoralizing effect out of all proportion to the amount of physical destruction achieved[109]. By
attacking GPS satellites China might bring out an undesirable situation of this sort.
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Figure 3.1: AOR - 2D Image
Figure 3.2: AOR - 2D Image (close-up)
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Figure 3.3: AOR - 3D Image

















Figure 3.4: AOR GDOP Pre-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG

































































































































Figure 3.5: Facilities GDOP Pre-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000







Figure 3.6: GPS Satellite Distribution (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG
to 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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Figure 3.7: AOR GDOP Post-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG
to 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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(a) Facility 1 GDOP Post-Attack







































(b) Facility 1 GDOP Post-Attack (close-up)
Figure 3.8: Facility 1 GDOP Post-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000
UTCG to 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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(a) Facility 7 GDOP Post-Attack







































(b) Facility 7 GDOP Post-Attack (close-up)
Figure 3.9: Facility 7 GDOP Post-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000
UTCG to 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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(a) Facility 13 GDOP Post-Attack








































(b) Facility 13 GDOP Post-Attack (close-up)
Figure 3.10: Facility 13 GDOP Post-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000
UTCG to 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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(a) Facility 19 GDOP Post-Attack








































(b) Facility 19 GDOP Post-Attack (close-up)
Figure 3.11: Facility 19 GDOP Post-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000
UTCG to 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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(a) Facility 25 GDOP Post-Attack








































(b) Facility 25 GDOP Post-Attack (close-up)
Figure 3.12: Facility 25 GDOP Post-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000
UTCG to 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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Figure 3.13: AOR GDOP Post-Attack (11 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG
to 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00.000 UTCG)
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Total Air Delivered Weapons 227,648 23,644 17,459 29,199
Total PGMs delivered 17,644 7,057 10,548 19,948
% of PGMs Employed 7.70% 29.80% 60.40% 68.32%
Total JDAMs Used 0 652 5000 6,542
% of JDAMs Used 0 0.30 28.64 22.40
3.2 Is There a Benefit to Attacking Reconnaissance Satellites?
This section of the chapter will argue that although U.S. reconnaissance satel-
lites have important applications in a battle, it does not immediately render them as
uniquely desirable targets. The satellite reconnaissance capability is spread across
many satellites. Attacking all of them might be impossible for an adversary like
China. Also, for most tactical battlefield reconnaissance needs, aerial platforms are
more appropriate. The publicly available data on Operation Desert Storm reveals
that battlefield intelligence was often obtained from aerial platforms (see table 3.2
below).
General Horner, Commander of coalition Air Forces’ during Operation Desert
Storm pulled in every reconnaissance platform the coalition possessed. That in-
cluded the high-flying TR-1/U-2R aircraft, the RF-4C for tactical information, the
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Table 3.2: Total Reconnaissance Sorties, 17 January - 28 February 1991[70]





Reconnaissance missions flown by U.S. A-6, A-7, EA-6B, F-14, F/A-18, P-3,
RC-135, RF-4C, S-3, MH-60, and coalition RF-5, Tornado GR-1, Jaguar,
Mirage F1-CR and Mirage 2000 aircraft. SLAR missions flown by U.S. OV-1D
and RC-12 aircraft. Observation flight missions flown by U.S. A-6, F-16,
F/A-18, and S-3B aircraft.
RC-135 Rivet Joint to monitor electronic emissions, the Boeing E-3B/C Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWCACS) and the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield
Command and Control Center (ABCCC) for combat management, the E-8A Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) to find ground targets, the
Navy F-14s equipped with TARPS (Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System) and
remotely-piloted vehicles. Details on the role played by each of these platforms
are discussed below. Importantly, all of these platforms (some in more advanced
versions) are still in service with the U.S. forces, raising questions on the value of
attacking U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Its seems that these aerial platforms would
be more attractive targets tactically and would have the additional advantage of not
escalating the conflict.
• The TR-1A and U-2R carried a multitude of sensors, including infrared, radar,
and long-range optical systems for all-weather capability, day or night. The
aircraft can be tailored for specific intelligence missions by changing the sensors
in the wing pods. Other SAR-equipped aircraft also played a vital part in the
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Gulf War. When the TR-1As could not take off due to excessive winds, Army
SAR-equipped OV-1Ds were called in to fill in some of the intelligence gaps[92].
• The 117th deployed to Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm was provided with
six RF-4Cs equipped with the long-range oblique photograph (LOROP) cam-
era. The RF-4C squadron provided photographs of key targets while staying
outside of enemy defenses[92].
• During Desert Shield, General Horner repeatedly sent F-15s, Tornados, and
F/A-18s racing toward the Iraqi border to locate Iraqi air defenses and discern
operating frequencies and types of communications. They would turn around
before reaching the border but not before triggering an Iraqi response. Big RC-
135 Rivet Joint electronic reconnaissance aircraft monitored the Iraqi radar
and communications response, gradually building a comprehensive knowledge
of Iraqi defensive systems and capabilities.
• TARPS transforms the F-14 into a reconnaissance platform. The pod con-
tains three sensors and ancillary control components. The sensors include two
high resolution cameras–one for forward oblique and vertical photography and
the other for panaromic views–and a sophisticated infrared sensing system.
Although conceived as a low-to-medium altitude strike planning and battle
damage assessment system, TARPS was employed at high altitude during
Desert Storm because of the heavy air defense batteries[92].
• During Operation Desert Storm, the E-3B/C AWACS controlled the air-to-
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air war and EC-130E ABCCC controlled the air-to-ground war. The flexible,
mobile, jam resistant E-3B/C Sentry was a highly modified Boeing 707 trans-
port. The large aircraft carried an extensive complement of mission avionics,
including a computer, radar, IFF, communications, display, and navigation
systems. The AWACS radar provided a look-down capability and could ac-
quire and track multiple targets. The ABCCC is a C-130 specially modified
to carry a high-tech command, control, and communications module in the
cargo compartment. It was used to coordinate the aerial operations.
• The JSTARS was an extremely useful reconnaissance platform that provided
very high resolution imagery of ground troops during Operation Desert Storm.
The JSTARS was a modified Boeing 707-300 equipped with a Norden AN/APY-
3 phased array (electronically steered) multimode and a side-looking airborne
radar (SLAR) antenna. The radar was capable of searching out targets over a
77,000-sq-km area with a line of sight range in excess of 250 km (see figure 3.14
below for an indication of the coverage into Kuwait and Iraq that JSTARS had
during the 1991 Operation Desert Storm). It operated in two modes: Doppler
(for slow-moving objects) and synthetic aperture (for stationary objects). In
the former mode a moving target indicator (MTI) is used for wide-area air-
borne battlefield surveillance, while in the latter mode the synthetic aperture
radar (SAR) is employed for fixed-target imagery[141, 92].
• The utility of JSTARS was starkly observed in three different events during
Operation Desert Storm. On January 29 (4 weeks before the main coalition
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Although JSTARS guaranteed all-weather coverage to a depth of 150
kilorneters, tactical commanders still needed a close-in system to see over
the next hill. XVIII Airborne Corps capitalized on the Horus radar pos-
sessed by the French 6th Light Division. Horus is a prototype
moving-target indicator mounted on a Puma helicopter that functions
much like the }STARS. In its first use, the all-weather Horus cued Apaches
and MLRSs for night deep operations. Another technical solution was to
employ drones-UAVs in military parlance-equipped with television
cameras and other sensors. The Navy and Marines possessed the Israeli-
designed Pioneer drones. When the air attacks started, the Army had only
an experimental platoon of five Pioneer UAVs at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
With a 100-mile range, day-and-night capability, multiple-hour endur-
ance, and near-real-time data link, the Pioneer could have served both as
a scout and as a means of precise, instantaneous targeting. However, the
Army's single platoon did not arrive in theater until January 26 and did
not fly its first mission until February 1. As the main attack force, only VII
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Figure 3.14: Operation Desert Storm JSTARS Coverage[164]
ground offensive), Saddam Hussein ordered an attack on Khajfi, just inside
Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately for him, an E-8A Joint STARS aircraft was on
the job, using its moving target indicator and side-looking radar to look deep
inside the battle area. Joint STARS operators detected an armored division
assembly area and a convoy of more than sixty vehicles moving through the
night into Saudi Arabia. They called in two A-10s and an AC-130 gunship
and vectored them onto the convoy and the staging area with the result that
seventy-one vehicles were destroyed. Saddam therefore started his attack on
Khafji short-handed. U.S. officials claim that, during the battle for the Saudi
border town of Khafji early in the war, Joint STARS crew members informed
allied forces that no Iraqi units were coming to support their comrades who had
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entered the town. Armed with this information, allied commanders launched
an immediate and highly effective counterattack. Coalition air forces attacked
the Iraqis in and around Khafji. After two days of fighting, most of Saddam’s
remaining forces withdrew and the rest surrendered[92].
• JSTARS aircraft was also used to watch Iraqi ground reaction when coalition
troops moved into position for the “Left Hook” flanking movement. During the
coalition ground offensive, JSTARS aircraft provided highly detailed images
on Iraqi troop movements (see figures 3.15 and 3.16 below) using which the
coalition forces were able modify their attack posture. Finally, on February 29
the JSTARS was able to capture the retreat in its radars. Using these images
the retreating was targeted and stopped very effectively. This event was given
the moniker, “the highway of death” because of the devastating effect it had
on the Iraqis. Aerial platforms like JSTARS would have a much higher target
value than reconnaissance satellites.
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Certain Victory: The US Army in the GuIf War
JSTARS readout, G plus 1 , depicted 12th Armored Division and
Republican Guard elements moving into blocking positions. This
picture allowed General Stewart to track the lraqi GHQ battle plan as
it developed on the ground.
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Figure 3.15: Desert Storm JSTARS Image During Left Hook Maneuver[164]
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277Figure 3.16: Desert Storm JSTARS Image During Left Hook Maneuver[164]
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3.3 Is There a Benefit to Attacking Communication Satellites?
This section of the chapter will make an argument similar to the one made
above about reconnaissance satellites. Although U.S. communication satellites are
a chief component in the U.S. battlefield communication architecture, there are also
other terrestrial components, like tropospheric scatter (tropo) and microwave sys-
tems, that play an equally important role. U.S. battlefield voice and data networks
are spread across satellite, terrestrial and other radio relay components as shown in
this section. For an adversary attempting to degrade U.S. performance in battle, it
is not apparent that attacking U.S. communication satellites could directly translate
into a particularly predictable advantage. Although an attack on communication
satellites might slow down U.S. actions, it would also provide the U.S. with the
legitimacy to escalate the battle as it desires. That might not be a positive outcome
for the adversary.
In order to understand the communication network employed in warfare, the
1991 Operation Desert Storm communications’ architecture will be examined in this
section. What evolved during the 1991 Gulf War was the largest single communi-
cations mobilization in military history (see Table 3.3 below). It was a network
of multiple systems that was stretched and stressed to provide the connectivity for
a theater-wide communications system. Subsection 3.3.1 below will describe the
development of the Operation Desert Storm theater communication infrastructure
and subsection 3.3.2 will describe how a combined satellite and terrestrial theater
communication infrastructure was used to establish a battlefield voice and data
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network.
Table 3.3: 1991 Gulf War Communications Effort[5]
SINGLE LARGEST COMMUNICATIONS MOBILIZATION
IN HISTORY
110 SHF earth terminals
3 commercial T-1 satellite terminals
1050 USAF circuits
1000 miles of terrestrial systems: 29 tropo (AN/TRC-170) and mi-
crowave links
6 DCS entry points
19 automatic telephone switches (72 AUTOVON trunks)
17 manual switches






350,000 operations for Desert Shield
225,000 operations for Desert Storm
Air Tasking Order often exceeded 950 pages
12 Combat Communications Squadron
3.3.1 Operation Desert Storm: Theater Communications Infrastruc-
ture
When on August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein announced the invasion of Kuwait
to a shocked world, the United States had a single administrative unit in Bahrain
and two training mission in Saudi Arabia, served by satellite communications. U.S.
Army and Air Force communicators were hard pressed to provide means for adequate
connectivity among the rapidly growing number of bases and to the nodes in the
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United States that provided those units with logistic and intelligence. Connections
had to be quickly made if the planned initial air campaign could hope to blunt the
expected Iraqi attacks into Saudi Arabia.
The only immediate solution to the theater connectivity problem was in use
of Ground Mobile Force (GMF) Super-High Frequency (SHF) tactical satellite com-
munications5. The ground network of GMF SHF tactical satellite infrastructure
was created from scratch during the buildup to Operation Desert Storm. Thumrait,
Oman was selected for the initial hub location because it was believed to be outside
the range of Scud or air attack. Soon the buildup of air power required a second
hub at Riyadh and then a third at Al Dhafra, UAE. This latter hub providing
inter-theater trunking to Europe via a UK Syknet satellite and the Indian Ocean
DSCS satellite. Figure 3.17 on page 105 shows the network for the USCENTAF as it
5. During the 1991 Gulf War, the flexibility of space communications was demonstrated by U.S.
authorities by reconfiguring their space segment to match traffic demands. Prior to hostilities, the
U.S. space communications workhorse, the SHF Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
provided the telecommunications coverage of the area through its Eastern Atlantic (EA) and Indian
Ocean (IO) satellites. The total DOD traffic throughput over these two satellites was about 4.5
Mb/s–equivalent to around 70 commercial voice circuits. A little more than 1 month later, with
the first U.S. forces in theater, 48 tactical terminals had been deployed; the traffic throughput
had risen to 38 Mb/s (600 voice channels); and DSCS IO was saturated. Traffic demands were
still building. By mid-September, DSCS 9E was reconfigured (in a novel realignment of its high
gain and multibeam antennas) to increase its Gulf traffic capability. At the same time, under
longstanding agreements, the United Kingdom provided U.S. forces with capacity on its Skynet
4B satellite positioned at 53oE. In the meantime, the U.S. tactical terminal population had risen to
53. It was at this time that President George Bush announced the deployment of 200,000 more U.S.
troops to the Gulf. The decision was then made to boost Gulf traffic capability by relocating the
DSCS reserve West Pacific (WP) satellite from its 180o geostationary parking slot to 65oE. Shortly
after DSCS WP began operation, traffic had risen to 44 Mb/s (710 voice circuits), 60 U.S. earth
stations were operating in theater and the United Kingdom’s Skynet 4A at 30oE was providing
additional reserve capability. By the time traffic to U.S. forces in the Gulf had peaked, yet another
SHF satellite, DSCS Indian Ocean Reserve, was available, the throughput had risen to 68 Mb/s
(1,100 voice circuits) and the earth station population was 110. In addition to DSCS SHF services,
U.S. forces in the Gulf were also served by UHF geostationary satellites, the Fltsatcom/AFsatcom
and Leasat/Syncom families[185].
103
ultimately evolved. Commercial satellite communications eventually supplemented
each of USCENTAF’s satellite hubs, becoming the primary means of extending DSN,
AUTODIN, weather and several other services from CONUS to theater[5, 64].
However, the interim theater network provided by the Ground Mobile Force
(GMF) satellite terminals provided an initial, if precarious capability. Commu-
nications were almost totally dependent upon the theater satellite hubs and would
remained so until airlift could be obtained for the AN/TSC-170 tropospheric scatter
and microwave terminals. By mid-August, engineers from the 5th Combat Commu-
nications Group had completed initial studies6 and concluded that it was feasible to
construct what would become the “longest tactical, digital, terrestrial transmission
system ever assembled.” The first increment of the tropo network would connect
the communications hubs at Riyadh with Al Dhafra, through the tactical air bases
on the eastern side of the Saudi Arabian peninsula. Later it would extend north
through King Khalid Military City (KKMC) to Rahfa on the border with Iraq.
This northward extension provided circuitry from the Tactical Air Control Center
(TACC) in Riyadh to the radar control and reporting center at KKMC and to three
air support operations centers co-located with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, the VII
Corps and other coalition ground forces (Figure 3.18 on page 106 shows microwave
sites connecting the XVIIIth Airborne Corps). Figures 3.19 and 3.20 below show
the final configuration of the terrestrial transmission system, consisting of 29 links
of tropospheric and microwave, covering over 1,000 miles.
6. Design parameters called for a transmission rate of 2,304 kbps with a link availability of .90 and a
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Figure 3.17: Desert Storm: Satellite Communication Architecture[64]
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Figure 3.18: Microwave Communications Relay Sites Providing Commu-
nications Link Between XVIII Airborne Corps and Rear Area[214]
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Figure 3.19: Desert Storm: Terrestrial Communication Architecture[64]
Figure 3.20: Desert Storm: Terrestrial Communication Architecture
(Close-up View)[64]
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This subsection demonstrates that both satellite and terrestrial communica-
tion architectures were created during Operation Desert Storm. Though, it should
be acknowledged that satellite-based communications systems came into operation
much earlier due to the easy availability of GMF terminals during the operations.
The next subsection will discuss how the satellite and terrestrial communication
architectures were used to establish a theater voice and data network.
3.3.2 Operation Desert Storm: Theater Voice and Data Network
Figure 3.21 below shows the U.S. voice network that drew its trunking from
both the satellite and terrestrial systems described above. It contained 19 automatic
and 17 manual switchboards and processed just under 30 million calls through 70
AUTOVON trunks. By January 1991 there would be an additional 169 telephone
switches brought into the theater by the other military services.
This networks eventually evolved to satisfy customer needs for both voice and
message traffic, but had little capability to handle large volumes of bit-oriented
data traffic. Planners had greatly underestimated the volume and the variety of
data transmission that would be required by automated combat support systems.
A significant proportion of warfare was automated during Operation Desert Storm
requiring the ability to transmit large volumes of data.
At the higher levels of command, enemy formations and strengths are tracked
and analyzed with computers, courses of action were war-gamed with computer




























































































Figure 3.21: USCENTAF Voice Network[64]
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computer spreadsheets. Once this information was analyzed and compiled by com-
puters, the same machines were used to pass the information between commanders
and staff organizers. During Desert Storm, staff officers regularly used spreadsheets
and databases to track the arrival and location of units and supplies. Briefing charts,
with operational information for senior commanders, were changed and distributed
daily to other headquarters through computer systems. There was a need to send
large amounts of information securely over long distances. For example, the daily
theater logistic report was prepared at the 22nd Support Command Headquarters
in Dhahran in eastern Saudi Arabia. This report was medium sized (approximately
fifty kilobytes) Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet that was compiled with data from both the
Dhahran area and from King Khalid Military City (KKMC) which is 380 miles
north-west of Dhahran. Once officers at the 22nd Support Command Headquarters
compiled and briefed the report to their commander, they sent the report to the
Army Headquarters in Riyadh, 350 miles to the southwest. The Army headquarters
staff made any changes necessary for their purposes, presented it to their comman-
der, and then forwarded it 8000 miles to the rear Army headquarters in the United
States.
All the data requirements for computer-based planning discussed above was
met by the Army Central Forces (ARCENT) Command and Control Information
System (AC2IS). AC2IS provided Army level staff officers with a secure means to
quickly pass electronic messages and transfer data files long distances[203]. AC2IS
was designed to use the existing theater communications architecture. The trans-
mission medium ran the gamut from short line-of-sight microwave and tropospheric-
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scatter systems to communications satellites as shown in figure 3.22. AC2IS was
accurate and could transfer the file to any other station on the network, including
stations in the United States or Germany, in less time than it took to make a con-
nection on a secure FAX machine. A dedicated data system like AC2IS also reduced
the load on the tactical switching system.












































Circuit From To Type
Figure 3.22: ARCENT Command and Control Information Systems[7]
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Another system that was used to handle the large volumes of bit-oriented
data traffic among the elements of the U.S. Air Force was the Tactical Data Links7
(TADIL) (see figure 3.23 below). A key component of the successful Desert Storm
air campaign, TADIL enabled real time exchange of voice and radar displays. This
network had to be improvised during the operation. The challenge to USCENTAF
communicators was to provide communications connectivity between the Tactical
Air Control Center (TACC) in Riyadh and its eyes and ears now embarked on a
growing family of aircraft, some of which were orbiting at greater distances from
Riyadh8 than could be reliably supported through conventional ground-air-ground
communications nets. Also, these nets were not suitable for transferring data in
near real-time. TADIL served that purpose by connecting the various components
of the TACC. TADIL used satellite, terrestrial and other self-sufficient radio relays
7. Tactical Data Links or TADIL consists of: TADIL-A (also known as Link-11A) employs netted
communication techniques using standard message formats. TADIL-A radios can operate in the
HF band, giving a range of up to 300 nautical miles(nm), or the UHF band, giving a range of
approximately 25 nm surface-to-surface or up to 150 nm surface-to-air. TADIL-A data links op-
erate at rates of 1,364 bps (HF/UHF) or 2,250 bps (UHF). TADIL-A is used commonly in the sea
environment for the exchange of air, surface, and subsurface tracks, EW data, and limited com-
mand data among connected terminals. TADIL-B (also known as Link-11B) provides a secure,
full-duplex, point-to-point digital data link utilizing serial transmission frame characteristics and
standard message formats at 2,400, 1,200, or 600 bps. It interconnects tactical air defense and
air control units. Tactical Data Link (TADIL-J) is a secure, high capacity, jam-resistant, nodeless
data link which uses the JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) transmission
characteristics and protocols, conventions, and fixed-length messages formats. TADIL-J operates
in the UHF band in the frequency range of 960 to 1,215 MHz, and therefore provides LOS op-
eration. TADIL-J is an all-informed nets. In the U.S. Army, TADIL-J terminals is now planned
to be assigned to division, corps, and echelon above corps (EAC). These terminals will support
engagement operations, command and control, surveillance, weapon status and coordination, pre-
cise participant location and identification (PPLI), and battlefield situation awareness (air and
ground).
8. The airborne warning and control system (E3 AWACS), the airborne command and control center
(ABCCC), the intelligence gathering RC-135 Rivet Joint and eventually the airborne radar Joint
Stars (JSTARS) aircraft, were often ranging or orbiting well beyond limits of UHF radio range
from the TACC in Riyadh.
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Figure 3.23: USCENTAF TADIL Network[64]
These operational descriptions of the voice and data networks used during
Operation Desert Storm again reinforces the point that communication capabilities
are spread across satellite, terrestrial and other radio relay components9. For an
adversary attempting to degrade U.S. performance in battle it is not apparent that
attacking U.S. communication satellites could directly translate into a particularly
predictable advantage.
9. This multiple platform communication architecture will persist. Two of the DSCS satellites have
failed. The replacement to the DSCS satellite, the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) com-
munications satellites has experienced both program delays and cost increases. The first Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS) communications satellite was launched on February 24, 2012: a




This chapter was intended to test the validity of the argument that there
are substantial military motivations that might induce an adversary of the U.S. in
attacking its satellite assets. In order test that argument, three classes satellite
systems were examined in this chapter. Section 3.1 examined the benefits to an
adversary from attacking the GPS satellite system. In that section, the GPS system
was modeled and its performance was simulated under conditions of attack. The
simulation revealed that that an adversary like China or one with capability similar
to China, would have to simultaneously attack at least 4 GPS satellites to produce
a militarily relevant benefit10. Any benefit, however, dissipates quickly within 2
hours. After that, the redundancy of the GPS satellite constellation makes up for
the effects of the attack on the GPS satellite system. Also, the degradation of the
GPS accuracy shows a daily periodic pattern after the attack. This would make it
possible for the U.S. to respond and adapt its strategy after the attack. Given this,
this section concludes that there does not seem to be any abiding tactical military
logic in attacking GPS satellites.
Section 3.2 examined the benefits of attacking U.S. satellite reconnaissance
platforms. Using the data from the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, the case is made
that U.S. battle reconnaissance capabilities are spread across multiple platforms
10. The simulation discussed above was done assuming that the adversary would possess the capability
to attack and disable 4 or more satellites simultaneously. The next chapter on anti-satellite (ASAT)
missiles will argue that neither does China possess the satellite tracking infrastructure nor is there
evidence it is developing the operational missile batteries needed to execute such an attack with a
high probability of success.
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including air-borne vehicles. These aerial reconnaissance platforms can perform
as good as satellites and in some cases better. Also, the satellite reconnaissance
infrastructure is composed of many satellites providing redundancies against attacks.
In order to disrupt that infrastructure a number of those satellites will need to be
attacked. Section 3.2 argues that although U.S. reconnaissance satellites do have
important applications in a battle, that fact alone does not mean that they would
be considered as desirable targets. For an adversary trying to obtain a military
advantage, there seems to be little value in attacking reconnaissance satellites due
to the presence of multiple systems capable of performing reconnaissance missions.
Finally, section 3.3 examined the benefits to an adversary from attacking U.S.
communication satellites. Similar to the argument made in the section on reconnais-
sance satellites, even though U.S. communication satellites are a chief component in
the U.S. battlefield communication architecture, there are other terrestrial compo-
nents, like tropospheric scatter (tropo) and microwave systems, that play an equally
important role. U.S. battlefield voice and data networks are usually spread across
satellite, terrestrial and other radio relay components. For an adversary attempting
to degrade U.S. performance in battle, it is not apparent that attacking U.S. com-
munication satellites could directly translate into a particularly predictable battle
advantage.
In sum, the various sections of this chapter make the case there are no obvi-
ously evident benefits for an adversary in attacking U.S. satellite systems for purely




The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Missiles
A recurrent refrain in the debate on space security has been about the threat to
U.S. military space assets. The most dramatic characterization of this refrain is the
“space Pearl Harbor” analogy used by the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission1 report. The
Rumsfeld Commission in its report stated, “If the U.S. is to avoid “a space Pearl
Harbor” it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems.
The U.S. is more dependent on space than any other nation. Yet the threat to the
U.S. and its allies in and from space does not command the attention it merits.
Other participants in the debate on space security have also expressed similar
concerns on the safety of U.S. military space assets in various forms:
• Among many complex and diverse lessons, Chinese analyses of U.S. military
operations in the Persian Gulf wars, Kosovo and Afghanistan have yielded one
critical insight: the U.S. is inordinately dependent on its complex but exposed
network of sophisticated command, control, communications and computer-
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems operating syner-
gistically in and through space. In other words, while American military power
derives its disproportionate efficacy from its ability to leverage critical space
1. Formally, it was called Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization. It was headed by Donald Rumsfeld.
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assets, these very resources are simultaneously a font of deep and abiding vul-
nerability. Chinese strategists concluded, that any effort to defeat the U.S.
would require a riposte against its Achilles heel: its space-based capabilities
and their organic ground installations[21].
• The Chinese consider American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
satellites, and even meteorological satellites, to be “space weapons” and there-
fore legitimate targets. According to Kevin Pollpeter, China Project Manager
of the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis of Defense Group Inc., a
common theme in practically every Chinese book and magazine article about
space is that “whoever controls space controls the Earth.” Its almost obliga-
tory to put this in a book or article[65].
• The fragility of space systems, and the very limited number of spares, means
that the functions these systems provide can be quickly and in some cases
easily cut off[49].
• This (U.S.) dependence on space will offer opportunities for low-cost, “asym-
metric” strategies for inflicting significant damage to the U.S. without having
to confront the full brunt of U.S. military forces[82].
• Due to the dramatic war fighting advantage that space support provides to
U.S. forces, security analysts are nearly unanimous in their judgment that
future enemies will likely attempt to “level the playing field” by attacking
U.S. space systems in efforts to degrade or eliminate that support[80].
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This chapter challenges the validity of the concern raised above about the feasi-
bility of an attack on U.S. space systems2. It does so by systematically evaluating the
question: How vulnerable are satellites to a targeted attack? More specifically, can
nominated adversaries like China be able to destroy with high probability specific
U.S. military satellites employing a direct-ascent hit-to-kill anti-satellite (ASAT)
missile? Direct-ascent hit-to-kill ASAT missiles are required to ensure a high prob-
ability success in attacking and destroying satellites. An operational direct-ascent
hit-to-kill ASAT missile capability is, therefore, a clear indication of a nation’s intent
to attack satellites.
In the discussions within the community that subscribes to the idea of an
imminent threat to U.S. military space systems, China is invariably considered as
the most likely potential adversary. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) director, Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, recently told a Senate committee
while presenting the DIA’s 2012 worldwide threats report that the agency believes
China is developing a space weapon program that can be used against satellites
worldwide[116]. He argued that it would take “only” (emphasis added) about two
dozen ASAT missile attacks from China to cause serious damage to U.S. military
operations.
The evidence usually provided to make the case for China’s ability to success-
fully execute such comprehensive ASAT missions is the 2007 Chinese ASAT test3.
2. The question on the utility of attacking U.S. military satellites was addressed in the previous
chapter.
3. The 2010 Chinese missile defense test is also used by some as a potential demonstration of China’s
ASAT capabilities. On 11 January 2010, China launched an SC-19 missile from the Korla Missile
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In 2007, China used a modified version of its DF-21 (NATO CSS-5) missile called
the SC-19 ASAT missile to intercept and destroy one of its non-functional weather
satellite (the FY-1C of Fengyun series) at an altitude of roughly 865 kilometers.
Those making the case for Chinese ASAT capabilities argue that this test
was a clear indication of the capability to engage in an advanced ASAT mission.
The analytical evidence presented in this paper, however, argues against that idea.
The results demonstrate that ASAT intercepts are very complex under realistic
conditions and that China’s has very limited to potential, if any, to use direct ascent
hit-to-kill ASATs in a real-world battle scenario.
4.1 Conceptualizing an ASAT Missile Attack
This chapter will examine the two different ways to understand a direct ascent
hit-to-kill anti-satellite (ASAT) mission profile.
• The first one is the simpler case of a target satellite on a non-varying4 orbit
for the duration of the ASAT attack mission. In this scenario, the satellite
being targeted has been tracked and its orbit mapped for a substantial period
of time. This means that the nation engaging in the ASAT attack can predict
with high accuracy the position of the satellite at each instant of time. The
mission then reduces to flying out the intercepting ASAT missile to a pre-
determined location on the path of the satellite at the right time. Put simply,
Test Complex and supposedly successfully intercepted a near-simultaneously launched CSS-X-11
medium-range ballistic missile launched from the Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center[27].
4. The satellite is on a predicted orbit and will not undergo any maneuvers.
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the target here reduces to a fixed point in space. The Chinese ASAT test is
an example of this kind of intercept. The region of outer space in which the
ASAT missile can successfully intercept a non-varying orbit satellite is referred
to as the “cone of vulnerability” in this chapter. The extent of the cone of
vulnerability is a function of the ASAT missile boost-phase flight velocity
profile. Section 4.2 of this chapter will discuss in detail the simulation and
estimation of the “cone of vulnerability.”
• The second type of ASAT mission profile is more complex and realistic. In this
scenario the targeted satellite has performed a maneuver or there is no prior
information available on its orbit. Either way, the satellite has be tracked as
it flies towards the territory of the nation (or its allies) engaging in the ASAT
attack while the ASAT missile is in flight towards a “head-on collision” with
the satellite. This is a more realistic representation of how an ASAT attack
will unfold. Section 4.3 will discuss in detail the simulation of a “head-on
collision” scenario.
The evidence presented in the chapter will show that even under the ideal con-
ditions5 of a non-varying orbit satellite as target the reach of Chinese SC-19 ASAT
missile is very limited. In the case of an ASAT engaging an emerging satellite target
in a “head-on collision” the capabilities of the modeled SC-19 are insufficient. To
maintain a manageable miss distance, an ASAT attack has to be launched simul-
5. Ideal conditions refer to perfect targeting information of the target satellite. This enables the
ASAT to aim at a fixed point in space to achieve intercept collision at the same time the satellite
traverses it.
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taneously as the emerging target is being tracked. Doing so requires a continuous
thrusting capability that would enable the ASAT to fly out and intercept the target
satellite. The ASAT missile can, however, generate thrust only during its boosting
phase.
4.2 Case I: Cone of Vulnerability
The “cone of vulnerability” is broadly defined as the region in space in which
a satellite with a non-varying orbit is vulnerable to attack from a particular ASAT
missile. Any satellite passing through the cone can be destroyed by the ASAT with
a high probability of success. The cone of vulnerability is centered at the launch
location of the ASAT missile and its maximum radial and altitude range depends
on the boost-phase velocity profile and dynamics of the ASAT missile.
In the first part of this section, the cone of vulnerability will be determined
for a ASAT missile with a zero-lag guidance system i.e., the ASAT missile is able
to spontaneously satisfy all its lateral divert requirements (subject to 10 g limit
on lateral acceleration at any instant). In the second part of this section, the the
zero-lag guidance system will be replaced by a more realistic 3rd order flight control
system (subject to 10 g limit on lateral acceleration at any instant). A third-order
flight control system creates a time lag between commanded and achieved lateral
divert of the ASAT missile and it is not able to spontaneously satisfy all of its lateral
divert requirements.
The “cone of vulnerability” for both of these analyses is generated using an
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SC-19 Chinese ASAT missile (the parameters of the missile are shown Table 4.1
below) launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center (28o12′00′′N latitude and
102o02′00′′E longitude). These parameters were chosen to mimic the 2007 Chinese
ASAT test.
Table 4.1: Assumed Properties of Chinese DF-21 ASAT Missile
Total Propellant Isp(s) Burn
Mass(lb) Mass(lb) Time(s)
Stage-1 20,800 19,136 300 60
Stage-2 11,200 10,304 300 60
KV
Stage
1,325 1,200 300 60
KV
Payload
125 0 0 0
As previously stated, the “cone of vulnerability” analyses discussed in this
section are done by assuming that the target satellite will arrive at a particular
point in space inside the vulnerability cone at the same time the ASAT missile
reaches that point in space. Subsection 4.2.1 and subsection 4.2.2 below will outline
the equations used to model the flight dynamics and guidance laws of the ASAT
missile used in a “cone of vulnerability” intercept scenario.
4.2.1 Physics of Cone of Vulnerability Simulation
There are two parts to simulating the dynamics of the ASAT intercept used to
produce the data for generating the “cone of vulnerability.” The first part involves
modeling and simulating the parameters of the target satellite. For determining
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the “cone of vulnerability,” the satellite’s flight path is not simulated. Instead the
satellite is positioned at various points in space. The altitude of the satellite is varied
from 300 km to 850 km, the inclination is varied from 0 degrees to 360 degrees, and
the values of mean anomaly6 are accounted for by placing the satellite at various
radial distance from the launch location at the given altitude and inclination.
The second part involves modeling and simulating the ASAT missile which is
described below. The simulation of the ASAT missile is accomplished by forcing
the ASAT model to obey Newton’s Second Law at each time step[235]. The ASAT
missile also has a built-in guidance system designed to reduce the distance between
itself and the target satellite in order to achieve collision. The guidance system
generates a thrust component perpendicular to the velocity vector that forces the
ASAT missile to move in a direction that achieves collision.
In vector form Newton’s law is written as
~F = m~a (4.1)
where ~F is the force vector (in Newtons) acting on the center of gravity of the ASAT
missile, m is the total mass (in kg), and ~a is the net acceleration (in m/s2). There
are three major forces acting on the missile:
~F = ~T + ~W + ~D (4.2)
6. The mean anomaly of a satellite tells where the satellite is located in its orbital path
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Thrust (~T ) acting in the direction of the ASAT missile velocity vector, Weight
( ~W ) acting in the direction of the center of the Earth, and Drag ( ~D) acting in the
direction opposite to the ASAT missile velocity vector. Thrust (~T ) is calculated as
as




However, the Thrust (~T ) is composed of ~Tv and ~Tp as shown in equation 4.4 below.
~F = ~Tv + ~Tp + ~W + ~D (4.4)
~Tv is the thrust component along the direction of the velocity vector (in m/s) and ~Tp
is the thrust component perpendicular to the velocity vector (i.e. the lateral divert).
The mechanism to calculate ~Tv and ~Tv is shown in subsection 4.2.2 below. The total
magnitude of the two thrust components parallel and perpendicular to the velocity
vector is always equal to the total thrust ~T provided by the rocket engine.
The magnitude of the other two forces are calculated as
W = mg (4.5)
D = 0.5ρV 2CdAprojected (4.6)
where Isp is the stage specific impulse (in s), Ẇ is the change in stage weight over
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time, ρ is the atmospheric density at the current position of the ASAT missile,
V is the velocity magnitude of the ASAT missile, Cd is the co-efficient of drag,
and Aprojected is the projected area of the ASAT. Ẇ is the product of in-stage fuel
consumption dm
dt
(in kg/s) and gravitational acceleration at the current distance
from the center of the Earth g in (m/s2).
4.2.2 ASAT Missile Guidance System
Proportional navigation guidance law is used for estimating ~Tp, the guiding
force used in driving the ASAT missile towards the target satellite7. Figure 4.1
on page 126 depicts the operational logic of the Proportional Navigation guidance
system.
The first step in the guidance law is for the ASAT missile to measure/read the
position vector of the target satellite ~rt and compute the line of sight (LOS) vector
~λ by subtracting its own position vector ~rm as shown in equation 4.7 below
~λ = ~rt − ~rm (4.7)
This LOS vector ~λ is then differentiated to calculate the LOS rate vector ~̇λ
7. The proportional navigation guidance law is optimal for constant velocity targets. This condition
is not satisfied for satellite targets. However, the aim in this simulation is not to design a guidance
law for ASAT intercepts. The aim is to understand ASAT intercept physics in generic terms. Hence
the simplified proportional navigation guidance law is used. More detailed studies for designing a
tuned guidance system for an accelerating target can be found in the APS study on boost-phase
intercept[16].
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Figure 4.1: ASAT Missile Proportional Navigation Guidance System Diagram




where ∆t is the simulation step time.
The closing velocity Vc is computed as the range rate. The range between
the target satellite and the ASAT missile is the magnitude of the LOS vector |~λ|.
This magnitude is calculated for each time step of the simulation and differentiated.







The calculated parameters ~̇λ and Vc are multiplied by the navigation coefficient




The commanded acceleration is always applied perpendicular to the LOS. The
flight control system uses the commanded lateral acceleration to change the attitude
of the missile resulting in the achieved lateral acceleration vector ~nL. The achieved
lateral acceleration vector ~nL is integrated along with other accelerations acting on
the system resulting in a new missile position ~rm.
The instantaneous LOS vector is normalized to obtain the LOS unit vector λ̂.
In the next time step, the new LOS is computed using equation 4.7 and converted
to the unit vector. Vector subtraction of these two unit vectors is the direction
in which the acceleration command is applied and is always perpendicular to the








where n̂c is the unit acceleration command vector perpendicular to the LOS, λ̂ is
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instantaneous unit LOS vector, and λ̂previous is the previous unit LOS vector.
Finally, the commanded acceleration vector is calculated. The magnitude of
the commanded acceleration is computed by multiplying the navigation ratio, the
closing velocity, and the magnitude of the LOS rate. Multiplying the magnitude
of the acceleration command with the acceleration command unit vector yields the
commanded acceleration command vector. This is expressed as
~nc = n̂cN
′Vc|λ̇| (4.12)
For a zero lag system, the achieved acceleration nL is always equal to the
commanded acceleration nc and, for the moment it is assumed that the ASAT
missile dynamics are free of lags.
The computed acceleration command is perpendicular to the LOS; however,
missile acceleration commands ( ~Tp) can only be applied perpendicular to the ve-
locity vector. Thus, only the commanded acceleration component perpendicular
to the velocity vector contributes to the missile guidance. The thrust component
perpendicular to the velocity vector, ~Tp, is then given as
~Tp = ~nc⊥mm (4.13)
where mm is the ASAT missile mass at the current time.





|~T |2 − |~Tp|2 (4.14)
4.2.3 The Extent of the “Cone of Vulnerability” for a Zero-Lag Flight
Control System
This section will show the results of applying the equations outlined above
in subsection 4.2.1 and subsection 4.2.2 for a zero-lag flight control system. The
dimensions of the “cone of vulnerability” i.e., the maximum radial distance at a
given altitude of the target satellite up to which a successful interception can be
accomplished are illustrated in figure 4.2 on page 130, figure 4.3 on page 131, fig-
ure 4.4 on page 131 and figure 4.5 on page 132 below. The dimensions of the “cone
of vulnerability” are also listed in table 4.2 on page 130 along with other variables of
the simulation. For example, at a target satellite altitude of 500 km, the maximum
radial distance at which the SC-19 can successfully intercept and destroy the satel-
lite is 360 km8. This maximum radial distance changes from altitude to altitude.
The simulation also shows that the SC-19 has a very low radial outreach of 1 km at
an altitude of 850 km.
8. The criteria for successful intercept is a miss distance of 5 m or less. In real-world operations a
miss distance of 1 m or less is required. However, in a computer simulation 5 m is accepted due
to the effects of the time resolution on the intercept.
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Table 4.2: Maximum Radial Reach of SC-19 ASAT Missile at Given Altitude (Zero-
Lag Flight Control System)
Altitude of Max. Radial Miss Lateral Time to
Intercept Distance at Distance Divert Interception
(km) Altitude (km) (m) (m/s) (min)
300 390 4.79 7629.47 3.00
400 410 3.77 4951.67 3.01
500 360 4.36 3236.05 2.99
600 280 2.54 2071.68 2.99
700 70 3.20 443.28 3.00
800 2 3.58 56.72 3.17
850 1 3.82 48.41 3.25
Figure 4.2: SC-19 ASAT Missile: Cone of Vulnerability (Top View)
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Figure 4.3: SC-19 ASAT Missile: Cone of Vulnerability (Top View)
Figure 4.4: SC-19 ASAT Missile: Cone of Vulnerability (Side View)
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Figure 4.5: SC-19 ASAT Missile: Cone of Vulnerability (Side View)
4.2.4 3rd Flight Control System
So far the ASAT missile guidance is assumed to be perfect. In other words, the
achieved acceleration nL is always equal to the commanded acceleration nc. This
type of model is known as a zero-lag guidance system, where the ASAT missile
flight control system can respond to acceleration commands immediately and with
100 percent efficiency. In reality, guidance systems have lags (or delays) in their
response. In this subsection, the simulation model is expanded to include a real-
world flight control system.
If the flight control system lag is modeled as a 1st order transfer function, the
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where nL is the achieved lateral acceleration that is integrated to obtained the ASAT
missile lateral divert (~Tp), nc is the commanded lateral acceleration, s is the complex
frequency, and T is the system time constant9.





bsn + csn−1 + · · ·+ ds2 + es+ f
(4.16)
where a, b, c, · · · , f are constants characterizing the system poles.
For the simulation executed in this chapter the ASAT missiles’ flight control











s2 + Ts+ 1
(4.17)
In the next subsection the simulation results obtained using this 3rd order
ASAT guidance system are shown.
9. The determination of optimal system time constant is study in itself. This was done in the
background of the simulation in this chapter. It is however not detailed here. More information
on designing a transfer function can be seen in Zarchan[152, 153].
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4.2.5 The Extent of the “Cone of Vulnerability” for a 3rd Flight Con-
trol System
This section will show the results of applying the third-order flight control
equations to the ASAT missile. The dimensions of the “cone of vulnerability” under
this condition are illustrated in figure 4.6 on page 135, figure 4.7 on page 136 and
figure 4.8 on page 136 below. The dimensions of the “cone of vulnerability” are also
listed in table 4.3 on page 134 along with other variables of the simulation.
Table 4.3: Maximum Radial Reach of SC-19 ASAT Missile at Given Altitude (3rd
Order Flight Control System)
Altitude of Max. Radial Miss Lateral Time to
Intercept Distance at Distance Divert Interception
(km) Altitude (km) (m) (m/s) (min)
300 5 4.70 57.00 2.14
400 4.8 4.72 47.83 2.39
500 4.4 4.89 41.71 2.62
600 5.1 4.48 44.88 2.82
700 5.1 4.28 42.00 3.00
800 0.8 4.89 7.16 3.17
850 0.8 4.61 8.45 3.25
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Figure 4.6: SC-19 ASAT Missile: Cone of Vulnerability (Top View)
It is immediately clear from observing figures 4.6, 4.8 and 4.7 generated for an
ASAT missile with a 3rd order flight control system that the region of space contained
in the “cone of vulnerability” has dramatically reduced. The lags introduced into the
ASAT missile by the third-order flight control system increases the miss distances
above the tolerable limit of 5 m in almost every point in space.
To understand why that is happening, a comparison of the lateral acceleration
and divert is made below between a ASAT missile with a zero-lag and a 3rd order
flight control system. For both cases, the ASAT is attempting to intercept a satellite
that would pass through the point in space that is at an altitude of 500 km and
radial distance of 360 km from the ASAT launch site (Xichang Satellite Launch
Center). Figure 4.9 below shows the lateral acceleration and divert for a zero-lag
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Figure 4.7: SC-19 ASAT Missile: Cone of Vulnerability (Side View)
Figure 4.8: SC-19 ASAT Missile: Cone of Vulnerability (Side View)
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flight control system ASAT whose intercept miss distance is 5.36 m. Figure 4.10
below shows the lateral acceleration and divert for a 3rd order flight control system
ASAT whose intercept miss distance is 110.73 m.
The increased miss distance for a 3rd order flight control system ASAT can
be explained by the constant lag between achieved and commanded lateral accel-
eration. The left panel of figure 4.10 shows that the achieved lateral acceleration
lags behind the commanded lateral acceleration at every time instant for a 3rd order
flight control system. This lag causes the required lateral acceleration and divert for
an intercept to rise in comparison to the zero-lag system. Although the increased
lateral acceleration compensates for some of the effects of the constant lag, it is still
insufficient to reduce the miss distance to manageable levels.

















































Figure 4.9: Zero-Lag Flight Control System ASAT Missile: Lateral Ac-
celeration and Divert
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Figure 4.10: 3rd Order Flight Control System ASAT Missile: Lateral
Acceleration and Divert
4.3 Case II: Head-On Collision
The “head-on collision” type of ASAT mission profile is more realistic. An
ASAT mission during wartime is much more likely to resemble the “head-on colli-
sion” intercept scenario described below. In this scenario, the targeted satellite has
either performed a maneuver or there is no prior information available on its orbit.
Either way, the satellite has to be tracked as it flies over the territory of the at-
tacking nation (or its allies) while the ASAT missile is in flight towards a “head-on
collision” with the satellite. This scenario is similar to a ballistic missile defense
intercept.
There are two parts to simulating the dynamics of the ASAT-satellite “head-on
collision” scenario. The first part involves modeling and simulating the parameters of
the target satellite. This part is described in subsection 4.3.1 below. The second part
involves the modeling of the dynamics, guidance law, and flight control system of the
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ASAT missile, which was described in subsection 4.2.1 on page 122, subsection 4.2.2
on page 125 and subsection 4.2.4 on page 132 above.
4.3.1 Satellite Orbit Simulation
For the “head-on collision” simulation, the target satellite orbit is propagated
in time. The altitude of the target satellite is 800 km. The inclination is set equal to
the latitude of Xichang satellite launch center and the right ascension of ascending
node (RAAN) is chosen to mimic an ideal situation where the satellite exactly passes
the launch site. The mean anomaly at the beginning of the target satellite orbit
propagation is, however, varied as a function of time ranging from 0 to 12 minutes
after zero mean anomaly passage. The mean anomaly at various instants is given
by
w = nt (4.18)
Given the inclination, RAAN, and mean anomaly, the position of the target
satellite during simulation is determined in spherical angles using the formulas given
in table 4.4 below.
After calculating the spherical coordinates, the target satellite position vector
at each time can be determined in an Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF) coordi-
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Table 4.4: Spherical Coordinates for Target Satellite at a Given Time
[22]
θ (radians) φ (radians)
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4.3.2 Limits on Achieving a “Head-On Collision”
Assuming that China is able to continuously track a satellite, this subsection
will show that it is still not possible for China to engage an emerging satellite in a
“head-on collision” using its SC-19 ASAT missile.
Figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 below illustrate the result of a “head-on col-
lision” between the modeled SC-19 ASAT missile and a satellite at 800 km altitude.
The left panel of each of these figures show an ideal scenario where the ASAT missile
has a zero-lag flight control system with unlimited thrust. The right panel shows
an operational real-world SC-19 missile with a 3rd order flight control system that
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has thrusting capability only when its rocket motors are ignited.
It can be seen from the right panel that for a real-world, operationally limited
ASAT missile, the lateral acceleration starts to rise after the boost-period of the
missile. However, the ASAT is not able to provide the required lateral acceleration.
This leads to continuously rising lateral divert and growing target satellite maneuver
as seen from the perspective of the ASAT missile. These effects lead to an inability
of the SC-19 ASAT missile to engage the satellite in a “head-on collision”. The
same effect is observed for the various cases of 0, 5, 10 and 12 minutes after 0 mean
anomaly passage shown below.
This difficulty in engaging a satellite in a “head-on collision” scenario can be
understood as a result of the difference between the velocity of the target satellite
and the ASAT missile. The satellite is traveling at approximately 7.5 km/s. In the
three minutes of boost available to the modeled SC-19 missile the satellite travels
a distance of 1350 km. In the same three minutes the ASAT missile will have to
travel to the altitude of 800 km and, at the same time, compensate for the 1350 km
the satellite traverses using its lateral acceleration forces. The ASAT mission must
accomplish this while starting from 0 km/s velocity and flying at a average velocity
of approximately 5.42 km/s during its 3 minutes of boosted flight.
4.4 Conclusion: The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Missiles
This chapter has made the case even under ideal conditions, the reach of the
Chinese SC-19 direct-ascent hit-to-kill ASAT missile is very limited. There seems
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to be a thin region in space where a direct-ascent hit-to-kill ASAT mission might
be feasible under the conditions of perfect satellite tracking. Given that, in order
to have a high probability of success, an adversary like China would have to invest
significantly in both satellite tracking infrastructure and ASAT missile batteries that
would engage in salvo fire against target satellites.
There does not seem to be any sign that the Chinese are creating such an
infrastructure. Those arguing otherwise would need to provide evidence proving the
presence of such infrastructures or will have to demonstrate how the Chinese or an
adversary with similar capability can execute a targeted ASAT attack against an
U.S. satellite with a high probability of success.
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(c) Ideal Case: Zero-Lag flight Control
System With Unlimited Thrust
(d) Real-World Case: 3rd Order flight Control System
With 3 Minutes of Thrust
Figure 4.11: Head-on Collision (0 Minutes After 0 Mean Anomaly Passage)
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(c) Ideal Case: Zero-Lag flight Control
System With Unlimited Thrust
(d) Real-World Case: 3rd Order flight Control System
With 3 Minutes of Thrust
Figure 4.12: Head-on Collision (5 Minutes After 0 Mean Anomaly Passage)
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(c) Ideal Case: Zero-Lag flight Control
System With Unlimited Thrust
(d) Real-World Case: 3rd Order flight Control System
With 3 Minutes of Thrust
Figure 4.13: Head-on Collision (10 Minutes After 0 Mean Anomaly Passage)
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(c) Ideal Case: Zero-Lag flight Control
System With Unlimited Thrust
(d) Real-World Case: 3rd Order flight Control System
With 3 Minutes of Thrust
Figure 4.14: Head-on Collision (12 Minutes After 0 Mean Anomaly Passage)
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Chapter 5
Satellites, Missile Defense and Space Security
This chapter will investigate the role of modern satellite systems in U.S. missile
defense operations and the effect of that linkage on space security. The Russians
and Chinese contend that such a functional dyad, if and when operational and
synchronized, could provide the U.S. with a false confidence in its ability to engage
in a coordinated nuclear strike against them. This, they argue, upends the balance
of strategic restraint between the U.S. and them. The Russians and Chinese frame
the debate on space weaponization and arms control to include missile defense. The
U.S. has argued that missile defense is a legitimate right that it preserves to protect
itself. It is between these contrasting views that any agreement on space security
will have to emerge.
U.S. missile defense systems have for a long time had a weak functional link
to satellites. In the face of repeated claims and attempts to use satellites to sig-
nificantly improve the efficiency of missile defense systems little was accomplished.
The only implemented satellite system for missile defense purposes is the Defense
Support Program (DSP)1. However, the utility of the DSP satellites for missile de-
1. DSP is the first operational constellation of satellites being used since 1970s for missile defense
applications. Since then, DOD has attempted to replace DSP with the Advanced Warning System
in the early 1980s; the Follow-on Early Warning System in the early 1990s; and the Alert, Locate,
and Report Missiles system in mid-1990s. These attempts failed due to immature technology, high
cost, and affordability issues[218]. Then in 1996, the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) was
initiated. However, negative trends in cost, schedule and performance estimates for the SBIRS-low
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fense has been mostly trivial in comparison with the role played by other sensors.
DSP satellites are capable of providing the position of missiles in flight to within
a 1 km pixel once every 10 seconds in the early stages of flight[16]. This sampling
rate is too low to enable independent guidance of the missile defense system inter-
ceptors. Therefore, the DSP satellites can only be used to construct a trajectory
profile of the target ICBM missiles in the early stages of boost-phase flight. Once
the target missile appears above the radar horizon all tracking and acquisition are
accomplished by using ground-based radars.
This weak functional relationship between satellites and missile defense sys-
tems could however change substantially because of the advanced capabilities of the
recently launched Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. The
two experimental LEO STSS satellites have dramatically more advanced capabili-
ties than the DSP systems. They operate in stereo mode providing 3D positioning
data on target ICBMs to within a 50 m pixel. The STSS satellites are based on a
step-stare focal plane array (FPA) design than enables continuous tracking of target
missiles in all phases of flight.
This chapter will study the improvements in intercept miss distances obtained
by using STSS satellites for boost-phase missile defense. Boost-phase missile defense
was chosen due to availability of detailed open-source information on the various
processes involved in it. The “Report of the American Physical Society Study
Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific
program resulted in DOD taking it off an acquisition track, and converted it to a sustained and
deliberate experimental technology development program called STSS in 2002[219].
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and Technical Issues” published in October 2004[16] evaluated each of the processes
involved in boost-phase missile defense in extensive detail. This report was used to
benchmark and validate each of the steps undertaken in this chapter. This chapter
is an initial attempt at studying the role of modern advanced satellite systems in
missile defense. Future work of this chapter will extend the study to evaluate the
effect of these advanced satellite systems on the mid-course phase of missile defense
systems2.
This chapter will demonstrate that the capability of STSS satellites when stud-
ied via computer simulations indicates that they reduce the attained miss distances
in a boost-phase missile defense interception from the thousands of meters to less
two hundred meters. These drastic reductions in intercept miss distances obtained
with STSS is still insufficient to successfully execute a hit-to-kill boost-phase mis-
sile defense3. However, the improvements obtained with STSS are significant. Miss
distances of less than two hundred meters shown in this chapter were obtained by
modeling the parameters of the experimental STSS. It is conceivable that a tech-
nologically mature constellation could make STSS a credible mechanism for missile
defense.
2. Tests are now being planned for the STSS satellites to see if the tracking data is good enough to
cue the launch of ship-based interceptor missiles used in mid-course missile defense. As it stands
now, the U.S. Navy Aegis ships can only launch interceptors if the ship’s own radar is locked onto
the missile. If it turns out that the satellite data is good enough to target missiles independently,
it would drastically increase the effective range of each ship[41]. This would certainly threaten
Russian and Chinese capabilities. The addition of a modern space-based missile detection network,
which STSS is designed to demonstrate, could also give strategic, regional and theater defense
systems more accurate warning of an enemy missile and permit the launch of interceptors against
the threat earlier than ever before[190]. This again would be a matter of significant concern to
China and Russia.
3. A successful hit to kill boost-phase intercept requires a miss distance of less than 1 m.
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The potential capabilities of STSS adds a new and unique dimension to space
security. To have a chance at successfully intercepting a rogue North Korean missile
the STSS satellites have to be protected against any form of disruption. However, if
the STSS based missile defense system is not operationally limited to rogue threats
other nations including China and Russia perceiving themselves as potential targets
will challenge its legitimacy and disrupt these satellites if needed. This scenario
will evolve in some form in the future when the potential of STSS becomes more
clear. Effective missile defense against rogue threats will require the U.S. to self-
impose limitations on its space-based missile defense applications in order to obtain
operational sanctuary for its satellites against disruption.
5.1 Outline of the Chapter
In order to investigate the role of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) in missile defense operations, a simulation of a boost-phase ballistic missile
defense (BMD) system utilizing STSS was undertaken in this chapter. There are
multiple technical questions involved in estimating the utility of STSS to boost-
phase missile defense. This section of the chapter will outline the various important
sections and subsections that provide answers to those questions.
• Section 5.2 on page 153 will briefly describe the history behind the STSS
satellites, their expected capabilities, their performance to date and future
configurations.
• Section 5.3 on page 156 models and simulates the target ICBM threat that a
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rogue state like North Korea could mount. The Peacekeeper missile is used as
the baseline to model the threat ICBM missile.
• Section 5.4 on page 161 describes in detail the modeling and simulation of the
boost-phase missile defense interceptors. Within Section 5.4, Subsection 5.4.1
on page 162 details the analysis done to decide the optimum interceptor bas-
ing location for given North Korean target ICBM parameters and other geo-
political considerations. Next, subsection 5.4.2 on page 166 details the equa-
tions governing the flight simulation, i.e., the dynamics of the interceptor.
Subsection 5.4.3 on page 169 explains the Proportional Navigation guidance
laws that direct the interceptor towards the target ICBM. Following subsec-
tion 5.4.3, subsection 5.4.5 on page 176 describes the flight control system of
the interceptor.Finally, subsection 5.4.6 on page 179 shows the performance
results of the modeled interceptor missile against the target North Korean
ICBM.
• Section 5.5 on page 181 models and simulates a X-Band radar that could
be used for boost-phase missile defense. Within section 5.5, subsection 5.5.1
on page 185 details the analysis done to decide the optimum radar basing
distance and bearing for a given target ICBM launch location. Subsection 5.5.2
on page 190 details the method used to calculate the Radar Cross Section
(RCS) of the target ICBM for a particular geometry between the radar and
the interceptor. Finally, subsection 5.5.4 on page 194 shows the results of the
modeled X-Band radar when it is tracking the target North Korean ICBM as
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it flies to its intended target location. Also shown are the fused position error
magnitudes for the two X-Band radars.
• Section 5.6 on page 201 explains the various new technologies like step-stare
Focal Plane Arrays (FPA) and Quantum Well Infrared Photodetectors (QWIP)
that are behind the performance of STSS. First, subsection 5.6.1 on page 205
configures the Infrared (IR) characteristics of the target ICBM during its flight
in boost-phase and post-boost4 for both day-time and night-time operations.
Then subsections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 on pages 209 and 211 respectively use the
estimated IR characteristics of the target ICBM to determine the field of view,
lens diameter, aperture area and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the QWIP FPA
of STSS. Finally, subsection 5.6.4 on page 215 explains the methodology used
to estimate target ICBM position through stereoscopic satellite measurements.
Also shown are the position error magnitudes obtained by STSS.
• Section 5.7 on page 220 describes the endgame simulation and the sensors used
on the Kill Vehicle (KV) of the interceptor missile. The KV sensor parameters
are taken from the American Physical Society (APS) report on boost-phase
missile defense[16].
• Section 5.8 on page 221 shows the results of the complete simulation. Graphs in
this section show the improvement in boost-phase missile defense miss distance
on using STSS as compared to ground-based radars.
4. Post-boost phase is included since STSS is claimed to have multiband discrimination capability
enabling seamless tracking from boost-phase to mid-course phase.
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• Finally, section 5.9 on page 224 concludes by reiterating the linkage between
missile defense and space security and the emerging need for U.S. acceptance
of limits on its military space applications.
5.2 Evolution of STSS: “Holy Grail” for Missile Defense
The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) is the latest iteration
of many space-based satellite IR systems intended to aid missile defense. STSS is
the LEO component of a scaled down version of the Space Based Infrared System
(SBIRS). Initially, SBIRS was designed to have two components: SBIRS-GEO and
SBIRS-Low. There were to be 4 SBIRS GEO and 24 SBIRS-Low. However, esca-
lating cost and schedule slips5 lead to a reduced system of four GEO satellites and
two experimental STSS payloads riding on classified host satellites in HEO[147].
5. Despite years of significant investment, most of the DOD large space acquisition programs have
collectively experienced billions of dollars in cost increases, stretched schedules, and increased
technical risk. Unit costs for the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), for instance, has climbed
about 231 percent to over USD 3 billion per satellite. Moreover, the first satellite, GEO-1 was
launched into geostationary orbit on May 2011, about 9 years later than predicted[226]. Total cost
for the SBIRS High program is currently estimated at over USD 18 billion for six GEO satellites,
representing a program unit cost of over USD 3 billion, about 233 percent more than the original
unit cost estimate[225].Also, program officials are predicting a 1–year delay on production of the
3rd and 4th GEO satellites due in part to technical challenges, parts obsolescence and test failures.
Along with the production delay, program officials are predicting a USD 438 million cost overrun for
the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites. There were three identified primary reasons for the SBIRS program
cost increases/schedule delays/technical problems: (1) latent defects, resulting from insufficient
product assurance activity in earlier design and production activities; (2) insufficient schedule and
budget to ensure robust GEO first article integration/test; and (3) process escapes due to human
error/insufficient training/fragile processes. In mid-2006, Gary Payton, then the chief of Air Force
space acquisition, trying to explain the delays in SBIRS, told Aerospace America: “In the beginning
of the SBIRS High program, everybody said ‘we’re going to take a grand and glorious big leap
forward to replace the old DSP missile warning satellites that are old and are not good enough any
more.’ The problem was that we didn’t have the technology that would be needed....but we went
ahead anyway.” The Air Force and its SBIRS High contractors “began doing the research work
without having the technology in hand for the sensor that was supposed to go on the spacecraft,”
he explained[90].
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The two experimental STSS satellites were launched on the 25th of September
2009 on a single United Launch Alliance Delta 2 rocket[187]. They now fly in tan-
dem in HEO at about 1350 km above the Earth and a couple of thousand kilometers
apart. In that configuration, they provide a stereo view of the missile and warheads
they track[233]. Each satellite has two sensors. During operation, first an acquisition
sensor detects the short-wave infrared (SWIR) signature produced by the hot ex-
haust of a missile launch. As the missile passes through the boost-phase, the second
sensor takes over, using mid-wave infrared (MWIR) to track upper stages of rockets
and the small engines of post-boost vehicles[233, 211]. During an extended on-orbit
check-out and calibration phase, the satellites tracked multiple missile launches in
the early boost and post-boost phase and demonstrated the ability to relay data
from one satellite to another.
On 6 June 2010, the twin STSS satellites observed the debut of the MDA’s
two-stage interceptor for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System as it lifted
off from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and flew over the Pacific Ocean.
Ten days later, STSS observed an ICBM test launch from the same location. On 28
June 2010, the satellites observed a target missile that was launched from a mobile
platform in the Pacific Ocean as part of a test of the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense System[212]. All this was done by only the acquisition sensor tracking in
the boost-phase.
For the first time on the 16th of March 2011, STSS detected and tracked a
ballistic missile launch through all phases of flight. The so-called “birth-to-death”
tracking of a ballistic missile had never been done before from space and is the most
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significant achievement to date for the STSS spacecraft. As Doug Young, Northrop
Grumman’s vice president of missile defense and warning programs said, “It’s the
Holy Grail for missile defense[210].” During the test, an ARAV-B short-range target
missile was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai, Hawaii. A
STSS satellite detected the heat signature of the launch with its acquisition sensor,
and then its tracking sensor locked on to the boosting missile6. It then passed
the tracking data off to the second satellite, which followed the missile through
space, re-entry and splashdown[210]. This is very significant as it demonstrated the
ability to pass tracking data along from one spacecraft to another[41]. STSS sensor
calibration was also done while tracking missile surrogate targets like ground-based
Starfire laser and a NOAA weather satellite[190].
On October 5, 2011 the STSS demonstration satellites tracked two different
missile targets and delivered data in real-time to support a successful flight test of
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), according to Northrop Grum-
man. During the live-intercept of both targets, the STSS demonstrators transmitted
data in real-time to the U.S. MDA’s Command, Control, Battle Management and
6. There have been significant problems in implementing the same sensor-to-sensor missile track
transfer capability in the SBIRS GEO satellite. SBIRS GEO, similar to STSS, has two infrared
sensors: a scanning sensor that sweeps over large swaths of territory watching for missile launches,
and a staring sensor that can be trained constantly on a smaller area of interest to provide imme-
diate notification of launches. Gen. William Shelton, head of Air Force Space Command, said the
service will not be able to fully exploit data from the staring sensors on-board the SBIRS GEO
satellites until 2016 or 2017. Shelton said the Air Force ran into “money issues” on the SBIRS
program that led it to focus on getting the first satellite into orbit while deferring work on the
ground segment. Moreover, he said, some of the ground software for the SBIRS satellite has proved
more complex than anticipated[205]. Until the new software is ready, Shelton said, the Air Force
will not be able to exploit the staring sensor data in real time[205]. Given this information, it
seems rather questionable that STSS would have demonstrated the mentioned track transfer. All
the information on STSS to date has been released by its contractor,Northrop Grumman, and its
quite possible that the capabilities are being overstated.
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Communications System. Known as FTT-12, the THAAD flight test took place at
the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai, Hawaii. FTT-12 is the second THAAD
flight test that included STSS, with far more extensive participation by the demon-
stration satellites compared with the previous test on June 28, 2010 (FTT-14).
After the STSS demonstration mission is finished, the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) is planning to populate an operational constellation of missile tracking satel-
lites based on STSS dubbed the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) scheduled
to begin launch operations in 2018[210]. MDA hopes that the STSS program will
set the stage for PTSS, a network of 9 and 12 satellites to join MDA operational
assets in real-world defense efforts. The PTSS satellite fleet would be used by sea-
and U.S.-based interceptors and future missile defense deployments in Europe[190].
5.3 Modeling the Target Ballistic Missile
This section of the chapter will detail the modeling and simulation of the target
ICBM. It is the first step in determining the role of STSS in a boost-phase missile
defense system.
In choosing a target ballistic missile, North Korea’s space launcher/missile ca-
pabilities were used as a benchmark. The latest North Korean launchers Unha-2/3
are considered to represent a significance advance in capabilities. Unha-2 was esti-
mated to have the potential to reach continental United States with a payload of 1
ton or more if North Korea modified it[52]. David Wright and Ted Postol[52] have
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explained the possible capabilities of the Unha-2 and estimated its dimensions7.
Although significant details on the Unha-2 were approximated by Wright and Pos-
tol, in order to simulate the physics of a ballistic missile intercept more detailed
information like the magnetic permeability and electrical conductivity of the missile
structure is required. Hence for the purposes of modeling it is assumed that a future
North Korean ICBM would parallel the capabilities and designs of the early U.S.
ICBM–Peacekeeper.
Peacekeeper is chosen as the model for simulation due to the extensive amount
of information available on its design, capabilities, and structure. The detailed
capabilities and dimensions of each stage of the Peacekeeper ICBM is shown below
in table 5.1 and table 5.2. Choosing a solid-propellant target ICBM missile like
Peacekeeper for analysis enforced a demanding requirement on the STSS satellite
system being evaluated. A solid-propellant missile burns much faster than one built
on liquid propellant. This implies that is there is less time for the STSS satellite
system to form a trajectory track of the target ICBM missile. A missile tracking
satellite system that works against a solid-propellant missile should also be able
to work against a liquid-propellant missile as demonstrated in the APS report on
missile defense[16]. Two models of the Peacekeeper (one targeting San Francisco and
the other targeting Washington D.C.) were used in the simulation discussed in this
chapter. This was done to model and simulate a boost-phase missile defense system
7. In their article, David Wright and Ted Postol argued that although this launcher could be modified
to create a ballistic missile with capability to reach continental United States that any such missile
would be significantly dependent on foreign components and technical expertise.
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that should be able to operate against ICBMs attacking the entire the latitude and
longitude range of the continental United States.
Table 5.1: Target Missile Properties: Peacekeeper Missile[78]
Total Propellant Propellant Isp(s) Burn
Mass(lb) Mass(lb) Mass(lb) Time(s)
San Francisco Washington D.C.
Mass Fraction=0.85 Mass Fraction=0.90
Stage-1 108,000 91,800 97,200 300 60
Stage-2 61,000 51,850 54,900 300 60
Stage-3 17,000 14,450 15,300 300 60
Stage-4 5,000 0 0 0 0
Table 5.2: Target Missile Dimensions: Peacekeeper Missile[78]






Diameter of the missile=2.3 m
5.3.1 Simulating the North Korean ICBM
The two models of the peacekeeper ICBM discussed above are simulated using
slightly varying parameters. The first is modeled to be launched from Kilju-kun
missile base in North Korea towards San Francisco. The second is modeled to be
launched from Kilju-kun missile base in North Korea towards Washington D.C. The
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launch towards Washington D.C. requires a more capable ICBM and is modeled to
have a mass fraction of ninety percent, whereas the ICBM targeting San Francisco
is modeled to have a mass fraction of eighty-five percent. The simulated trajectory
and velocity profile of both the ICBM models are shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2 on
page 160. The simulation of the ICBMs are accomplished by forcing the ICBM
model to obey Newton’s Second Law at each time step. In vector form Newton’s
law is written as
~F = m~a (5.1)
where ~F is the force vector (in Newtons) acting on the center of gravity of the
ICBM, m is the total mass (in kg), and ~a is the net acceleration (in m/s2). There
are three major forces acting on the missile: Thrust (~T ) acting in the direction of
the ICBM velocity vector, Weight ( ~W ) acting in the direction of the center of the
Earth, and Drag ( ~D) acting in the direction opposite to the ICBM velocity vector.
The magnitude of the three forces are calculated as




W = mg (5.3)
D = 0.5ρV 2CdAprojected (5.4)
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where Isp is the stage specific impulse (in s), Ẇ is the change in stage weight over
time, ρ is the atmospheric density at the current position of the ICBM, V is the
velocity magnitude of the ICBM, Cd is the co-efficient of drag, and Aprojected is the
projected area of the ICBM. Ẇ is the product of in-stage fuel consumption dm
dt
(in
kg/s) and gravitational acceleration at the current distance from the center of the
Earth g in (m/s2).
Figure 5.1: ICBM Trajectories Targeting San Francisco and Washington D.C.
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Figure 5.2: ICBM Velocity Profile
5.4 Modeling the Interceptor Ballistic Missile
Two types of missile defense interceptors are modeled and simulated (refer to
table 5.3 below). The first interceptor IM-1 is meant to intercept and destroy the
North Korean ICBM targeting San Francisco. The second interceptor IM-2 is meant
to intercept and destroy the North Korean ICBM targeting Washington D.C.
As a mission requirement, both the interceptors should be more capable than
the ICBMs. This is because usually there is a significant time delay between the
ICBM and interceptor launch and the interceptor missile should be able to make up
for this lost time. Therefore, both interceptors IM-1 and IM-2 are modeled to have
ninety-five percent mass fraction. IM-2 is modeled with a specific impulse of 350
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Table 5.3: Interceptor Missile Properties




Stage-1 108,000 102,600 300 350 60
Stage-2 61,000 57,950 300 350 60
Stage-3 17,000 16,150 300 350 60
Stage-4 1,500/1,500 0 0 0 0
seconds whereas IM-1 is modeled with a specific impulse of 300 seconds. These mass
fraction and specific impulse values were chosen to meet the minimum requirements
for a successful boost-phase interception8.
5.4.1 Determination of Interceptor Location
The first decision to be made concerning the architecture of a boost-phase
BMD system is the location of the interceptors. This section will discuss the process
involved in making that decision. Ideally, the interceptors should be located and
launched in a direction opposite to the flight direction of the attacking missile i.e. a
head-on collision geometry. However, that is not currently possible for the case of a
North Korean ICBM targeting either San Francisco or Washington D.C. since the
8. These values are very high and is extremely difficult to achieve, if at all possible. However, as
the APS report on boost-missile defense stated, “Boost Phase defense of the entire United States
against solid-propellant ICBMs, which have shorter burn times than liquid-propellant ICBMs, is
unlikely to be practical when all factors are considered, no matter where or how the intercep-
tors are based. Even with optimistic assumptions, a terrestrial-based system would require very
large interceptors with extremely high speeds and accelerations to defeat a solid-propellant ICBM
launched from even a small country like North Korea.” In order to evaluate the effect of STSS
satellite systems it was assumed these values of the interceptor missiles are achievable.
162
direction of the ICBM flight requires basing the interceptors within Russia or its
territorial waters to gain a head-on collision geometry. This difficulty is illustrated
in figure 5.3 below.
Figure 5.3: ICBM Track Direction
The next best feasible location for the interceptors is to the east of the ICBM
launch location in the Sea of Japan or in Japan as shown in figure 5.4 below.
To determine the optimal interceptor launch site distance to the east of the
IBCM launch site, a preliminary simulation was run with the assumption that an
interceptor (IM-1) with perfect dynamics9 was pursuing an San Francisco-bound
9. Meaning the interceptor possess no system lags is able to execute all guidance commands imme-
diately and completely.
163
Figure 5.4: ICBM Track Direction with Possible Interceptor Missile Locations
North Korean ICBM with perfect targeting information10. The simulation was run
multiple times with the interceptor located at distances ranging from 100 km to
1000 km to determine the optimal distance. For the case of an ICBM launched from
North Korea targeting San Francisco, the results of the simulation are tabulated in
table 5.4 below.
A distance of 900 km or more is rejected since the intercept takes more than
10. Meaning the interceptor possess perfect and immediate knowledge about the location and acceler-
ation of the ICBM at every instant.
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Table 5.4: Interceptor (IM-1) Siting Parameters (for ICBM targeting San Francisco)









100 1.50 1.95 1085.22 86.60
200 1.70 2.36 937.45 2.90
300 1.98 2.30 975.67 5.30
400 2.20 4.64 896.96 1.93
500 2.40 2.61 985.62 24.75
600 2.58 4.34 1081.05 11.56
700 2.74 3.55 1231.35 9.11
800 2.88 7.88 1508.25 19.05
900 3.00 6.74 2097.55 86.16
1000 3.11 7.98 2076.84 14.61
the 3 minutes of boost-phase. Interceptor location siting distances of 100 km, 500
km, 800 km, 900 km and 1000 km are rejected since interception from these distances
results in excessive acceleration demands on the interceptor missile that are phys-
ically infeasible11 (10 G is considered the limit). The lowest miss distance within
acceptable values of interceptor acceleration demands is 2.30 m obtained at 300 km
distance. This is a tolerable miss distance for a numerically approximated computer
simulation. In a real-world case, a miss distance of less than 1 m is required to have
a high probability of single-shot hit-to-kill intercept. At 300 km, the effort required
11. The high values of acceleration (i.e., any value above 10 G) show in table 5.4 would be physically
impossible to realize due to structural limitations of the interceptor missile. It was possible only
because the conputer programs used in these calculations did not enforce a maximum limit on
the acceleration at this stage. Such limits will be enforced from the next step of the simulation
algorithm.
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to achieve a miss distance of 2.30 m is reasonable at 975.67 m/s of lateral divert.
Therefore, the optimum interceptor location for the ICBM targeting San Francisco
is taken to be at a distance of 300 km.
For the case of an ICBM launched from North Korea targeting Washington
D.C. the results of the simulation are tabulated in table 5.5 on page 167. Any
distance greater than 700 km is rejected since the intercepts takes more than the
3 minutes of boost-phase. Similarly, 100 km and distances greater than 500 km
are rejected due to excessive acceleration demands on the interceptor missile. The
lowest miss distance within acceptable values of interceptor acceleration demands is
2.74 m obtained at 200 km distance.
To mimic real-world conditions the interceptor should be located at a distance
where it should at least be able to intercept and destroy ICBMs having the latitude
and longitude spread of the San Francisco and Washington D.C. trajectories. This
means a distance of 200 km is not acceptable since for the San Francisco-bound
ICBM, a distance of 300 km is required. Therefore, all further calculation in this
simulation is performed by modeling the interceptors as being located at distance
of 300 km east from the ICBM launch location (Kilju-kin in North Korea).
5.4.2 Simulating the Interceptor Missile
The simulation of the interceptor (similar to the ICBM simulation) is accom-
plished by forcing the modeled interceptor to obey Newton’s Second Law at each
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Table 5.5: Interceptor (IM-2) Siting Parameters (for ICBM targeting Washington
D.C.)









100 1.50 1.70 702.30 85.58
200 1.80 2.74 768.75 6.57
300 2.11 2.87 670.16 1.48
400 2.36 1.87 752.44 2.42
500 2.58 3.25 943.08 10.07
600 2.77 6.38 1335.29 15.66
700 2.93 5.75 2106.96 41.71
800 3.07 7.64 2916.93 27.27
900 3.20 7.55 3132.73 18.40
1000 3.34 5.86 3236.28 13.56
time step. In vector form, Newton’s law is written as
~F = m~a (5.5)
where ~F is the force vector (in Newtons) acting on the center of gravity of the
ICBM, m is the total mass (in kg), and ~a is the net acceleration (in m/s2). Similar
to the ICBM modeling, there are three major forces acting on the missile as shown
in equation 5.6.
~F = ~T + ~W + ~D (5.6)
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However, the Thrust (~T ) in the case of the interceptor missile is composed
of ~Tv and ~Tp as shown in equation 5.7. The Weight ( ~W ) is acting in the direction
of the center of the Earth and Drag ( ~D) is acting in the direction opposite to the
ICBM velocity vector.
~F = ~Tv + ~Tp + ~W + ~D (5.7)
~Tv is the thrust component along the direction of the velocity vector (in m/s)
and ~Tp is the thrust component perpendicular to the velocity vector (i.e. the lateral
divert). The mechanism to calculate ~Tv and ~Tv is shown in subsection 5.4.3 below.
The total magnitude of the two thrust components parallel and perpendicular to the
velocity vector is always equal to the total thrust ~T provided by the rocket engine.
The other two components of the force vector are estimated similar to the
method used in the ICBM modeling. The magnitude of weight vector is given as
W = mg (5.8)
and the magnitude of the drag vector is calculated as
D = 0.5ρV 2CdAprojected (5.9)
where ρ is the atmospheric density at the current position of the ICBM, V is
the velocity magnitude of the ICBM, Cd is the co-efficient of drag, and Aprojected is
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the projected area of the ICBM.
5.4.3 Interceptor Guidance System
The Interceptor Guidance System uses Proportional Navigation guidance law
for estimating ~Tp, the guiding force used in driving the interceptor missile towards
the ICBM target12. Figure 5.5 on page 169 depicts the operational logic of the
proportional navigation based guidance system.
Figure 5.5: Interceptor Proportional Navigation Guidance System Diagram
12. The proportional navigation guidance law is optimal for constant velocity targets. This condition
is not satisfied for acceleration ICBMs which are the targets in boost-phase BMD intercepts.
However, the aim in this simulation is not to design a guidance law for boost-phase intercepts. The
aim is to study the effect of STSS sensors. Hence the simplified proportional navigation guidance
law is used. More detailed studies for designing a tuned guidance system for an accelerating target
can be found in the APS study on boost-phase intercept[16].
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The first step in the guidance law is for the interceptor missile to measure/read
the position vector of the target ~rt and computes the line of sight (LOS) vector ~λ
by subtracting its own position vector ~rm as shown in equation 5.10 below
~λ = ~rt − ~rm (5.10)
This LOS vector ~λ is then differentiated to calculate the LOS rate vector ~̇λ




where ∆t is the simulation step time.
The closing velocity Vc is computed as the range rate. The range between the
ICBM and the interceptor is the magnitude of the LOS vector |~λ|. This magnitude
is calculated for each time step of the simulation and differentiated. Dividing the





The calculated parameters ~̇λ and Vc are multiplied by the navigation coefficient





The commanded acceleration is always applied perpendicular to the LOS. The
flight control system uses the commanded lateral acceleration to change the altitude
of the missile resulting in the achieved lateral acceleration vector ~nL. The achieved
lateral acceleration vector ~nL is integrated along with other accelerations acting on
the system resulting in a new missile position ~rm.
The instantaneous LOS vector is normalized to obtain the LOS unit vector λ̂.
In the next time step, the new LOS is computed using equation 5.10 and converted
to the unit vector. Vector subtraction of these two unit vectors is the direction
in which the acceleration command is applied and is always perpendicular to the








where n̂c is the unit acceleration command vector perpendicular to the LOS, λ̂ is
instantaneous unit LOS vector, and λ̂previous is the previous unit LOS vector.
Finally, the commanded acceleration vector is calculated. The magnitude of
the commanded acceleration is computed by multiplying the navigation ratio, the
closing velocity, and the magnitude of the LOS rate. Multiplying the magnitude
of the acceleration command with the acceleration command unit vector yields the
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commanded acceleration command vector. This is expressed as
~nc = n̂cN
′Vc|λ̇| (5.15)
For a zero lag system, the achieved acceleration nL is always equal to the
commanded acceleration nc. For the moment, it is assumed that the interceptor
dynamics are free of lags.
The computed acceleration command is perpendicular to the LOS; however,
missile acceleration commands ( ~Tp) can only be applied perpendicular to the ve-
locity vector. Thus, only the commanded acceleration component perpendicular
to the velocity vector contributes to the missile guidance. The thrust component
perpendicular to the velocity vector, ~Tp, is then given as
~Tp = ~nc⊥mm (5.16)
where mm is the interceptor missile mass at the current time.




|~T |2 − |~Tp|2 (5.17)
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5.4.4 Simulation Results With Zero-Lag Interceptor Guidance Sys-
tem
Applying the equations derived earlier, simulations of the intercept were per-
formed. The interception between IM-1 and the San Francisco-bound target ICBM
produces very different flight profiles and demands as compared to the interception
between IM-2 and the Washington D.C.-bound target ICBM as discussed below.
Interception Geometry
The intercept geometry of the two intercept is shown in figure 5.6 on page 174. There
are some significant differences between the two. The intercept between IM-2 and
Washington D.C.-bound target ICBM takes place at an altitude 40 km higher than
the intercept of IM-1 and San Francisco bound-target ICBM as shown in figure 5.7.
This would mean that the IM-2 intercept would have more and quicker exposure to
space-based satellite Infrared (IR) sensors. The higher velocity of intercept in the
case of the Washington D.C.-bound target ICBM as shown in figure 5.8 on page 175
is due to the relative superior capabilities of that ICBM and the IM-2 interceptor.
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Figure 5.6: Interception Geometry (San Francisco on left; Washington
D.C. on right)












































Figure 5.7: Height vs. Distance for Target ICBM and Interceptor (San
Francisco on left; Washington D.C. on right)
Target Maneuver
Shown below in figure 5.9 on page 176 is the acceleration of the target ICBM
for both intercept scenarios as seen by the respective interceptor, i.e., the observed
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Figure 5.8: Velocity for Target ICBM and Interceptor (San Francisco on
left; Washington D.C. on right)
target maneuvers. It is this acceleration viewed by the interceptor as a function
of the interception geometry between itself and the target ICBM that influences
the effort required and the miss distance produced. Constant target acceleration is
ideal to achieve zero miss distances. Apparently, the interception between IM-2 and
Washington D.C.-bound target ICBM produces appreciably more target maneuver
than the other scenario.
Interceptor Effort
Two variables measure the effort made by the interceptor during the course of
its mission. The lateral divert measures the change in velocity that is experienced
by the missile due to the guidance force thrust perpendicular to the velocity vector,
~Tp. The lateral divert values are shown below in the figure 5.10 on page 177 for both
the interceptions. The second variable of interest is the acceleration experienced by
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Figure 5.9: Acceleration of Target ICBM as Seen by the Interceptor
Missile (San Francisco on left; Washington D.C. on right)
the interceptors (shown in figure 5.11 on page 177) during the course of its mis-
sion. Higher values of acceleration cause more stress on the interceptor’s structure.
The intercept between IM-1 and the San Francisco-bound ICBM seems to generate
greater lateral divert and acceleration demands.
5.4.5 Third Order Flight Control System
So far, the missile guidance has been assumed to be perfect. In other words,
the achieved acceleration nL is always equal to the commanded acceleration nc.
This type of model is known as a zero-lag guidance system where the interceptor
missile flight control system can respond to acceleration commands immediately
and with 100 percent efficiency. In reality, guidance systems have lags (or delays)
in their response. In this subsection the simulation model is expanded to include a
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Figure 5.10: Lateral Divert Demands on the Interceptor (San Francisco
on left; Washington D.C. on right)

















































Figure 5.11: Acceleration Experienced by Interceptor Missile (San Fran-
cisco on left; Washington D.C. on right)
real-world flight control system.
If the flight control system lag is modeled as a 1st order transfer function, the
177







where nL is the achieved lateral acceleration that is integrated to obtained the
interceptor missile lateral divert (~Tp), nc is the commanded lateral acceleration, s is
the complex frequency, and T is the system time constant13.





bsn + csn−1 + · · ·+ ds2 + es+ f
(5.19)
where a, b, c, · · · , f are constants characterizing the system poles.
For the simulation executed in this chapter, the interceptor missile’s flight
control systems are modeled as a 3rd order single time constant flight control system










s2 + Ts+ 1
(5.20)
In the next subsection the simulation results obtained using this 3rd order
interceptor guidance system are shown.
13. The determination of optimal system time constant is study in itself. This was done in the
background of the simulation in this chapter. It is however not detailed here. More information
on designing a transfer function can be seen in Zarchan[152, 153].
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5.4.6 Simulation Results With 3rd Order Interceptor Guidance Sys-
tem
The simulation results indicate that an interceptor with a 3rd order guidance
system has the same intercept geometry as a zero-lag guidance system. The altitude
and distance of intercept of both interceptions do not change. However, a 3rd order
system results in lags in the lateral divert and interceptor acceleration demands as
seen in figures 5.12 and 5.13 respectively.
For the intercept between IM-1 and the San Francisco-bound target ICBM,
the lateral divert increases from 975.67 m/s to 1283.25 m/s and the acceleration
demands on the interceptor increases from 5.30 g to more than 10 g during the final
stages of the intercept. However, to model the interceptor realistically, a maximum
acceleration limit of 10 g is imposed. This can be observed from the flat lining of the
commanded acceleration nc at 10 g’s in figure 5.13 on page 181. Also observed in the
same figure is the lag of the system response behind the control input. This implies
that even if accurate target position data is provided, the missile will experience
some miss distance. Finally, the miss distance increases from 2.30 m to 203.10 m.
This is a significant increase in miss distance14.
For the intercept between IM-2 and the Washington D.C.-bound target ICBM,
the lateral divert increases from 670.16 m/s to 936.44 m/s and the maximum accel-
eration demands on the interceptor increases from 1.48 g to 10 g’s in the endgame of
14. This was accomplished without modeling a Kill Vehicle in the endgame. This will be done in later
stages of the chapter.
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the intercept. Also seen in figure 5.13 on page 181 for this intercept case is the lag
of the system response behind the control input. Finally, for the intercept between
IM-2 and the Washington D.C.-bound target ICBM, the miss distance increases
from 2.87 m to 69.60 m. While, not as drastic an increase compared to the previous
case, this level of miss distance still constitutes mission failure.













































Figure 5.12: Lateral Divert demands on the Interceptor (San Francisco
on left; Washington D.C. on right)
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Figure 5.13: Acceleration Experienced by Interceptor Missile (San Fran-
cisco on left; Washington D.C. on right)
5.5 Sensors: Radar
Having modeled and simulated the interception between the target North Ko-
rean ICBM and the interceptor missiles, the next step is to include sensors to make
the interception more realistic. This section will model Radar sensors. The next sec-
tion will model the STSS space-based sensors. There are five challenges to modeling
radar systems involved in the boost-phase missile defense system. They are:
1. modeling the target ICBM with sufficient electrical precision and detail
2. predicting the monostatic radar cross section (RCS) of the modeled target
ICBM for all possible aspect angles that may emerge during the course of the
interception
3. determining the optimum location to place the radars for the mission given
operational, technical, and/or geo-political constraints
4. determining the operating parameters of the radar
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5. simulating the actual intercept where the radar(s) acquires and tracks the
target ICBMs
All of the five issues outlined above have been undertaken during the course of
research done for this chapter. The modeling of the target ICBM (the Peacekeeper
missile) was done as illustrated in table 5.2 on page 158. The model was then
imported into a custom Matlab code15 to predict the monostatic RCS of the target
ICBM for all possible aspect ratios. RCS of the target ICBM is the only parameter
independent of the radar system. The RCS is defined as[48]
σ =
Power Reflected to Receiver Per Unit Solid Angle
Incident Power Density/4π
(m2) (5.21)







15. A common approach to predict the RCS of a three-dimensional complex target is the physical
optics (PO) approximation. Many software packages provide accurate RCS results with small
structures and/or low frequencies. However, while working with large structures, such as ICBMs
and high frequencies like X-Band, most methods result in unreasonable computational require-
ments due to the small wavelengths, and in turn, the requirement for a extra fine mesh structure.
Obtaining accurate results for electrically large structures may take months of computation. The
PO method overcomes the excessive computational requirements while working with electrically
large structures. There are however trade-offs while working the PO method. This method is only
accurate in the specular direction, and surface waves, multiple reflections, and edge diffraction are
not included.
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where R is the range to the target. The RCS values were predicted assuming
that an X-Band (10 GHz) Radar was tracking the target ICBM16.
Given the symmetry of the peacekeeper missile, a two dimensional RCS pre-
diction for aspect angles ranging from 0 to 360 degrees is sufficient. Symmetry17
would render the values in the third dimension similar to those obtained in the two
dimensional prediction for a given aspect angle. Figure 5.14 on page 184 shows the
results of the RCS prediction for all possible aspect angles of the target ICBM at
various stages of its boost-phase flight.
The RCS values for the complete ICBM and ICBM after stage 1 jettison are
very similar. So is the RCS values for the ICBM after stage 2 jettison and the ICBM
after stage 3 jettison. For this particular ICBM model, it appears very difficult to
discriminate the various stages from each other using RCS values. It is observed
that fluctuations in aspect angles within the same stage are much more significant
then those between different stages. The top aspect angle (θ = 0o) has a very low
RCS of approximately -20 dBsm for all stages of the ICBM due to the scattering
by the nose cone in all directions other than the aspect direction. As the aspect
angle changes from 0o, the first peak occurs at approximately 75o where the slant
nose cone causes a specular backscatter. The next peak occurs at θ = 90o. The
peak at 90o is caused by the exposure of the entire ICBMs body to the radar. The
maximum peak RCS occurs at 180o at the bottom aspect. Since the ICBM structure
16. X-Band radar are used since they are the most powerful in operation currently including the
sea-based X-Band radar used with the Aegis ship-based missile defense systems.
17. The Peacekeeper ICBM has a nearly smooth surface and does not have any fins or protruding
surfaces.
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Target ICBM (Complete Missile) RCS in X-Band
















Target ICBM (After Stage-1 Jettison) RCS in X-Band
















Target ICBM (After Stage-2 Jettison) RCS in X-Band
















Target ICBM (After Stage-3 Jettison) RCS in X-Band
Figure 5.14: RCS Calculation of Target ICBM at Various Stages
is symmetric, the RCS changes between 180o and 360o are similar to the changes
observed between 0o and 90o. RCS can be improved by viewing the target ICBM
from specular directions, such as the side or bottom. However, radar sensor locations
have constraints and there is rarely complete freedom to locate the radars to view
the target ICBM from desired aspects. The next subsection will delve into these
issues.
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5.5.1 Determination of Radar(s) Location
In order to determine the optimum location to place the X-Band radars a
series of simulations was performed in which the radars were sequentially located at
various locations in the Sea of Japan around the North Korean ICBM launch site
at various angles (ranging from 0o to 180o in azimuth) and distances (ranging from
350 km to 1000 km). The distribution of the possible radar locations for a given
ICBM trajectory is shown below in figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15: Possible X-Band Radar Locations
At each location for a given ICBM trajectory the average RCS was calculated
during the boost-phase. The values of average RCS was then interpolated at other
angles and distances. A plot of the average RCS of a radar tracking an ICBM
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targeting San Francisco from various azimuth angles and distances from the launch
location is shown below in figure 5.16.
Figure 5.16: Average RCS for Various Azimuth Angles and Distances -
San Francisco Trajectory
Similarly, a plot of the average RCS of an radar tracking an ICBM target-
ing Washington D.C. from various azimuth angles and distances from the launch
location is shown below in figure 5.17 on page 187.
Examining figures 5.16 and 5.17 two inferences emerge clearly. The first is
that, for every target ICBM trajectory, there is a unique optimum azimuth angle
from the launch location at which maximum average RCS for the boost-phase flight
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Figure 5.17: Average RCS for Various Azimuth Angles and Distances -
Washington D.C. Trajectory
is obtained. For example, for a ICBM targeting San Francisco the maximum average
RCS for the boost-phase is obtained at an azimuth angle of 140 degrees. Similarly,
for a ICBM targeting Washington D.C. the maximum average RCS for the boost-
phase is obtained at an azimuth angle of 120 degrees. The second inference that
can be drawn from the plots is that the farther the radars are placed from the
launch locations at a given optimum azimuth angle, the better is the average RCS
for the boost-phase. At the optimum azimuth angles, the maximum average RCS
is obtained at the greatest distance of 1000 km.
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There is, however, a technical downside to placing the radars at the maximum
possible distance. The decision to locate a radar sensor is constrained by two op-
posing factors. This constraint can be understood by examining the range equation









where Rmax is the maximum detection range, Ni is the number of pulses integrated,
PT is the peak power of the transmitter, n is the compression factor, GT is the gain
of the transmitter antenna, GR is the gain of the receiver antenna, σ is the RCS of
the target ICBM, λ is the wavelength of the radar, K is the Boltzmann constant
(1.38x10−23J/deg.), T is the antenna temperature (290K), B is the bandwidth, F
is the system noise factor, (S/N)pdfa is the smallest signal-to-noise ratio capable of
giving the required detection and false-alarm probability, and L is the total loss.
Equation 5.23 can be simplified by using the following assumptions:
1. Ni=1. This implies the number of integrated pulses is one,
2. if there is no pulse compression applied then n=1,
3. if a monostatic radar is used GT=GR=G,




5. neglecting other losses i.e. L=1.
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The opposing constraint in locating a radar sensor is evident from equa-
tion 5.25. The signal-to-noise ratio S/N is directly proportional to the RCS (σ).
However, it is also inversely proportional to the distance between the radar and the
ICBM its tracking (R). Therefore, a compromise has to be made. Further examin-
ing figures 5.16 and 5.17 on pages 186 and 187 it can be seen that RCS decreases
sharply below the distance of 650 km at the optimum azimuth angle. Therefore,
in the simulation attempted in this chapter the radar(s) are placed at a distance of
650 km.
Two radars are modeled in the simulation. The first radar is placed at 140
degree azimuth and a distance of 650 km optimized to track a North Korean ICBM
targeting San Francisco. This translates to 36o31′19′′N latitude and 133o49′18′′E
longitude. The second radar is placed at an azimuth angle of 120 degree and a
distance of 650 km optimized to track an ICBM targeting Washington D.C. This
translates to 38o04′38′′N latitude and 135o33′58′′E longitude. Both of the locations
are to the east of the launch site in the Sea of Japan close to Japanese territory.
189
5.5.2 Simulation of Target ICBM RCS as Seen by the Radars
Using the optimized radar locations determined in the previous section, the
target ICBMs are tracked in the simulation and their RCS is determined. In the
first run of the simulation, the RCS of the ICBM targeting San Francisco is tracked
by both radars, radar-1 (optimized to monitor the San Francisco-bound ICBM)
and radar-2 (optimized to monitor the Washington D.C.-bound ICBM). The results
are shown in figure 5.18 below. Also shown is the aspect angle of the intercept as
observed by both the radars.





















Radar-1 (optimized for San Francisco)
Radar-2 (Optimized for Washington D.C.)

























Radar-1 (optimized for San Francisco)
Radar-2 (Optimized for Washington D.C.)
Figure 5.18: RCS of the San Francisco Bound Target ICBM
It is clear from the figure that higher RCS values are obtained for the San
Francisco-bound ICBM from the radar optimized for it i.e. by radar-1. The shape
of the observed RCS curve can be understood by comparing the aspect angle curve
observed during the simulation shown in the right-side of figure 5.18 with the stage-
wise RCS curves shown in figure 5.14 on page 184. For example, the peak RCS of
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approximately 35 dBsm for the San Francisco-bound ICBM as observed by radar-1
occurs at approximately 1.85 minutes. This happens because at that time instant
(approx. 1.85 minutes) the aspect angle as seen from the right half of figure 5.18
is close to 75 degrees. Going back to figure 5.14, at that particular instant after
stage-1 jettison at 75 degrees, the RCS is approximately 35 dBsm.
In the second run of the simulation, the RCS of the ICBM targeting Washing-
ton D.C. as tracked by both radars, radar-1 (optimized to monitor the San Fran-
cisco bound ICBM) and radar-2 (optimized to monitor the Washington D.C.-bound
ICBM) is determined. The results are shown in figure 5.19 on page 191. As expected,
it is clear from the figure that higher RCS values are obtained for the Washington
D.C.-bound ICBM from the radar optimized for it—by radar-2.





















Radar-1 (optimized for San Francisco)
Radar-2 (Optimized for Washington D.C.)




























Radar-1 (optimized for San Francisco)
Radar-2 (Optimized for Washington D.C.)
Figure 5.19: RCS of the Washington D.C. Bound Target ICBM
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5.5.3 Operating Parameters of the Radar
The various parameters of the radar have to be determined in order to con-
vert the RCS values estimated in the previous subsection into actual position es-
timates. The radar sensors are designed to have a minimum unambiguous range
of Run=1000 km. A low pulse repetition frequency (LPRF) is used. The pulse





where c is the speed of light (in m/s). With Run=1000 km, the maximum PRF is
fp=150 Hz.








where θa3dB is the half-power (3-dB) beamwidth in the azimuth direction, and θ
e
3dB is
the half-power (3-dB) beamwidth in the elevation direction. Assuming the antenna





where εap is the aperture efficiency and λ is the wavelength (in m).
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From equations 5.27 and 5.28 it is evident that the antenna area is dependent
on the half-power beamwidth. The area of the antenna is the limiting parameter
that will influence the half-power bandwidth. Assuming an aperture efficiency of
0.5, the gain (G), antenna area and antenna diameter are calculated. It seems that
a beamwidth of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees leads to a manageable antenna diameter of 4.36
m. Higher beamwidth might lead to excessive antenna diameter requirements (see
Table 5.6) that may be infeasible to design and operate.





Antenna Area (m2) Antenna Diameter (m)
(Degrees)
0.5 x 0.5 50.17 14.90 4.36
1 x 1 44.15 3.72 2.18
The radar sensor frequency is already decided as X-Band (10 GHz). PRF is
calculated as a function of the range certainty requirements as shown previously.
Antenna beamwidth and gain (G) are calculated according to antenna diameter
limitations as shown above. The peak power, pulsewidth and noise factor are set in
the range of typical values for classical radar systems. Table 5.7 on page 194 below
shows the radar parameters chosen to be used in the simulations discussed in this
chapter.
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Table 5.7: Radar Parameters
Parameter Values
Frequency X-Band (10 GHz)
Peak Power 1 MW
Antenna Gain 50 dB










5.5.4 Simulation of Target Position Data as Determined by the Radars
Having determined the RCS as a function of the interception geometry between
the interceptor(s) and target ICBM(s) in subsection 5.5.2, the RCS values can now
be used along with the radar parameters determined in the previous subsection to
evaluate the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as measured by the two radars. The SNR
is then used to estimate the position errors of the target ICBM as measured by the








Figures 5.20 and 5.21 below show the SNR obtained by the two radars as they
observe each of the interceptions.
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Figure 5.20: SNR for San Francisco Trajectory
However, the estimated SNR is affected by the tracking quality of the radar
sensors leading to errors in the target ICBM position estimates. The most prevalent
cause of error is thermal noise. The RMS error in angle (i.e. azimuth and elevation)









































where the constant K for the RMS angle error is approximately 1.7 for a
monopulse tracker and the constant K for the RMS range error is between 1 and 2.
Using these equations the error in radar sensor’s determination of the target ICBM
position is simulated. The magnitude of the RMS errors is calculated as
eRMS =
√
(x− x̂)2 + (y − ŷ)2 + (z − ẑ)2 (5.32)
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where (x, y, z) is the true position of the ballistic missile and (x̂, ŷ, ẑ) is the
radar’s sensor measurement of the target ICBM at any given time in the simulation.
For the intercept between IM-1 and the San Francisco-bound target ICBM, the
positions error given by radar-1 and radar-2 are shown in figures 5.22 and 5.23
respectively on page 198. As expected radar-1 has less error than radar-2 since it is
optimized to observed the ICBM targeting San Francisco.
Similarly, for the intercept between IM-2 and the Washington D.C.-bound
target ICBM, radar-2 has less error than radar-1 as shown in figures 5.24 and 5.25
on page 199. Although the optimized radar would always have less error than the
other for a given target ICBM trajectory, the magnitudes of the error are random in
nature. The patterns of target ICBM position error will mimic the crests and troughs
indicated in the figures, however the magnitude will vary from one simulation to
another.
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IM-1 - San Francisco Bound ICBM Intercept



































Radar-1 (Optimized for San Francisco Trajectory)
Figure 5.22: Radar-1 Position Error for San Francisco Trajectory































Radar-2 (Optimized for Washington D.C. Trajectory)
Figure 5.23: Radar-2 Position Error for San Francisco Trajectory
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IM-2 - Washington D.C. Bound ICBM Intercept





























Radar-1 (Optimized for San Francisco Trajectory)
Figure 5.24: Radar-1 Position Error for Washington D.C. Trajectory
































Radar-2 (Optimized for Washington D.C. Trajectory)
Figure 5.25: Radar-2 Position Error for Washington D.C. Trajectory
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Finally the fused data from the two radars for each of the two cases of intercept
(San Francisco and Washington D.C.) modeled in this chapter is shown below. The
fused radar data for the IM-1 San Francisco intercept is shown in figure 5.26 below.
The fused radar data for the IM-2 Washington D.C. intercept is shown in figure 5.27
on page 201. The data fusion is done using the equation below
p̂w(x, y, z) =
p̂1(x1, y1, z1)× (S/N)1 + p̂2(x2, y2, z2)× (S/N)2
(S/N)1 + (S/N)2
(5.33)
where p̂w(x, y, z) is the fused target position vector, p̂1(x1, y1, z1) and p̂2(x2, y2, z2) is
the ICBM target position vector as determined by radar-1 and radar-2, and (S/N)1
and (S/N)2 is the signal to noise ratio of radar-1 and radar-2.
IM-1 - San Francisco Bound ICBM Intercept



































Figure 5.26: Fused Radar Position Error for San Francisco Trajectory
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IM-2 - Washington D.C. Bound ICBM Intercept






























Figure 5.27: Fused Radar Position Error for Washington D.C. Trajectory
5.6 Sensors: Space Tracking and Surveillance Systems (STSS)
The previous section modeled radar sensors and estimated the magnitude of
position errors (as observed by the radars) of the two tracked target ICBMs. The
next section will model the STSS space-based sensors and then simulate their effect
on the magnitude of position error of the tracked target ICBMs. The major concern
in a space-based IR sensor “looking down” to the Earth and tracking an ICBM
is the discrimination of the IR signal produced by the target of interest from the
signals produced by the background. The space-based sensor must contend with
sources of clutter on the surface of Earth and in the intervening atmosphere like
solar reflection/radiation, earth radiation (earthshine), rain, clouds, fog, terrain
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types and luminance (day-night). Inability to discriminate signal from background
noise can lead to false alarms.
In ballistic missile defense, medium wavelength IR (MWIR) (3-5 µm), long
wavelength IR (LWIR) (8-12 µm) and very-LWIR (> 12 µm) sensors are required
due to the nature of the target-background combination, which varies throughout
the flight of the ICBM. To address these concerns and requirements, the STSS is
equipped with a multi-color quantum well IR photodetector (QWIP) step-stare focal
plane array (FPA). The term multi-color means that a single sensor has the ability
to detect and track IR targets of interest in different areas of the IR spectrum. Mul-
ticolor IR sensing is important for early missile typing and booster classification,
plume-to-hardbody handover, and to eliminate the effects of earthshine in exoatmo-
spheric discrimination[143]. A multi-color IR sensor is required to maintain target
tracking during the transition from boost-phase to burnout-coasting. A sample im-
age of a Delta-II launch vehicle captured in multi-color QWIP is shown in figure 5.28
on page 203. The image clearly indicates the advantage of multi-color sensors in dis-
criminating and identifying the body of the cold launch vehicle in the presence of the
hot exhaust plume. This ability helps ensure a smooth tracking from boost-phase
to post-boost-phase.
Recent developments at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and other centers
have demonstrated the fabrication of two-band and four-band QWIP FPAs tuned
to detect in the IR bands of 4-5.5 µm, 8.5-10 µm, 10-12 µm and 13-15.5 µm[18, 183,
184, 196]. Major advantages of QWIPs are their excellent uniformity, which allows
for rejection of elevated backgrounds (suitable for boost-phase ICBM detection),
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Figure 5.28: LWIR Tracking of Delta-II Launch Vehicle
[183]
low cost, low power dissipation, low 1/f noise and their narrow-band spectrum.
However, QWIPs do suffer from low quantum efficiency[143].
Apart from multi-color QWIP, the other advanced feature in STSS is the
implementation of step-stare focal plane arrays (FPA). These FPA sensors have
enough detectors to cover the entire sensor field of view simultaneously, without
the need for scanning format implementations like the Defense Support Program
(DSP) satellites. A sensor can be designed to have relatively few detectors that
scan the field of view, or it can be designed to have a very large number of detectors
staring at the scene to detect targets by their motion through the field of view. The
technology during the development of DSP in the 1960s enabled only the former
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approach18. In the case of STSS, due to FPA technology the individual detectors do
not have to scan the field of view. They can stare at the entire sensor field of view.
This approach results in longer integration times, improved sensitivity and higher
SNR when compared to traditional scanning types sensors. In addition to providing
improved sensitivity, staring sensors are particularly well-suited for moving target
indication (MTI) applications. In MTI type applications, the sensor attempts to
detect a target that is moving over a cluttered but stationary background. With the
field of view of a staring sensor held fixed with respect to the stationary background,
clutter can be eliminated by taking differences of successive frames of data.
For detectors staring only at the background with no target present, the differ-
encing process results in a zero output signal. For those detectors that are traversed
by the moving target, the differencing process results in a detectable, nonzero signal.
In order to implement this approach from a low earth orbit a step-stare technique
is used. The step-stare FPA sensor divides the total field of view into smaller steps
and periodically alternates among them. In this approach, the footprint of the sen-
sors is held in a fixed observation point for the period of time required to collect
the necessary number of frames of staring data. This is the starting point of the
step-stare cycle. After this data is collected, the detector footprint is moved, or
stepped to a new observation region. This the step portion of the cycle[62].
18. Early strategic surveillance sensors like DSP operating in the infrared part of the spectrum achieved
the necessary spatial coverage by scanning discrete infrared detectors over the search field of view.
Scanning was necessary because the number of resolution cells in the search field usually exceeded
the number of discrete IR detectors available to the sensor[62].
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5.6.1 Target ICBM IR Spectroscopy
The first step in the process of simulating the position errors of the tracked
target ICBMs as observed by the STSS satellites is to configure the IR characteris-
tics of the target. This subsection will outline that process. Although the simulation
discussed in this chapter involves only boost-phase missile defense, in order to real-
istically model the space-based STSS sensor it is modeled as being able to operate
in boost-phase as well as in the post-boost phase of flight.
In the boost-phase of flight, the target ICBM altitude is approximately below
250 km. In this phase the missile exhaust plume is the principal contributor to
the IR signature of the ICBM. The exhaust plumes of the target ICBM usually
contain water vapor, carbon dioxide gas and solid particulates and are at an average
temperature of 1400oK and an emissivity of about 0.9[17]. The determination of the
target ICBM plume’s maximum radiant exitance as well as wavelength where the
maximum occurs is done by applying Planck’s radiation formula. The formula is
given as










where M is the radiant exitance, ε is the emissivity, λ is the radiation wavelength,
T is the source temperature in K, h is the Planck’s constant (6.626 x 10−34 J.sec),
k is the Boltzmann’s constant (1.38 x 10−23 J/K) and c is the speed of light. Using
the formula the radiant exitance of the ICBM exhaust plume is plotted as shown
in figure 5.29 on page 206. The maximum radiant exitance from the plume is seen
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to be 5.512 W/cm2 and corresponding peak wavelength is 2.073 µm. However, the
background has to be examined before deciding the bandwidth at which the sensor
should be centered for observing the boost-phase.




































Figure 5.29: ICBM (Boost-Phase) Plume Radiant Exitance at 1400oK
The background of the missile is affected by both solar radiation and earth-
shine. The solar radiation is dominant for wavelengths below 3 µm as shown in
figure 5.30 on page 207. This would generate significant clutter for an IR sensor
during daylight observation[79]. Further, the radiation from earthshine is significant
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for wavelengths greater than 5 µm[79] as seen in figure 5.31 on page 208. Consid-
ering these two limitations the IR sensor bandwidth should be from 3 to 4 µm for
the narrowband QWIP.































Figure 5.30: Radiant Exitance of Sun at 5500oK
In the post-boost-phase, when the ICBM booster “burns-out,” the IR signa-
ture of the ICBM changes significantly. At the altitude at which burn-out occurs,
the temperature of the missile’s surface is governed only by its surface configuration,
solar radiation intensity, and whether the ICBM is rotating[17]. A typical temper-
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Figure 5.31: Radiant Exitance of Earth at 300oK
ature for the missile surface after burn-out is 200oK. The radiant exitance of the
ICBM at this stage is plotted as shown in figure 5.32 on page 209 using Planck’s
formula.
It is seen from the plot that the maximum radiant exitance of the post-boost
ICBM is approximately at 3.7 x 10−4 W/cm2 and the corresponding peak wavelength
is approximately at 14.51 µm. For the case of the post-boost ICBM the background
characteristics actually work in favor of the ICBM. The measured exoatmospheric
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Figure 5.32: Radiant Exitance of Post-Boost ICBM at 200oK
data indicates that the Earth’s atmosphere totally blocks the earthshine in the
carbon dioxide band between 14 and 16 µm[143]. Therefore, for this phase the
bandwidth considered for the narrowband QWIP is from 14 to 15 µm.
5.6.2 Focal Plane Array (FPA) requirements
Having determined the operating bandwidths for the STSS sensors in the pre-
vious subsection this subsection will estimate the focal plane array (FPA) charac-
209
teristics of the STSS sensors before proceeding to calculate the sensor SNR. The
main factor in outlining the requirements of a IR FPA is the azimuthal resolution.
The dimensions of the target IR signature in combination with the detection range
influences the FPA design. The exhaust plume of an ICBM has an approximate
length of 50 m[62]. During the post-boost-phase the target ICBM IR signature is
comparable to the physical dimensions of the ICBM, which has an approximate
length of 20 m. Using an worst-case scenario it would be conservative to assume
that the space-based IR sensor must be able to discriminate IR targets spaced 20
m apart at a distance of 1350 km. These values lead to an azimuthal resolution of
approximately 15 µradians. This implies that the horizontal and vertical instanta-
neous field of view (HIFOV, VIFOV) of each detector element on the FPA must be
15 µradians.
The IR sensor is required to cover a total footprint equal to the area of North
Korea which is approximately 120,000 square kilometers. Considering a step-stare
IR sensor FPA of 20 steps, each FPA step must cover a footprint of 6000 square
kilometers. Then the horizontal and vertical field of view (HFOV, VFOV) is ap-





















= 4000× 4000 (5.35)
Mid-IR and long-IR QWIP FPAs incorporating 1024 x 1024 elements have
been developed and demonstrated[184]. The development of a FPA with a number
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of elements more than this value requires the union of more than one array. Such
a design involves complexity due to spatial alignment and temporal registration
problems. However, such designs have been accomplished successfully as illustrated
in figure 5.33 on page 211. The figure on the left side shows a union of nine 1024 x
1024 pixel QWIP FPAs on a GaAs wafer and the figure on the right is a 1024 x 1024
QWIP FPA.The Landsat 7 satellite is an example of an advanced satellite that has
implemented FPA technology[101] of 1000 x 1000 detectors per spectral band with
a ground resolution of 185 m.
Figure 5.33: QWIP FPA wafers
[184]
5.6.3 SNR for a QWIP FPA











where D∗ is the normalized detectivity19, Ad is the detector area, ∆f is the noise
equivalent bandwidth, I (W/sr) is the radiant intensity of the target source, Aenp is
the area of the collection aperture (entrance pupil) of the detector optics and r is
the detector to target range.
The performance analysis for SNR is conducted under the assumption that the
IR sensor is operating under Background Limited Infrared Photodetection (BLIP)
conditions. This implies that the dominant noise source is the background photon
flux. All other internal noise associated with the detector itself, such as John-
son noise, Generation-Recombination noise, and 1/f noise are considered negligible.
BLIP operation is common for IR scanning and staring systems[69]. Therefore, for
a cooled photodetector operating under BLIP, D∗ is given by







where λ is the background radiation wavelength, η is the detector quantum efficiency,
h is Planck’s constant, and Ebackground is the total background photon irradiance.
Ebackground is determined by integrating the background photon irradiance
Mbackground over the two IR sensor bands of consideration, MWIR and SWIR. Mbackground
19. This variable is the sensor sensitivity normalized to a 1 cm2 area and 1 Hz noise equivalent
bandwidth. It may be interpreted as a SNR out of detector when the radiant power of 1 W is
incident on the detector, given an area of 1 cm2 and noise equivalent bandwidth of 1 Hz.
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is calculated as











The figure of merit, D∗ has to be calculated for each band (MWIR and SWIR)
of the multi-color IR sensor separately since the integration of the background photo
irradiance in the 3-4 µm and the 14-15 µm are different. Using equations 5.37
and 5.38, D∗ for the two spectral areas of operation is determined for day-time
luminance and night-time luminance conditions.
1. Day-time Luminance Conditions
















2. Night-time Luminance Conditions
















The other parameters required to calculate SNR are estimated as explained
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below. Detector Area Ad is given as
Ad = 15µm× 15µm = 2.25× 10−10m2 (5.43)
Assuming a frame rate of 100 Hz, the detector signal bandwidth ∆f is cal-
culated to be equal to 50 Hz. Given that the maximum spectral radiant exitance
at day-time conditions is 5.512 W/cm2 and at night-time conditions is 3.7 x 10−4
W/cm2, the radiant intensity of the target is calculated to be 2.63 x 106 W/sr and
25.70 W/sr respectively for day-time and night-time conditions. Finally, the area
of the collection aperture (entrance pupil) Aenp is determined by estimating the





where ∆θ is the required angular resolution calculated earlier to be 20 µradians.
For the two wavelengths under consideration, λ=3.5 µm and λ=14.5 µm the corre-
sponding values for Dlens are 0.427 m and 1.8 m respectively. The larger value of
1.8 m is chosen for all further calculations in order to preserve the performance of
the detector at the more demanding SWIR region. Given Dlens=1.8 m, the value of
Aenp=πD
2/4=2.55 m2.
Given all the parameters, SNR is now estimated to be
214
1. Day-time
SNR(3− 4µm) = 43.25dB (5.45)
SNR(14− 15µm) = 17.73dB (5.46)
2. Night-time
SNR(3− 4µm) = 72.40dB (5.47)
SNR(14− 15µm) = 28.38dB (5.48)
These achieved SNR are good enough. In a typical missile surveillance receiver, an
SNR value of at least 14 dB ensures a high detection probability with low false alarm
rate[17]. However, it should be remembered that this analysis was undertaken under
the assumption of BLIP, neglecting other sources of noise, which could degrade the
performance of the detectors to lower values than outlined here.
5.6.4 Simulation of Target Position Data as Seen by STSS
Compiling all the analysis done in the preceding subsections the specifications
of the STSS system are detailed in table 5.8 on page 216. Using the data from ta-
ble 5.8, simulation of the position error of the target ICBM as observed by the STSS
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satellites is undertaken. In the simulations attempted, the satellites are assumed to
be perfectly positioning to aid in the interception (one of the satellite IRSAT-1 is
located on top of the target ICBM launch site and the other IRSAT-2 is located on
top of the interceptor missile launch site). Otherwise, the simulation has to take
into account the relative motion between the satellite and the ballistic missile and
the fact that the different points on the surface of earth within the field of view
move with different velocities with respect to the satellite, which makes the problem
very complicated.
Table 5.8: STSS Parameters
Parameter Values
Type FPA step-stare
Format 4000 x 4000
Detector Two-color QWIP














Focal Length 1 m
The STSS IR sensors are passive. They give azimuth and elevation information
on the target ICBM. To derive the range to the target ICBM, two satellites have to
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observe the ICBM in stereo as is attempted in the case of STSS. The intersection of
the IFOV of the two satellite can be used to calculate the range to the target ICBM.
This geometry between the STSS satellites and the target ICBM is illustrated in
figure 5.34 below.
Figure 5.34: Geometry between STSS satellites and target ICBM
It is assumed that the exact position of the STSS satellites are known through
on board sensors. Once the satellites have LOS to the target they can measure the
angle to the target ICBM in azimuth and elevation. Given these parameters, the












Since distance A between the satellites and all angles are known, the other
distance (i.e. range) can be calculated.
In the simulation to model real-world conditions, a random uniformly dis-
tributed error is added to the measured angles. As the target must be within the
IFOV lines, the error is chosen such that the midline of the IFOV can move up
to ±IFOV/2 radians. The results of the simulation are shown below. Figure 5.35
on page 219 shows the error in the San Francisco-bound target ICBM position as
measured by the STSS satellites during the simulation. Figure 5.36 on page 219
shows the error in the Washington D.C.-bound target ICBM position as measured
by the STSS satellites during the simulation.
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Figure 5.35: STSS Position Error for San Francisco Trajectory


































Figure 5.36: STSS Position Error for Washington D.C. Trajectory
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5.7 Sensors: Kill Vehicle (KV) Sensors
Both the X-Band radar and space-based STSS sensors yield to sensors on the
KV as the interceptor closes in on the target ICBM. This mechanism is adopted
to ensure a hit-to-kill intercept. In order to achieve a miss distance of less than 1
m that is required for a hit-to-kill intercept it is imperative that highly accurate
position data on the target is available during the endgame. The only possible way
to generate such accurate data is to use sensors on the KV to track the target ICBM.
The Kill Vehicle (KV) typically consist of more than one sensor that acquires
the target and helps guide the KV to the predicted interception point. In this
chapter the parameters for the KV sensors is taken from the APS study on boost-
phase intercept[16] which used an short-wave IR (SWIR) sensor and Light Ranging
and Detection (LIDAR) sensor20. For the first part of the endgame the target ICBM
is tracked by a short-wave IR (SWIR) sensor on the KV. The APS study decided to
adopt an SWIR sensor for imaging the plume because it is simpler than an MWIR
sensor and appeared adequate to allow a Light Ranging and Detection (LIDAR)
sensor on the KV to locate the rocket body in the final stages of the endgame.
This chapter assumes that the decision still holds and applies an SWIR sensor
in the fist part of the endgame. The SWIR sensor on the KV needs to be at an
altitude of 100 km or more where atmospheric friction is sufficiently low for the
20. No attempt is made to design the sensors or to estimate its performance parameters like SNR.
Details of such kind for the SWIR can be found in the APS study[16]. Details on the design
and performance of a LIDAR system are well understood and documented[48, 119]. The Near
Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) spacecraft mission involved an advanced Laser rangefinder
system[2].
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sensor to begin operating. Therefore, for the purpose of simulation a passive SWIR
sensor is functional on the KV that can detect and track the missile plume at a
range of 700 km and could estimate the location of the rocket hardbody to within
100 m at a range of 100 km.
As it closes on the target, the KV shifts from homing on the plume to homing
on the rocket body by handing over to its LIDAR sensor. This shift is called the
plume-to-hardbody handover problem21. Compared to a conventional radar, the
beamwidth of a LIDAR is very small due to its operation at very high frequencies.
This property gives it the ability for high resolution22.The LIDAR sensor is designed
to detect and track the hardbody as soon as it is within 100 km of the target with
a 10-Hz update rate and could locate the position of the aim point on the target
within 0.5 m.
5.8 Simulation Results: STSS vs. Ground-based radars
Using all the insights developed in the previous sections, a comparison is made
in this section between the performance of the boost-phase missile defense system
using ground-based radar data versus the performance of the boost-phase missile
defense system using space-based STSS data. It has already been demonstrated that
21. One mechanism is to use long-wavelength infrared (LWIR) sensors on board the kill vehicle to
detect and image the rocket body’s thermal emission. The radiation would have to be detected in
the presence of the background LWIR emission from the plume. The other option is to use active
light detection and ranging sensor (LIDAR) to determine the range to the target ICBM.
22. On the other hand, due to the narrow bandwidth they have limited search capability. Since, the
endgame stage the target ICBM is already within the sights of the LIDAR there is no need for a
search.
221
the magnitude of target ICBM position error obtained from STSS is significantly
lower than the magnitude of target position error obtained from ground-based radar
(compare subsections 5.6.4 and 5.5.4).
For the case of the intercept using ground-based radar, the data from the two
radars are fused. This process reduced the target ICBM position error to some
extent. However, in an actual setting a tuned Kalman filter needs to be applied to
the radar data. For the purposes of comparing the accuracy of STSS vs. ground-
based radars this is not needed and is not attempted in this chapter. Similarly,
for a a multi-target, multi-interceptor scenario a joint probability data association
(JPDA) algorithm[117] (i.e., a sub-optimal Bayesian algorithm) and an ellipsoidal
gating[186] logic would have to be implemented to fuse the sensor tracking data. No
attempts were made to create such a data processing architecture. Also, no attempt
was made to fuse the DSP data with the radar data as is probably currently done.
For these reasons, the results of this chapter should not be used as an absolute
estimate of the miss distances obtained from a boost-phase missile defense system.
To understand how a boost-phase would perform in real-world operating conditions
a more detailed analysis needs to be performed. However, it can be inferred from
the analysis and results shown in figures 5.37 and 5.38 below that boost-phase
missile defense systems using ground-based radar data for interception will suffer
from significantly larger miss distances than those using STSS data by more than
an order of magnitude.
As observed from figures 5.37 and 5.38 above using position data from STSS
reduces the miss distance of an intercept to between 160 and 190 m compared to
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Miss Distance (with endgame) w. STSS (SF)





























Miss Distance (with endgame) w/o STSS (SF)
Figure 5.37: STSS vs. Ground-based Radar Performance (San Francisco
Trajectory)




























Miss Distance (with endgame) w. STSS (DC)






























Miss Distance (with endgame) w/o STSS (DC)
Figure 5.38: STSS vs. Ground-based Radar Performance (Washington
D.C. Trajectory)
the thousands of meters of miss obtained from using X-Band radar data. This
phenomenon is observed for both the San Francisco-bound and Washington D.C.-
bound ICBM intercepts. The miss distance distribution for the radar data case has
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a Gaussian distribution pattern and the miss distance distribution for the STSS case
has an uniform distribution as expected.
5.9 Conclusion: Satellites, Missile Defense and Space Security
This chapter sequentially developed the mechanics involved in a boost-phase
missile defense in order to estimate the reduction in intercept miss distances obtained
by using STSS satellites. By simulating the interception between a target ICBM
and a boost-phase missile defense interceptor, this chapter demonstrates that the
improvements obtained from STSS satellite sensors in comparison to radar sensors
are still insufficient to successfully execute a hit-to-kill boost-phase missile defense.
However, the miss distances obtained with STSS are significantly lower than those
obtained using radar sensors. It is conceivable that a fully populated and technolog-
ically mature STSS constellation could be a credible mechanism for missile defense
against threats like North Korea.
However, this potential capability of STSS has other implications for the de-
bate on space security. Even a limited STSS-based missile defense system might in
principle reduce the effect of Chinese and possible Russian nuclear missile forces.
For both Russia and China, any U.S. attempt to use space systems to augment its
missile defense capabilities is of significant concern23. Determining whether Russia
23. From their perspective, the U.S. decision to expand missile defense capabilities into outer space
represents the collapse of the Cold War bargains of strategic stability based on mutual vulnerability.
During the Cold War period, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty codified a situation in which
the Soviet Union and the U.S. were equally vulnerable to a nuclear retaliatory strike, no matter
who made the first strike. Missile defense systems were substantially limited in scope by ABM
Treaty. The U.S. however withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 1991[146].
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and China will be able to maintain confidence in their retaliatory missiles depends
on how quickly and efficiently the U.S. could transfer STSS capabilities from a lim-
ited boost-phase system to other missile defense systems that could threaten them.
If missile defense requires infrastructure—large radars or IR satellite systems—that
could support a much larger system, and if the time required to build, test, and
integrate the system is much greater than the time required to add more intercep-
tors, then even a limited STSS-based missile defense system would give the U.S. a
running start.
Unless the Russians and Chinese who could be threatened by the capabilities
of an STSS-enabled missile defense system accept its legitimacy it would be very
difficult for the U.S. to assure operational sanctuary for these satellites. If perceived
as a threat to their nuclear retaliatory capabilities, China and Russia could disrupt
STSS satellites, either passively or actively. They could also influence the North
Korean missile program in a way that degrades the utility of a STSS-based missile
defense systems. These considerations imply that if the U.S. needs to establish
missile defenses against rogue threats like North Korea, then it needs to reassure
other states that STSS or for that matter other satellite systems will not be used
against them. It would also have to restrict the scope of its various missile defense
architectures to rogue threats.
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Appendix A
Failure Causes and Test Requirements for Spacecraft
Table A.1: Factors in Establishing Space Vehicle Test Requirements[55]
Factors in Space Vehicle Test Requirements
⇒ Criticality to mission
⇒ Sensitivity to Environment
⇒ Criticality to mission
⇒ Sensitivity to Environment
⇒ Severity of Environment
⇒ Knowledge or uncetainty of environment
⇒ Environmental time profile
⇒ Similarity to previously qualified articles
⇒ Ability to analyze vs. design margins
⇒ Maturity of technology
⇒ Maturity of production line
⇒ Level of assembly vs. simulation e.g. tubing and wiring vibration tested at higher
levels of assembly
⇒ Product complexity
⇒ Cost of repair and retest for problems found at higher levels of assembly
⇒ Use of qualification articles for flight-alternative strategies
⇒ Benefits of dedicated qualification articles
⇒ ⇒ Fatigue life verification for repeated acceptance test of flight articles
⇒ ⇒ Available test article to evaluate upgrades/modifications
⇒ ⇒ Available testbed to evaluate mission anomalies
⇒ ⇒ Greater ability to prove design robustness
⇒ Simulation of mission environments
⇒ Prior experience with statistically significant sample of similiar products and their
performance variability
⇒ Training and experience of manufacturing, assembly, integration and test personnel
⇒ Use of automated vs. operator performed manufacturing operations
⇒ Manufacturing processs controls proven to produce defect free products of similiar
designs and complexity
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Table A.2: Spacecraft Components and Subsystems Failure Causes[55]








































































































Precision Surfaces/Alignment X X X X X
Insufficient Structural Margin X X X X X X X X X X X
Poor Thermal Design X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Wrong Material X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Insufficient Fatigue Life X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Tiedown of Tubing/Wiring X X X X X X X X X
Inadequate Envivonmental
Criteria
X X X X X X X X X X
Insufficient Life X X X X X X X X X
Wrong Lubricants X
Incompatible Materials X X X X X X X
Insufficient Insulation X X X X
Insufficient Spacing/Clearance X X X X X
Tolerance Buildup X X X X X X
Cold Welding X
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE
Inaqequate Grounding X X X X X X X X X X
Insufficient Shielding X X X X
Defective RF Seals X X X X
High Resistance X X X X
No RF Ground X X X X
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Table A.3: Spacecraft Components and Subsystems Failure Causes[55]







































































































TESTING AND TEST PROCEDURES
Failure to Follow Procedures X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Wrong or No Procedure X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Defective Test Equipment X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Test Equipment Failure X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Wrong Fixtures X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Over/Under Torqued Bolts X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Inadequate Instrumentation X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Operator Error X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Excessive Testing X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
REPAIR, REWORK AND RETEST
Ad Hoc Procedures X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Excessive Rework X X X X
Excessive Retest X X X X X X X X
Excessive
Heat/Soldering/Welding
X X X X X
Collateral Damage X X X X
INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL
Manufacturing X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Handling X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Assembly X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Integration X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Table A.4: Spacecraft Qualification Test[55]
Primary Qualification Tests
to Precipitate Failure Mechanism















































































Mounting broken/loose X X X X X
Broken Part X X X X
Shorted Part X X X X
Defective Part X X X X X
Defective Board X X X X X
Broken/Shorted/Pinched Wires X X X X X
Defective/Broken Solder X X X X X
Contamination X X X X




Relay/Switch Chatter X X X
Adjacent Circuit Board Contact X X X
Premature Wearout X X
Electromagnetic Interference X
Insufficient Design Margin X X X X
Corona Discharge/Arcing X
Inadequate Tiedown of X X X
Tubing/Wiring
Inadequate Thermal Design X X
Brittle Material Failure X
Inadequate Fatigue Life X X X
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Table A.5: Spacecraft Acceptance Test[55]
Primary Acceptance Tests
to Precipitate Failure Mechanism













































































Parameter Drift X X X X
Electrical Intermittants X X X X X
Latent Defective Parts X X X X X
Parts Shorting X
Chafed/Pinched Wires X
Adjacent Circuit Board Con-
tact
X X
Parameters Changing Due to
Deflections
X X X X
Loose Hardware X X X
Moving Parts Binding X X
Leaky Gaskets/Seals X X X X
Lubricants Changing
Characteristics X X X
Material Embrittlement X X X
Outgassing/Contamination X X X
Degradation of Electrical
or Thermal Insulation X X
Corona Discharge/Arcing X X
Defective Pressure Vessels X
Structural Defects X




Defining Field of Regard (FOR), Field of View (FOV) and
Resolution
B.1 FOR and FOV
The Field of Regard (FOR) of a satellite is the total extent of “the area of Earth
that can be covered by its sensor by altering the satellite orientation (in space).”
On the other hand, the Field of View (FOV) of a satellite is “the area of Earth
that a sensor has coverage over at any moment without moving its sensor.” FOR
encompasses everything that a sensor could theoretically see if it were moved on its
gimballing system while FOV (which is a subset of FOR) describes what a sensor
could actually see without being moved.
FOR’s are mission driven. A signals intelligence mission detecting radio trans-
missions only needs to have line of sight to the emitter that it is trying to detect,
hence its FOR extends to the horizon as seen from the satellite.Communication/BFT
missions generally requires the satellite to be at a specified angle above the horizon,
generally five to ten degrees, to ensure connectivity. The FOR for such a mission
would be the area on the ground from where the satellite is at least 5-10 degrees
above the horizon. Imagery missions have much more restrictive FORs. In order to
properly analyze overhead images, the images cannot be taken from too shallow an
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angle since the shallower the angle the greater is the distance to the object being
imaged.
The resolution of an image1, i.e., the ability to distinguish small, closely-spaced
objects from each other, is directly related to how far the object is. The smallest
feature x that can be resolved by a circular aperture of diameter D at a range R
from the target using an electromagnetic wavelength λ is approximately given by the
formula x = 1.22Rλ
D
, showing that the resolution power is linearly related to range.
Therefore, imagery satellites seldom look more than about 30 degrees off-nadir2. A
quick survey of currently operational private for-profit satellite systems prove this
(see table B.1 on page 233).
It must be noted that whether the requirement is ground-based (i.e., five de-
grees above the horizon for communication missions) or satellite-based (i.e., 30 de-
grees off-nadir for imagery), the FOR describes a specific circle on the ground. This
is illustrated by figures B.1 and B.2. Both the figures show the relative sizes of these
mission-driven FORs for a satellite orbiting at 185 km and 500 km, respectively.
Other satellites in LEO would have FORs with similar radius ratios depending on
whether their orbits are higher or lower than those depicted[67].
Finally, it is important to realize that just because a target is in the FOR of
the satellite, it is not necessarily being imaged by the payload. Satellites typically do
not image their entire FOR during a single pass. Especially for the high resolution
1. details on resolution requirements for military purpose and a standard definition for resolution are
discussed in section B.2.
2. nadir is the direction of an imaginary line extending from the satellite straight down toward the
center of the Earth.
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imagery necessary for the tactical war fighter, only a tiny fraction of the whole FOR
can be seen by the camera’s FOV at any instant. Similarly, the power from the
main lobe of a communication satellite would be concentrated in a smaller region of
its FOR.
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Figure B.1: Field of Regard (FOR) from 100 NM (185 km). The solid
line (Horizon) represent the SIGINT FOR, the dashed lines (5/10 degree
above horizon) represent communication/BFT FOR and the dotted lines
(45/30 degree off-nadir) represent ISR related FOR[67].
Figure B.2: Field of Regard (FOR) from 500 km. The solid line
(Horizon) represent the SIGINT FOR, the dashed lines (5/10 degree
above horizon) represent communication/BFT FOR and the dotted lines
(45/30 degree off-nadir) represent ISR related FOR[67].
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B.2 Resolution
Spatial resolution or ground resolution refers to the size of the objects on the
ground that a sensor can distinguish. The easiest way to define resolution is as the
minimum distance between two white spots on a black background at which the
sensor can distinguish the two white spots [12].
But for electro-optical sensors used in satellites, resolution is often defined as
the area on the ground that a single (square) pixel sees at any given instant i.e.,
its “Instantaneous Field of View”, or IFOV3. Each pixel only gives a reading of
predominant electromagnetic radiation in its IFOV. For a homogeneous feature to
be detected its size generally has to be greater than one pixel. If the feature is smaller
than this, it may not be detectable since the average brightness of all features in
that pixel will be recorded. As a rough rule of thumb, it generally requires at least
two-and-a-half pixels to distinguish an object. Thus, while a sensor with ten meter
resolution by the white-dot definition can actually distinguish objects as small as
about ten meters, a sensor with ten-meter resolution by the IFOV definition can
only detect objects above about twenty-five meters in size. Table B.2 below uses
the pixel-size IFOV definition to illustrate resolution required for various military
ISR applications. For most of the analysis in this paper, this IFOV definition is
used.
3. IFOV is the solid angle through which a single pixel detector is sensitive to radiation. In a scanning
system this refers to the solid angle subtended by the detector when the scanning mode is stopped.
IFOV is commonly expressed in milliradians.
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Table B.2: Examples of Spatial Resolution[12]
REQUIRED GROUND RESOLUTION FROM COMMERICAL
OBSERVATION SATELLITES (in meters)
Target Detection General ID Precise ID Description Technical
Analysis
Bridges 6 4.5 1.5 1 0.3
Radar 3 1 0.3 0.15 0.015
Supply Dumps 1.5-3 0.6 0.3 0.03 0.03
Troop Units 6 2 1.2 0.3 0.15
Airfield Facility 6 4.5 3 0.3 0.15
Rockets/Artillery 1 0.6 0.15 0.05 0.045
Aircraft Command 4.5 1.5 1 0.15 0.045
and Control Hq
Missile Sites 3 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
(SSM/SAM)
Surface Ships 7.5-15 4.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
Nuclear Weapons 2.5 1.5 0.3 0.03 0.015
Components
Vehicles 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.06 0.045
Land Minefields 3-9 6 1 0.03 0.09
Ports and Harbors 30 15 6 3 0.3
Coasts, Landing Beaches 15-30 4.5 3 1.5 0.15
Railroad Yards and 15-30 15 6 1.5 0.4
Shops
Roads 6-9 6 1.8 0.6 0.4
Urban Areas 60 30 3 3 0.75
Terrain - 90 4.5 1.5 0.75
Surfaced Submarines 7.5-30 4.5-6 1.5 1 0.03
Detection: Location of a class of units, objects, or activity of interest
General Identification: Determination of a general target type
Precise Identification: Discrimination within target type of known types
Description: Size, dimension, configuration, equipment count, etc
Technical analysis: Detailed analysis of specific equipment
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Appendix C
Validation of Ergodic Theory
In order to validate the accuracy of the Ergodic thory based numerical estima-
tion method used to optimize orbits for TacSats, a comparison was done between
the numerical method and a orbital propagator. A satellite orbit with parameters
similar to one optimized for TacSat coverage over Baghdad i.e. orbiting at an alti-
tude of 600km and inclined at 35 degrees1 was propogated for a period of 24 hours
in STK2 over the city of Baghdad. An illustration of the size of Baghdad chosen in
STK is shown in figure C.1 below.
The results from the orbital propogation is documented below in table C.1.
The coverage over Baghdad (of a optimized satellite) determined using STK’s orbital
propagator is compared with the coverage obtained from the numerical method
based on ergodic theory. It can be seen that the variance is not enough to challenge
the application of ergodic theory to the discussion of the chapter.
1. RAAN and mean anomaly was chosen to obtain maximum coverage over the region of interest.
2. STK or Satellite Tool Kit is a commerical software for orbital analysis. An evaluation copy of the






Figure C.1: Size and Extent of Baghdad as Used in the Orbital Prop-
agator (11 Apr 2012 12:00:00.000 UTCG to 12 Apr 2012 12:00:00.000
UTCG)








Baghdad 45-degree off-nadir 10.395
Baghdad 30-degree off-nadir 5.892
Orbital Propagation
Baghdad Horizon 85 (approx.)
Baghdad 45-degree off-nadir 10.2 (approx.)
Baghdad 30-degree off-nadir 4.4 (approx.)
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Appendix D
Effect of FOR Constraints on Optimized Orbits: Jakarta and St.
Petersburg
This Appendix expands the inferences drawn in subsection 2.4.2 of chapter 2
(on page 44) to the other two target locations of interest: Jakarta and St. Petersburg.
D.1 Jakarta: Communication Mission Constraints
For a communication satellite the sensor FOR constraints are 5/10 degree
above the Horizon.
Inference D.1 At a given satellite altitude and inclination, as the FOR becomes
more constrained due to operational reasons the maximum average daily coverage
over the target latitude decreases. For example, it can be seen in figure D.1 that
at an altitude of 500 km and an inclination of 6 degrees (Jakarta being the target
location of interest at that particular latitude) with a 5 degree above the horizon FOR
constraint the maximum average daily coverage is approximately 120 minutes: a 25
percent decrease in coverage (in comparison to the horizon FOR case). Similarly, it
is seen in figure D.2 that at the same altitude of 500 km and 6 degrees inclination with
a 10 degree above the horizon FOR constraint the maximum average daily coverage
is approximately 90 minutes: a 45 percent decrease in coverage (in comparison to




































Figure D.1: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Jakarta with a
5 Degree Above the Horizon FOR (minutes per day)
D.2 Jakarta: ISR Mission Constraints
For a ISR satellite the sensor FOR constraints are 30/45 degree off-nadir.
Inference D.2 Similar to the previous inference, when the FOR is constrained by
ISR requirements there are drastic losses in coverage time. For example, it can be
seen in figure D.3 that at an altitude of 500 km and an inclination of 6 degrees with a
45 degree off-nadir FOR constraint the maximum daily coverage is approximately 14
minutes: a 90 percent decrease in coverage from the horizon FOR case. Similarly,
it is seen in figure D.4 that at the same altitude of 500 km and 6 degrees inclination
with a 30 degree off-nadir FOR constraint the maximum average daily coverage is








































Figure D.2: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Jakarta with a
10 Degree Above the Horizon FOR (minutes per day)
horizon FOR case).
The dramatic fall in coverage between the ideal case of horizon FOR and the
5/10 degree above the horizon requirement for communication satellites or the 30/45
degree off-nadir FOR for ISR/imaging satellites can be comprehended by examining
figure B.2 in Appendix B on page 231. It is immediately clear that as the FOR
becomes more constrained the area on the ground accessible for the satellite mission
gets smaller hence leading to reduced mission coverage durations1.







































Figure D.3: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Jakarta with a





































Figure D.4: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over Jakarta with a
30 Degree Off-Nadir FOR (minutes per day)
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D.3 St. Petersburg : Communication Mission Constraints
For a communication satellite the sensor FOR constraints are 5/10 degree
above the Horizon.
Inference D.3 At a given satellite altitude and inclination, as the FOR becomes
more constrained due to operational reasons the maximum average daily coverage
over the target latitude decreases. For example, it can be seen in figure D.5 that at an
altitude of 500 km and an inclination of 60 degrees (St. Petersburg being the target
location at that particular latitude) with a 5 degree above the horizon FOR constraint
the maximum average daily coverage is approximately 50 minutes: a 30 percent
decrease in coverage (in comparison to the horizon FOR case). Similarly, it is seen
in figure D.6 that at the same altitude of 500 km and 60 degrees inclination with a
10 degree above the horizon FOR constraint the maximum average daily coverage is





































Figure D.5: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over St. Petersburg







































Figure D.6: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over St. Petersburg
with a 10 Degree Above the Horizon FOR (minutes per day)
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D.4 St. Petersburg : ISR Mission Constraints
For an ISR satellite the sensor FOR constraints are 30/45 degree off-nadir.
Inference D.4 Similar to the previous inference, when the FOR is constrained by
ISR and imaging requirements there are drastic losses in coverage time. For example,
it can be seen in figure D.7 that at an altitude of 500 km and an inclination of 60
degrees with a 45 degree off-nadir FOR constraint the maximum daily coverage is
approximately 8 minutes: a 90 percent decrease in coverage from the horizon FOR
case. Similarly, it is seen in figure D.8 that at the same altitude of 500 km and 60
degrees inclination with a 30 degree off-nadir FOR constraint the maximum average
daily coverage is approximately 3.5 minutes: a 95 percent decrease in coverage (in
comparison to the horizon FOR case).
As shown above, the dramatic fall in coverage between the ideal case of hori-
zon FOR and the 5/10 degree above the horizon requirement for communication
satellites or the 30/45 degree off-nadir FOR for ISR satellites can be comprehended
on examining once more figure B.2 in Appendix B on page 231. It is immediately
clear that as FOR becomes more constrained the area on the ground accessible for
the satellite mission gets smaller hence leading to reduced mission coverages2.








































Figure D.7: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over St. Petersburg





































Figure D.8: Maximum Average Satellite Coverage Over St. Petersburg
with a 30 Degree Off-Nadir FOR (minutes per day)
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Appendix E
Effect of FOR constraints Across Latitudes
This appendix will illustrate and prove that
Inference E.1 At any given altitude, the effect of various FOR constraints is to
reduce the average maximum coverage across latitudes. This effect, however, is
more pronounced at mid-latitude regions than in equatorial or polar regions.
E.1 100 NM (185 km) Altitude
For the case where the satellite is orbiting at an altitude of 100 NM (185 km);
when the various communication, BFT, and ISR FOR constraints are imposed there
are substantial decrease in optimized maximum average coverage times across all
latitudes. It will be shown in this section that even in the regions of the earth where
the coverage is greatest i.e., equator and polar1 the loss of coverage is substantial.
The other regions will suffer more rapid fall in coverage.
E.1.1 Effect of FOR Constraint on Equatorial and Polar Regions
On examining figures E.1, E.2, E.3, E.4 and E.5 below the loss of coverage at
equatorial and polar regions due to FOR constraints is apparent. The maximum
1. refer to inference inference 2.4 on page 41 for a discussion on the reason why equatorial and polar
regions greater maximum average coverage than other regions.
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coverage durations decrease progressively from 110 minutes (for the horizon FOR)
to
• 80 minutes (for the 5 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communication
mission; a 27 percent decrease in coverage
• 55 minutes (for the 10 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communication
mission; a 50 percent decrease in coverage
• 14 minutes (for the 45 degree off-nadir FOR) in the case of ISR mission; a 88
percent decrease in coverage
• 8 minutes (for the 30 degree off-nadir FOR) in the case of ISR mission; a 92
percent decrease in coverage
E.1.2 Effect of FOR Constraint on Mid-Latitude Regions
On examining figures E.1, E.2, E.3, E.4 and E.5 below again the loss of coverage
across mid-latitude regions (45 degree latitude) due to FOR constraints is clear. The
maximum coverage durations decrease progressively from 45 minutes (for the horizon
FOR) to approximately
• 25 minutes (for the 5 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communication
mission; a 45 percent decrease in coverage
• 15 minutes (for the 10 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communication
mission; a 67 percent decrease in coverage
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• 3 minutes (for the 45 degree off-nadir FOR) in the case of ISR mission; a 94
percent decrease in coverage





































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.1: HORIZON FOR Maximum Average Satellite Coverage From
































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.2: 5 Degree Above the HORIZON FOR Maximum Average


































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.3: 10 Degree Above the HORIZON FOR Maximum Average






























Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.4: 45 Degree Off-Nadir FOR Maximum Average Satellite Cov-






























Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.5: 30 Degree Off-Nadir FOR Maximum Average Satellite Cov-
erage From 100 NM (185 km) (minutes per day)
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E.2 500 km Altitude
For the case where the satellite is orbiting at an altitude of 500 km; when the
various communication, BFT, and ISR FOR constraints are imposed there are sub-
stantial decrease in optimized maximum average coverage times across all latitudes
with mid-latitude regions suffering more drastic fall in coverages than equatorial
and polar regions.
E.2.1 Effect of FOR Constraint on Equatorial and Polar Regions
On examining figures E.6, E.7, E.8, E.9 and E.10 below the loss of coverage
at equatorial and polar regions due to FOR constraints is apparent. The maximum
coverage durations decrease progressively from 180 minutes (for the horizon FOR)
to
• 140 minutes (for the 5 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communication
mission; a 33 percent decrease in coverage
• 110 minutes (for the 10 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communi-
cation mission; a 40 percent decrease in coverage
• 40 minutes (for the 45 degree off-nadir FOR) in the case of ISR mission; a 78
percent decrease in coverage
• 22 minutes (for the 30 degree off-nadir FOR) in the case of ISR mission; a 88
percent decrease in coverage
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E.2.2 Effect of FOR Constraint on Mid-Latitude Regions
On re-examining figures E.6, E.7, E.8, E.9 and E.10 below again the loss of
coverage across mid-latitude regions due to FOR constraints is clear. The maximum
coverage durations decrease progressively from 80 minutes (for the horizon FOR) to
approximately
• 60 minutes (for the 5 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communication
mission; a 25 percent decrease in coverage
• 45 minutes (for the 10 degree above horizon FOR) in the case of communication
mission; a 44 percent decrease in coverage
• 10 minutes (for the 45 degree off-nadir FOR) in the case of ISR mission; a 92
percent decrease in coverage
• 5 minutes (for the 30 degree off-nadir FOR) in the case of ISR mission; a 94




































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.6: HORIZON FOR Maximum Average Satellite Coverage From































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.7: 5 Degree Above the HORIZON FOR Maximum Average



































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.8: 10 Degree Above the HORIZON FOR Maximum Average






























Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.9: 45 Degree Off-Nadir FOR Maximum Average Satellite Cov-



































Line of Maximum Coverage
Figure E.10: 30 Degree Off-Nadir FOR Maximum Average Satellite Cov-
erage From 500 km (minutes per day)
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Appendix F
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Definitions and Stakeholders
The following table is adapted and improved upon from the original source[179].
The table summarizes some of the disparate definitions of Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) used by various stakeholders.




USN, retired, Office of
Force Transformation,
OSD
A new business model that includes (1) the defining of
a joint military demand function and (2) focus on pro-
viding joint military capabilities for our operational and
tactical level commanders. Finally, the model incen-
tives output rate and uses a co-evolutionary strategy of
concept-technology pairing, providing for iterative ad-
vancement in operational capabilities[19].




ORS will provide affordable capability to promptly, ac-
curately, and decisively position and operate national
and military assets in and through space and near space.
The ORS vision is to provide rapid, tailorable space






Assured space power that is focused at the operational
level of war[102].
Air University ....the ability to rapidly employ responsive space lift ve-
hicles and satellites; service, repair or recover on-orbit
satellite; and deliver space-based capabilities wherever
and whenever the war fighter requests them[4].
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Source Definition
GAO Report (1) Delivers low-cost, short term joint tactical capabil-
ities defined by field commanders (2) Complement and
augment national space capabilities, not replace them
(3) Serves as a testbed for the larger space program by
providing a clear path for science and technology invest-
ments...providing increased access to space for testing
critical research and development payloads.
2007 Defense Autho-
rization Bill
It is the policy of the United States to demonstrate,
acquire, and deploy an effective capability for opera-
tionally responsive space to support military users and
operations from space, which shall consist of (1) respon-
sive satellite payloads and buses built to common tech-
nical standards; (2) low-cost space launch vehicles and
supporting range operations facilitate the timely launch
and on-orbit operations of satellites; (3) responsive com-
mand and control capabilities; and (4) concepts of oper-
ations, tactics, techniques, and procedures that permit
the use of responsive space assets for combat and mili-
tary operations other than war[56].
USSTRATCOM ...Assured Space Power Focused on the Urgent Needs of
the JFCs.
AFSPC The ability to promptly, accurately, decisively deliver,
position, and operate national and military assets in and
through space....affordably
The table below summarizes the various organizations involved in the experi-
mentation and implementation of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) missions.
Table F.2: ORS Stakeholders[179]
Organization Role
Office of Force Transforma-
tion (OFT)
Author and prime mover of current ORS initia-
tive. Sponsor of TacSats 1-4
Naval Research Laboratory
(NRL)
Program Manager for TacSats 1 and 4
Air Force Research Labora-
tory (AFRL)
Program Manager for TacSats 2 and 3
DARPA Leading management of FALCON small launch
vehicle program
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Organization Role
USSTRATCOM Validates ORS Program Office requirements. Par-
ticipates in ORS Program Office acquisition deci-
sions
Executive Agent for Space
(Under Secretary of the Air
Force)
Acquisition authority for new ORS Program Of-
fice procurements
Air Launch LLC, Space
Exploration Technologies,
Corp (SpaceX)
Winners of DARPA FALCON SLV contracts
ORS Program Office Will run DOD ORS Program. Assumes program
management responsibilities previously by OFT
Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC)
(1)Requirements validation (if delegated by
USSTRATCOM) (2)TacSat military utility as-




Owners/operators of spacecraft potentially re-
quiring reconstitution
Joint Warfighting Space pro-
gram office
Established in 2005 within Detachment 12 of AF-
SPC’s Space and Missile Center
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